"Public Protests, Coups and Elections: Evidence from Africa," available here.
Widespread domestic protests can trigger coups in autocratic regimes. Yet, it is less clear how protests affect the political consequences of a coup. While theories on democratic change suggest that protests impose a social threat inducing elites to foster institutional change, this article shows that this threat does not prevail beyond an irregular leadership overthrow. Providing evidence on the link between protests, coups and subsequent competitive elections in a sample of 45 African countries for the period 1991 to 2012, it is shown that an increase in pre-coup protest activities increases the likelihood of a successful overthrow, but has a negative e ect on the occurrence of subsequent elections. Our results thus suggest that public unrest opens a window of opportunity for elites to restore autocratic stability rather than promoting competitive elections. By isolating exogenous variation in protests through rainfall shocks, the article provides evidence that the found effects are causal.
"Armed Conflict Exposure and Trust: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Turkey," with Arzu Kibris, HiCNWorking Paper Series, No. 363, available here.
Widespread domestic protests can trigger coups in autocratic regimes. Yet, it is less clear how protests affect the political consequences of a coup. While theories on democratic change suggest that protests impose a social threat inducing elites to foster institutional change, this article shows that this threat does not prevail beyond an irregular leadership overthrow. Providing evidence on the link between protests, coups and subsequent competitive elections in a sample of 45 African countries for the period 1991 to 2012, it is shown that an increase in pre-coup protest activities increases the likelihood of a successful overthrow, but has a negative e ect on the occurrence of subsequent elections. Our results thus suggest that public unrest opens a window of opportunity for elites to restore autocratic stability rather than promoting competitive elections. By isolating exogenous variation in protests through rainfall shocks, the article provides evidence that the found effects are causal.
"Electoral Reforms, Distribution of Local Political Power and Public Goods: Historical Evidence from German Cities", with Tommy Krieger.
"Wealth Inequality and Persistence in Local Political Power: Evidence from Germany's First Democratic Transition", with Tommy Krieger.
"Inter-Generational Transmission of Value Systems: Evidence from Two German States", with Kim Leonie Kellermann.