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Regional Government Consumption and Investment Multipliers (Job Market Paper)
Within a monetary and fiscal union, government consumption stimulates regional incomes by more than government investment. This is due to the larger intertemporal substitutability of investment relative to consumption. Empirically, I propose a methodology of categorizing contract-level data of U.S. federal military procurement into regional government consumption and investment across U.S. Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), and run panel IV regressions using a shift-share design. To rationalize my results, I construct a DSGE model of a two-region monetary union with consumption- and investment-goods sectors.
JEL Codes: E32, E62, H30, H57.
Media Mentions: Chosun Biz (Korean, English), Aju News (Korean)
Market Rents and CPI Shelter Inflation (with Laurence Ball) (NBER Working Paper 31413) (NBER Digest, October 2025)
Recent research finds that the shelter component of CPI inflation responds with a lag to movements in market rents - the rents that tenants pay when they move into a new dwelling. This paper seeks to improve our understanding of this fact. We start by identifying three sources of lags between market rents and CPI shelter: the rents of most tenants are set in long-term leases; rents are smoothed for continuing tenants who renew leases; and CPI shelter inflation is measured with rent changes over six months. We incorporate these lags in a model of shelter inflation and compare the model to monthly data since 2015, using the Zillow Observed Rent Index to measure market rents. We find that the model performs fairly well, suggesting that it may be useful for understanding and forecasting inflation.
JEL Codes: E31, R21.
Media Mentions: Hankyung Newspaper (Korean), Forbes (English)
Does government spending raise prices? Standard demand-side models predict an inflationary effect, yet empirical evidence often finds muted or negative price responses-the fiscal price puzzle. We argue that part of this puzzle reflects a mismatch in the level of aggregation. Using U.S. metropolitan statistical area (MSA)-level military procurement data from 1989:Q1 to 2023:Q4 and a shift-share IV strategy, we show that fiscal expansions raise prices in more exposed regions, while responses are negative when common time-series variation is retained. These findings reflect relative regional and common aggregate components rather than conflicting estimates of the same effect. A standard two-region New Keynesian monetary-union framework reproduces this pattern through common aggregate adjustment, without requiring favorable supply effects from government spending. Thus, the fiscal price puzzle can arise even when local fiscal transmission operates through a conventional demand channel. More broadly, our decomposition applies to exposure-based designs in which common aggregate shocks interact with heterogeneous local exposure, clarifying why estimates based on different sources of variation need not recover the same economic object.
JEL Codes: E31, E52, E58, E62, F33, F45.
Seeing the Economy with Colored Glasses: Partisanship in Macro and (not in) Micro Expectations (with Adrian Monninger and Tao Wang) (Bank of Canada Staff Working Paper 2026-24)
Political views affect households' macroeconomic expectations, but personal economic circumstances and self-interested motives remain the dominant factors shaping their beliefs. Using an expanded dataset covering 11 U.S. Presidential elections from 1980 to 2020, we show that households' personal finance expectations exhibit significantly less partisan bias than their macroeconomic expectations, as households are more directly informed about their own situations. By linking microeconomic beliefs to corresponding macroeconomic expectations, we differentiate between partisan bias, political sentiment, and differences in belief extrapolation. An empirically estimated factor model quantifies the time-varying importance of partisanship and microeconomic disparity in driving polarized views of the macroeconomy. Finally, we show that households "cheerlead" for policies to be beneficial to the broader economy often not because such policies are enacted by their favored winning party, but because they expect to personally gain from them.
JEL Codes: E21, E71.
I propose an estimation method, the panel Kalman filter, to estimate the slope of the regional Phillips curve (RPC) given unbalanced panel data of regional unemployment and inflation in a monetary union. I demonstrate, through Monte Carlo simulations, that estimates of the RPC slope through the panel Kalman filter are less biased and more consistent than estimates from fixed effects panel data methods. I compare these estimation methods on U.S. city-level data.
JEL Codes: C32, E30.
Works in Progress
Works in Progress
Pooling across the Pond: Aggregating Economics PhD Job Postings across JOE and EJM
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