"The G7 Business Cycle in a Globalized World" (with Kai Carstensen), 2017, Journal of International Money and Finance 73A, 134-161, see here
Abstract: Using a factor structural VAR for 14 countries out of the G20 group, we document that output innovations originating outside the G7 account for shares of 10 to almost 25 percent in the business cycle fluctuations of G7 GDP growth. Using auxiliary regressions, we additionally find that these innovations contribute noticeably, relative to G7 output innovations, to short-term fluctuations in important other national G7 variables such as employment, the current account balance, inflation, and inflation volatility, and in global macroeconomic indicators like the oil price, world stock market returns and exchange rate volatility. The results indicate that in a globalized world spillovers from emerging markets and industrial countries other than the G7 play a relevant role for major aspects of the G7 and world business cycle.
"Ifo Economic Forecast 2013/14: Favourable Perspectives for the German Economy" (with Kai Carstensen et al.), 2013, ifo Schnelldienst 66 (13),17-64
"The Impact of Uncertainty and Financial Shocks in Recessions and Booms", 2019, see working paper
Abstract: The literature has widely discussed the role of financial and uncertainty shocks for the macroeconomy. However, it has turned out to be difficult to isolate these shocks from financial market indicators and uncertainty proxies because any identifying restriction on their response profile requires strong assumptions. To obtain more robust results, I model financial and uncertainty shocks jointly in a state-dependent FAVAR setup for the U.S. and provide agnostic identification bounds on their effects. I document that (i) uncertainty shocks are of limited relevance for real activity and asset prices in boom periods but have contractionary effects in recessions. (ii) By comparison, adverse financial shocks are contractionary in both states of the economy. (iii) Identifying assumptions play a significant role in recessions, reflected by wide identification bounds on the macroeconomic effects. (iv) Financial shocks exhibit tighter bounds than uncertainty shocks considering the impact on asset prices, hence the impact can be determined more precisely.
"China's Economic Slowdown and International Inflation Dynamics", 2018, awarded by the INFER Research Prize 2018, see working paper
Abstract: I examine the impact of the Chinese economic slowdown that started after the Great Recession on global inflation dynamics. To this end, I fit a high-dimensional data set comprising macroeconomic indicators of 41 countries to a structural factor-augmented vector autoregressive model. My main findings are: (i) Business cycle shocks and especially demand shocks in China significantly spill over to inflation rates in the US, Europe, Asia, and Oceania and are transmitted by global oil, commodity, and steel prices. (ii) The decline in Chinese growth rates can be attributed to a combination of negative aggregate demand and supply shocks. (iii) Historical decompositions indicate that after 2014, these shocks lowered PPI inflation rates outside of China by up to 0.3 percentage points per quarter, resulting in a cumulative effect on the PPI of six percent. Hence, they markedly contributed to the decline in global inflation rates and hampered the recent upward trend. (iv) The Chinese influence is also reflected in interest rates outside of China by a reduction of yields at the current edge