No-confidence votes (NCVs) provide a sanctioning mechanism to hold democratically elected politicians accountable. However, national politicians can weaponize NCVs to target potential local rivals to deter future electoral challenge. This perverse form of accountability can undermine the quality of democratic competition, thus obviating the core goal of NCVs. Empirically, I evaluate this argument in the context of a developing democracy. During the 2016 presidential campaign in Benin, mayors who did not endorse the same presidential candidate as the MP from their district were two-thirds more likely to face an NCV. MPs who initiated NCVs against non-compliant mayors were more likely to win re-election. Finally, mayors who faced NCVs (even if not removed) were less likely to secure nomination. This evidence leverages administrative and electoral records and local audit reports to shed new light on an understudied dimension of democratic accountability.
This paper examines whether no-confidence votes (NCVs)---a core sanctioning mechanism in representative democracies---can improve governance even when they are politically distorted. While NCVs are intended to enhance accountability, in developing democracies they are strategically used at the local level by national elites to undermine challenging mayors, raising concerns about their effectiveness. Can such mechanisms still improve governance even distorted? Using data from the 2016–2017 wave of NCV motions against mayors in Benin, I implement a difference-in-differences design combining electoral records and administrative audit data. I find that exposure to NCV motions---regardless of their success---leads to significant improvements in budget execution (41\%), public goods provision (10\%), and internal revenue mobilization (31\%). These effects are short-lived and concentrated in domains under mayoral control. The findings suggest that NCVs operate as information shocks that raise the electoral costs of inaction, thereby strengthening incentives for improved governance.
Bureaucratic performance depends not only on individual incentives and ability but also on bureaucrats' beliefs about how others in the organization behave. We examine whether deliberation, an institutional process in which aggregate performance-relevant information about the organization as a whole rather than about individual officials is shared and discussed collectively, can improve performance. We conduct a randomized controlled trial with municipal administrations in Benin. Using administrative audit data from 2014 to 2019, we find that deliberation raises municipal performance by 8.7 percent of the control mean. The gains are broad-based: deliberation reduces financial irregularities, shifts procurement away from less competitive procedures, strengthens project implementation, and reallocates investment toward citizen-facing services rather than the administration's own overhead. Deliberation also changes the internal environment of the bureaucracy: bureaucrats come to perceive more corruption and weaker rule enforcement, and interpersonal trust declines. These results show that sharing aggregate information about organizational performance within the bureaucracy and deliberating on it collectively is a low-cost lever for improving performance, while revealing a tension in weakly institutionalized settings: performance gains may come at the cost of interpersonal trust and the relational arrangements that sustain it.
Delayed Disbursements of Fiscal Intergovernmental Grants as a Strategic Tool for Coalition Building. Under Review
This paper shows that when fiscal resources are constrained, central governments can manipulate not only how much they allocate, but when they allocate it. I argue that the timing of intergovernmental transfers constitutes a strategic instrument through which governments co-opt opposition-held municipalities and consolidate political power. Leveraging variation in local politicians’ endorsements during Benin’s 2016 presidential election, I implement a difference-in-differences design to estimate the relationship between political alignment and transfer delays. I find that opposition-held municipalities receive transfers with significantly shorter delays---by approximately two months---despite no differences in transfer amounts. Earlier disbursement improves local spending performance and is associated with substantial political realignment, reflected in increased vote shares for the incumbent president in subsequent elections. These findings challenge the conventional focus on resource allocation and instead highlight the timing of redistribution as a critical and underexplored dimension of political strategy in low-capacity states.
Structural transformation—the movement of firms and workers from low-productivity informal activities into higher-productivity formal sectors—remains limited across much of Sub-Saharan Africa despite sustained growth. This project examines whether weak state capacity constrains transformation not only through low revenues, but through unpredictable and discretionary taxation that discourages firm formalization and investment. Focusing on Nigeria, Francis Meda and Mike Omilusi leverages the country’s newly introduced tax reforms to evaluate whether implementing existing provisions in a predictable, rule-based manner—without introducing new taxes or legal changes—can expand the tax base, strengthen fiscal capacity, and promote productivity-enhancing reallocation. We implement a randomized controlled trial across Local Government Areas, targeting semi-urban towns where informal SMEs are concentrated. The intervention standardizes SME tax assessment and links incremental revenues to visible public investment. Outcomes include firm formalization, public revenues, investment, and sectoral reallocation. The project provides policy-relevant evidence on how predictable implementation of tax reforms can support inclusive structural transformation in low-capacity settings.
How do citizens evaluate electoral integrity? Existing research emphasizes electoral management bodies but largely overlooks the courts that adjudicate electoral disputes. We develop a Theory of Multi-layered Electoral Governance, arguing that citizens evaluate elections through confidence in complementary constitutional institutions responsible for administering and adjudicating elections. Using harmonized Afrobarometer surveys from 25 African democracies (147,921 respondents), We show that Trust in Courts independently increases Perceived Electoral Integrity beyond confidence in electoral management bodies. This relationship is strongest when confidence in election administration and democratic performance is low and cannot be explained by generalized political trust. These findings broaden theories of electoral integrity, identify judicial assurance as a distinct mechanism of democratic legitimacy, and reposition courts as central institutions shaping citizens' evaluations of democratic elections.
