Researcher at ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim

External PhD Candidate at Kassel University, supervised by Prof. Dr. Martin Kesternich

Research Interests: Behavioral Economics | Environmental Economics | Lab and Field Experiments | Development Economics

I am a PhD Researcher at the ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, working in the research unit Environmental and Climate Economics in the research area Cooperative Behavior for Sustainabilty.

I hold a B.Sc. in Economics from Heidelberg University and a M.Sc. in Economics from Marburg University and am currently enrolled as external PhD student at Kassel University.

My research interests lie at the intersection of environmental and behavioral economics, as well as development economics. My research toolbox comprises field and online framed-field experiments, and more recently, also lab experiments. I combine these methodologies with survey data and observational geographical data to gain a comprehensive understanding of the complex dynamics influencing individual behaviors within the realm of environmental economics.

Contact Information

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, L 7, 1

68161 Mannheim, Germany 


Email: bartels@zew.de

Phone:  

+49 (0)621 1235-219

PUBLICATIONS

This study explores the individual willingness to pay (WTP) for carbon removal through afforestation as a complementary climate change mitigation strategy. Using a framed-field experiment, we assess the impact of local co-benefits and geographic location on WTP. We find that participants strongly favor voluntary climate change mitigation through forestry-based removal. Emphasizing co-benefits doesn't significantly alter WTP in our municipal tree-planting project. A follow-up survey indicates a high awareness of co-benefits, suggesting that unobserved priors may influence WTP results. Trust levels are higher for forestry-based removal than for established market-based carbon avoidance, suggesting preferences for understandable mitigation measures with tangible co-benefits. 

Laboratory experiments in social sciences are a powerful tool with which to study causal mechanisms in human interactions. Over the past several years, experimental games have been applied increasingly in transdisciplinary research in natural resource management with a strong purpose to develop capacity to promote learning and behavioral change. Yet, few studies have evaluated the potential of different experimental game designs to promote collective action outside of experiments. In a framed field experiment on water management in rural India, we compared within-game behavior and collective action outside the game between individuals who received individual payments and those who did not. Our results show little evidence for different behavior in the game. However, we find some evidence that our experimental game induced real-world changes compared to a control group without game intervention and that this change is slightly more likely to occur when individual payments are used. 

As resource users interact and impose externalities on each other, institutions are needed to coordinate resource use, create trust, and provide incentives for sustainable management. However, in the absence of such collective action, what strategies can be employed to foster it? We contribute to the understanding of how experiential learning through games can influence behavioral change, potentially leading to more sustainable commons management. We present a conceptual framework describing the most important processes involved in experiential learning games. Subsequently, we apply the conceptual framework to examine design features that were particularly influential in driving behaviors related to commons management in three intervention cases from India, focusing on groundwater, surface water, and forests. Our conceptual reflections underscore the need to debate underlying assumptions when using games as intervention tools. We conclude by emphasizing future research needs, both from the conceptual perspective of behavioral change and the design of games.

DISCUSSION PAPERS

Inspired by literature on behavioral responses to public policies, we conduct an incentivized framed field experiment to untangle the impact of price and non-price effects in an energy-efficiency subsidy, and explore the extent to which the non-price effect is driven by changes in beliefs, perceptions of social norms, as well as spill-over effects. Typically, the optimal subsidy level is gauged through price elasticities derived from market changes. Yet, non-price effects can alter the demand response to a public policy, potentially affecting subsidy effectiveness. We indeed observe a 3% demand increase with price decreases and a notable 9% increase with equivalent subsidies and find suggestive evidence that this non-price effect is explained by a crowding in of intrinsic motivation.

It's well established that social norms shape behavior across various contexts and groups. But can cities leverage their climate actions through the social norm channel to encourage individuals to also engage in climate action?  Economic theory raises doubts about this approach. Funded by taxpayers' money, city climate contributions might be seen as substitutes, possibly reducing private contributions to the same cause. Drawing from research on the positive effects of social norms, leadership, and legal expressions, we question this assumption and conduct an incentivized framed-field experiment to investigate whether informing individuals about the city's previous contributions affects their private contributions to the same cause.

Drawing from the idea that highlighting co-benefits can boost mitigation efforts, we conduct a framed-field experiment to assess the revealed Willingness to Pay (WTP) for carbon dioxide removal (CDR) via afforestation. We examine whether (i) making the co-benefits of afforestation salient affects individuals' WTP, and (ii) whether the perceived value of local co-benefits depends on participants' proximity to the afforestation project. We do not find that emphasizing co-benefits significantly alter WTP, and find weak evidence of a distance-decay effect. A follow-up survey highlights widespread awareness of co-benefits, suggesting that undisclosed prior beliefs affect WTP outcomes. It also indicates that German citizens favor voluntary climate change mitigation through forestry-based CDR with tangible co-benefits over complex market-based carbon avoidance strategies.

Using economic games as a learning intervention in 56 Indian communities showed that involving more women led to greater success in sustainable water management two years after the intervention. Participation of female leaders indirectly influence management improvements, as their presence increased women’s participation in the games. These findings underscore the significance of involving women in game-based learning for sustainable resource management.

SELECTED WORK IN PROGRESS