My current research focuses on the management of (mostly common pool) renewable natural resources, and lies at the intersection of biology, ecology, and economics. In broad terms, I investigate how environmental variability, trade, and the quality of institutions affect fisheries management (e.g., harvest incentives, incentives for cooperation, performance of RFMOs, etc.) and pollution control.
Natural resources such as fish, and wildlife have the ability to move across different areas within an ecosystem. Such movements are subject to random changes in environmental conditions (e.g., nutrients, temperature, oxygen). Although empirical evidence suggests that learning about such movements helps improve management, the related economic literature concentrates on scenarios in which the resource population lives in a closed area and cannot migrate. In this paper, we develop a spatial bioeconomic model to examine a renewable resource harvester's responses to learning about fish movements. Our baseline is the scenario in which the harvester is fully informed about the distribution of fish movements. We find that introducing uncertainty and learning about fish movements critically affects extraction incentives. For instance, we show that uncertainty and learning may increase harvest in a patch and reduce harvest in another patch when the marginal harvesting cost function is constant. In the stock dependent marginal harvesting cost case, we delineate conditions under which uncertainty and learning increase harvest in all patches. We also show how harvest responses to learning change with the distribution of uncertainty.
Scientific evidence reveals that renewable resource stock dynamics are subject to uncertainty due to changes in environmental conditions. Despite its critical impacts on management, little is known about the effects of such uncertainty on the formation of regional fisheries management organizations (RFMOs). In this paper, we design a dynamic stock recruitment framework to examine this issue in a common pool setting. We find that stock growth uncertainty critically affects equilibrium behaviors under both open loop membership and dynamic membership. For instance, we delineate conditions under which uncertainty induces full non-cooperation in equilibrium. Strategic behaviors may also shift equilibrium outcomes from full non-cooperation under deterministic conditions to full cooperation under uncertainty when countries anticipate a small environmental variability. Moreover, strategic interactions to extract the resource stock may lead to higher individual payoffs under uncertainty. We also outline the differences in equilibrium responses of membership, harvest, and payoff to mean preserving spreads under both open loop membership and dynamic membership.
We empirically investigate the relationship between the return on collateral and monetary policy implementation in a channel system. Recent developments in monetary theory suggest that the return on government assets which measures the opportunity cost of holding collateral should have negative impacts on the interest-rate spread and the interbank market rate. The central bank should set a higher spread when the return on collateral is below a cutoff but implements a lower spread when the return on collateral is higher than the cutoff. The interbank market rate tends to lie above the policy target rate when the return on collateral is low and vice versa. We use data from Eurozone area and six industrialized countries to test these theoretical implications. We propose two econometric models: one is more structural and closely related to the monetary model to test the negative relationships, and the other is based on the threshold autoregression model to detect the potential cutoffs. Our findings provide conditional support for the negative impact of return on collateral.