Merit-based recruitment through competitive examinations is widely used to enhance state capacity. While such reforms are designed to reduce patronage and improve bureaucratic performance, their effectiveness may depend on the nature of the administrative tasks performed. I argue that merit-based selection strengthens state capacity primarily when used to recruit bureaucrats for positions requiring specialized expertise, rather than general or procedural knowledge. To test this argument, I leverage a recent civil service reform in Benin that introduced nationwide competitive exams and randomized bureaucratic appointments across 77 local administrations. The reform covers both specialized (planning, infrastructure, accounting) and general (coordination, secretarial) offices, enabling systematic comparison across tasks with different skill requirements. Using municipal audit, finance data, and performance measures from 2015–2024, I estimate the reform’s effects on bureaucratic performance, resource mobilization, and public goods provision. Data collection is ongoing in collaboration with Benin’s National Commission for Local Finance (CoNaFiL).
In many developing democracies, decades of electoral competition have not translated into improved governance or public goods provision. Politicians often underinvest available resources, even when such spending could enhance welfare and bolster their electoral standing. This project investigates why local governments in emerging democracies fail to invest in public goods despite the availability of resources to do so. I argue that uncertainty about voter preferences and policy outcomes generates a political tradeoff: while higher spending can enhance legitimacy, it also increases the risk of being punished for unproductive or unpopular investments. Consequently, politicians tend to underspend as a risk-avoidance strategy. To address this “spending puzzle,” I propose an intervention that reduces the information gap between citizens and politicians by creating shared knowledge of local priorities and fiscal realities. The intervention includes municipal-level socio-economic dashboards and deliberative community meetings where citizens and local politicians jointly identify spending priorities and discuss resource constraints. A randomized controlled trial (RCT) in Benin tests whether this intervention increases public spending, improves policy alignment, and enhances accountability.
Career choices are critical to understanding variations in labor-market outcomes. This paper investigates how early career choices vary with political connections in developing countries. We contend that labor-market outcomes depend on individual qualifications and ability for jobs available in an economy; however, political connections can substitute these determinants. Connections reduce costs associated with job search and improve job prospects for connected individuals. Anticipating this, individuals with such connections, we argue, choose careers that political connections can guarantee, which most likely are public-sector jobs. We test this argument by leveraging career choice data from pre-career individuals in Benin. Our empirical analysis yields two main results. First, politically connected individuals are likelier to choose top-tier careers in the public sector and less inclined to start a business. Second, connected individuals tend to drop less out of school and aspire to higher education. Our IV estimations suggest that these results are causal. Overall, the findings suggest that labor-market policies that substitute the insurance effects of connections can increase entrepreneurship through the spillover effects on education outcomes.
In sub-Saharan Africa, secondary school completion rates remain low, especially for girls. The gender gap persists even in countries where secondary education is free. This is not driven by parents’ lack of interest in investing in their daughter’s future: many of them pay for costly apprenticeships with, e.g., hairdressers, beauticians, and fashion designers. Anecdotal evidence suggests that parents expect higher returns from apprenticeships than from formal education, in terms of future employability. This creates a stark tradeoff, where girls miss out on acquiring formal human capital to acquire experience, contributing to the persistent gender gap in labor earnings. This project proposes to reduce this tradeoff by integrating vocational training into formal education in Benin. Specifically, we select five junior-secondary schools in two municipalities in northern Benin, where girls in grade 7th (first year of middle school in Benin) will attend, in addition to formal education, 1-2 hours per week on practical aspects of two vocational training, including fashion designer and hairdressers, for three months between February and April, 2026. We partner with ESPOIR POUR TOUS, an NGO that aims to improve girl education in Benin, and the Benin Ministry of Secondary Education and Vocational Training. The goal is to increase girls’ school participation and achievements while maintaining their ability to transition into the labor market.
In this project, we focus on gender imbalances in STEM fields, where the gap between girls and boys widens each year, limiting girls’ participation in computing and technology—key drivers of innovation and economic growth. The study will (1) introduce gender-responsive pedagogy (GRP) in STEM courses to reduce barriers and create an inclusive, stereotype-free learning environment and (2) organize weekly office hours for STEM courses to encourage girls’ participation and commitment to technology and computing sectors. We define GRP as a set of practices implemented through targeted teacher training sessions and ongoing pedagogical support to help STEM educators identify and mitigate gender-based disparities in their classrooms. As part of the intervention, Grade-8 girls will attend regularly scheduled Mathematics and Physics-Chemistry (MPC) classes with trained teachers in Benin. Additionally, girls in selected schools will participate in 20–30-minute weekly office hours (OH), during which high-achieving young women in MPC, serving as role models, will address clarification questions about class materials and homework assignments. We posit that the OH sessions will demystify STEM subjects, enhance understanding, and increase girls’ confidence in these disciplines. Together, the components of this intervention aim to reduce dropout rates, increase school completion, and help girls develop the critical-thinking skills essential to thrive in STEM fields. Our study aligns with global efforts to innovate teaching practices that respond to growing classroom heterogeneity and support success in STEM disciplines. While we are partnering with ESPOIR POUR TOUS and the Ministry of Secondary Education and Vocational Training in Benin, this project is pending IRB approval, with fieldwork expected to begin in 2026.