Research Topics

Publications

Abstract: Users are now typically able to access historical data in traffic, restaurant, and retailing contexts. This availability of information can be viewed as a means to reduce congestion. However, scientific support for this notion is weak. We investigate, using a laboratory experiment, whether an intermediate level of information provision might reduce congestion. We also study how the effect of making more information available changes over time. We show that providing all users with information is counterproductive in the short run. In the long run, users' behavior adjusts so that providing some or all individuals with information leads to more efficient outcomes than when no information is made available. Small Sample models capture a number of the patterns in the data, in particular the switching behavior between routes. The data show that making congestion information available to all parties reduces efficiency early on but is beneficial in the long run.

Abstract: Quantiles are used for decision making in investment analysis and in the mining, oil and gas industries. However, it is unknown how common quantile-based decision making actually is among typical individual decision makers. This paper describes an experiment that aims to (1) compare how common is decision making based on quantiles relative to expected utility maximization, and (2) estimate risk attitude parameters under the assumption of quantile preferences. The experiment has two parts. In the first part, individuals make pairwise choices between risky lotteries, and the competing models are fitted to the choice data. In the second part, we directly elicit a decision rule from a menu of alternatives. The results show that a quantile preference model outperforms expected utility for 30%-55%, of participants, depending on the metric. The majority of individuals are risk averse, and women are more risk averse than men, under both models.


Working Paper

Abstract: How discretionary gifts affect the informativeness of online reputation systems and market efficiency remains unclear, as theory provides limited insight. To address this issue, I conduct a laboratory experiment based on an infinitely repeated game in a market for an experience good with a reputation system, with two treatments differing in whether gifts are allowed. The results show that allowing gifts neither compromises the informativeness of the reputation system nor affects market efficiency or the distribution of surplus between buyers and sellers. Ratings remain predictive of product quality, even when gifts are present. At the same time, sellers persistently provide substantial and costly gifts, despite the fact that doing so reduces their payoffs. Further analysis suggests that gifting is a less cost-effective strategy for building reputation than improving product quality. The observed gifting behavior appears broadly consistent with strategic responses to market competition, though alternative interpretations remain possible.