Why and when politicians align with wealthy elites rather than relying on broad public support. Politicians face a strategic choice: pursue self-reliant electoral strategies or form patronage alliances with influential elites who provide campaign resources, media support, and endorsements in exchange for state benefits. The model of this paper shows that elite influence and expected payback determine politicians’ strategies. When elite influence is limited, incumbents avoid costly patronage. When it is high, politicians with low public support rely on elite backing, while those with strong support remain independent. In a dynamic setting, however, even strong incumbents turn to patronage to secure long-term power. If many voters are uninformed, patronage becomes even more attractive. These insights help explain patterns observed in the regimes of Yeltsin and Putin (Russia), Erdogan (Türkiye), and Orbán (Hungary), where elite alliances have been central to maintaining power.
Opposition factions in electoral autocracies face strategic choices about whether to mobilise against the incumbent and how to coordinate their efforts. They must balance the collective benefits of cooperation with the individual incentives to defect in pursuit of power after the regime’s fall. This tension shapes the effectiveness of opposition movements and their ability to challenge entrenched rulers. The model predicts two broad outcomes: either fragmented opposition with limited coordination, or unified mobilisation sustained through cooperative strategies. Repression emerges as a key factor: while it discourages mobilisation at the outset, it can also strengthen incentives for cooperation among those factions that do become active. From the incumbent’s perspective, moderate repression may offer the greatest chance of survival, as excessive repression can unintentionally unify the opposition. This dynamic resonates with the behaviour of contemporary dictators, who rely on subtle manipulation rather than overt violence to maintain power.
This paper examines Political Budget Cycles in federal systems, focusing on how a central incumbent allocates discretionary transfers across states in response to electoral incentives. We develop a theoretical model predicting that average discretionary transfers increase during federal election periods. While swing states consistently receive higher transfers due to their electoral competitiveness, the election-period increase is larger for non-swing states. This occurs because non-swing states are targeted primarily during federal elections: allocating transfers to them in state elections is not advantageous for the federal incumbent, as it has little effect on the probability of winning those state elections. To test these predictions, we compile a panel dataset of Indian states from 2006 to 2022. Using fixed effects specifications, we find evidence consistent with the theoretical model: discretionary transfers are significantly higher in federal election periods, swing states receive more discretionary transfers in non-election periods, and the election-period increase in discretionary transfers is more pronounced for non-swing states.