"Public Protests, Coups and Democratization: Evidence from Africa," with Marcel Kossack and Lukas Möller-Sappelt. Revise and Resubmit at Journal of Comparative Economics.
Widespread domestic protests can trigger coups in autocratic regimes. Yet, it is less clear how protests affect the political consequences of a coup, despite the common promise of its leaders to hold elections and promote democratic reforms. This study provides evidence on the link between protests, coups and subsequent democratization in a sample of 47 African countries for the period 1990 to 2017. Applying a granular monthly time structure, the study shows that an increase in protest activities raises the probability of an irregular and permanent change in leadership in the same month. However, these protest-induced coup regimes are not associated with a higher likelihood of holding subsequent competitive elections. Rather, difference-in-differences estimations on institutional indicators show that protest-induced coups are robustly associated with a degradation of electoral institutions, media freedom, civil liberties and rule of law. The results thus suggest that public unrest opens a window of opportunity for elites to restore autocratic stability rather than promoting democratic rights. By isolating exogenous variation in protests through shocks in international grain prices, the article provides evidence that the found effects are causal.
"Institutional rules and their effect on the distribution of political power: Evidence from Germancities" (with Tommy Krieger)
"Economic elites and the provision of human-capital promoting public goods in industrializingregimes: Evidence from 19th century German" (with Tommy Krieger)
"Socialism and women in politics" (with Tommy Krieger)