2020. “The Emotional Dimension to Sensory Perception,” in The Epistemology of Non-Visual Perception. Ed. by Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Electra   

           Gatzia. New York: Oxford University Press, 236-255.

Abstract: Our emotional states affect how we perceive the world. I perceive the world differently depending on how I’m feeling. Although this might at first seem to be a trivial observation, it certainly is not. We take for granted that our perceptual experiences give rise to justified beliefs and knowledge. If emotions — which are not fixed and in large part uncontrolled — affect our ability to accurately perceive the world, then they may undermine the justified beliefs and knowledge gained on the basis of our perceptual experience of the world. My goal here is to explore this potential problem. 

2019. “The Embodied Mind and Anorexia Nervosa," in The Bloomsbury Companion to Philosophy of Psychiatry. Ed. by Serife Tekin & Robyn Bluhm. 

          London: Bloomsbury Academic, 113-129.

Abstract:  In explaining the mind, we must consider not only brain states, but also wider bodily processes. What those wider bodily processes are and how they constitute certain mental states, are the key questions that we now face as philosophers of mind. Perhaps it is time to make a similar shift in psychiatry. There are certain disorders, such as anorexia nervosa, that have proven quite problematic to treat. Perhaps the reason for our lack of success stems from the starting assumptions we’ve used to guide our understanding and treatments. I propose here that we consider anorexia nervosa from an embodied mind approach. 

2017. “The Missing Pieces in the Scientific Study of Bodily Awareness.” Philosophical Psychology 30 (1504), 1-23.

Abstract: There are two ways in which we can be aware of our body: via observational awareness and via non-observational awareness. The research to date has focused on the former and has left the latter in the dark. This is detrimental to ever formulating a complete account of how we are aware of our body. It is understandable, however, because of the inherent problem in studying non-observational bodily awareness: how would you instruct a subject to report on their unattended awareness of the body? In view to resolving this problem, I propose here a working hypothesis on the basis of research on interoception and the rubber hand illusion, and on the effect of meditation on awareness and attention. 

2017. “The Subjectivity of Experiential Consciousness: It’s Real and It’s Bodily.” Mind & Matter 15 (1), 91-109.

Abstract: Experiential consciousness is characterized by a subjectivity. There is something it is like to be a subject of experience — a first-personal perspective, a what-it-is-like-for-me. In this paper I defend two proposals. First, I contend that to understand the subjectivity of consciousness we must turn to the subject: we are embodied subjects of experience. Thus, I argue, the subjectivity of experiential consciousness should be understood as a bodily subjectivity — an embodied first-personal perspective. Second, if we take this embodied approach, I propose that we can finally begin to explain the structure of experiential consciousness as subjective by looking at certain bodily processes — in particular interoception. 

2017. “William James and the Embodied Mind." Contemporary Pragmatism 14 (1), 51-75.

Abstract: The hard problem of consciousness lies in explaining what constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness. I argue that significant headway can be made on the problem from an embodied mind view, and particularly if we turn to William James’ theory of emotions. The challenge is one of explaining how bodily subjectivity arises from biological processes. I argue that the solution to this problem lies in our sense of interoception, and James’ theory which suggests emotional feelings are the cascade of changing bodily states. Through James’ account, I show how the biological body can give rise to a bodily subjectivity in experiential consciousness, and thus move towards a solution of the hard problem.

2015. “Insight: What is it, Exactly? A Commentary on Ursula Voss and Allen Hobson." In Metzinger & Windt (eds) Open MIND: Philosophy & the Mind 

          Sciences in the 21st Century  MIT Press: Camrbidge, 1629-1641.

Abstract: In “What is the state-of-the-art on lucid dreaming? Recent advances and questions for future research”, Ursula Voss and Allan Hobson provide a detailed view of the features characterizing lucid dreaming and put forward four innovative hypotheses to explain why and how lucid dreaming occurs, as well as how lucid dream states are related to other states of consciousness. I argue that there remains much conceptual work to be done. In this commentary I tease out three aspects of Voss and Hobson’s view that would greatly benefit from philosophical consideration. 

Interoception in Perception & Cognition (book manuscript)

“Why Ecological Perception Needs to be Embodied” with Tyler Duffrin (MA student in Psychology)

Summary: Ecological perception sees perception as a relation between a perceiver and its environment, mediated by the affordances that the environment presents to the perceiver. Successful perception relies on this. We argue, however, that the invitational qualities of affordances, their affective or motivational qualities, cannot be explained entirely by appeal to the information given to the perceiver by the environment. Rather, we must also consider information that the perceiver brings to the perceptual moment by virtue of being embodied. 

“Interoception's Role in Multisensory Intergration — Novel Features of Embodiment”

Summary: Discussions of multisensory integration in perception have focused on explaining how our exteroceptive senses (vision, touch, olfaction, gustation, olfaction) come together to form the complex perceptual experiences we have. These discussions, however, leave out what the body brings to the story. Here I show why it is essential that interoception be considered in these discussions, and argue that interoception generates novel features in our perceptual experience, what I call the 'tone of embodiment' and 'meaningful contextualization'.