Research
Research
Publications
The Politics of State Rainy Day Fund Investment
(Legislative Studies Quarterly)
Abstract: When do states save for natural disasters and economic downturns? How do partisan competition and majority party agenda control influence these decisions? I develop a two stage bargaining model of state rainy day fund (RDF) investment. In the first stage, a legislator from the majority party proposes an allocation of the budget between an RDF, particularistic good, and public good. Before the second stage, there is an election and an economic crisis may occur. If a crisis occurs, the legislature can access an existing RDF to fund relief. The model predicts that supermajorities and other similar requirements to create larger winning coalitions incentivize RDF investment. Further, legislators face a trade off between funding public goods and saving. A greater preference for public goods simultaneously increases the demand for saving and spending on first stage public goods-- decreasing the legislature's ability to invest in the RDF. Partisanship further complicates a legislature's willingness to save. A majority party is more likely to save as its reelection chances increases.
Working Papers
(Under Review)
Abstract: A persistent debate in American politics pits federal control over social programs against local discretion. Critics of discretion argue localities exploit it to exclude certain constituents. This paper examines these frictions through a model in which local actors and an executive bargain over taxation and distributional authority over benefits. I find local actors accept higher levels of taxation in exchange for autonomy, generating larger welfare programs. This reduces aggregate inequality even when some localities use this distributional authority to exclude the poor because the gains from higher taxation dominate within-locality distributional harms. As such, local actors and executives who favor the poor prefer delegation. Using state-level variation in devolution under the PRWORA, I find that liberal state governments are more likely to delegate and delegating states provide larger benefits, supporting the model's predictions that executives and legislatures favoring the poor will prefer discretion and that discretion results in larger benefits.
Dynamic Delegation (with Michael Ting and David Simpson)
Abstract: This paper develops a model of delegation over time in a separation of powers system. As in standard delegation models, a legislative majority chooses both a statute and a delegation level for an executive to implement, where delegation can exploit agency knowledge but also introduces policy bias. The legislature must also worry about future executive and legislative players, who may introduce new legislation. The key feature of the model is the presidential veto, which can protect status quo statutes from new legislation. The model predicts that under unified government, the legislature will under-delegate because it expects the future political environment to be less favorable. Under divided government, it over-delegates in order to take advantage of the possibility of having future control of the executive and its veto power. Thus, divided government may account for the substantial accumulation of presidential powers in recent decades.
Revealing through Redistribution: Eligibility, Stigma, and Strategic Underfunding
Abstract: Redistribution in the United States increasingly relies on private actors. However, when private actors stigmatize beneficiaries of redistribution, these programs can fail to reach their intended targets. How does this dynamic shape the design and funding of redistributive programs? This paper develops a formal model of housing vouchers in which a housing authority designs voucher eligibility rules anticipating that voucher status signals a renter’s riskiness to landlords who can then accept or reject applicants. A politician determines program funding. The model yields two results. First, the housing authority under-provides vouchers to those who benefit the most. Expanding eligibility to higher-need renters signals riskiness to landlords, resulting in a housing authority pursuing more restrictive eligibility than is socially optimal. Second, a politician whose constituents are ineligible for vouchers may strategically maintain welfare programs at low levels of funding, shielding their constituents from rejection by the landlord. Together, these results offer a theory of the under-provision of redistributive benefits in which private-sector screening creates incentives for under-targeting and strategic defunding.
Works in Progress
Source of Income Discrimination and Political Participation
The Politics of Alarm (with Jenn Kim)