How can political institutions improve governance and economic development when political incentives distort their intended functioning? Democratic institutions are designed to promote accountability, responsiveness, and effective governance. Yet political actors can strategically repurpose these same institutions to advance political objectives, undermining the outcomes they were designed to achieve. My research examines how institutional design and reform can mitigate these distortions and strengthen democratic accountability, state capacity, public goods provision, and inclusive development. I combine field experiments and quasi-experimental methods with administrative and survey data to identify practical institutional innovations that improve governance in low-capacity settings.
I am a political scientist specializing in comparative politics, political economy, and development, with a regional focus on Africa. I earned my Ph.D. in Political Science and Quantitative Methods from Emory University. Before beginning my doctoral studies, I earned a Master's in mathematics, Economics, and Statistics from the African School of Economics and served as Associate Director of Research at the Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IERPE) in Benin. My research combines rigorous empirical methods with sustained partnerships with governments, policymakers, and research organizations to study institutional reforms and their consequences for governance and development.
My research is forthcoming in the Journal of Political Institutions and Political Economy and has been supported by the J-PAL Governance Initiative, the Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Large Research Grant, the J-PAL Learning for All Initiative, and Prudentis Funds.
Contact Information
Email: lazare.kovo@emory.edu
Phone: (404) 229 - 8541