Research

[1] "External Cost of Leverage Adjustment: Evidence from Defined Benefit Pension Plans" with Tae-Nyun Kim,  Journal of Economics and Business (ABDC: B) 96 (March/April 2018), 1-14

[2] "Corporate Social Performance of Family Firms: A place-based perspective in the context of layoff"  with Zulquer Ali Haider, Zhenyu Wu and Junsheng Dou,  Journal of Business Ethics (ABDC: A, FT50 Journal), 167, 2020,  235-252

[3] "The Impact of Investor Sentiment on Dividend Catering Incentives Around the World" with Jinho Byun, Rose Liao and Carrie Pan,  Journal of International Financial Market, Institutions and Money (ABDC: A), 71, March 2021 

[4] "CEO Career Concerns and ESG Investments" with Tae-Nyun Kim,  Finance Research Letters (ABDC: A), 55, July, 2023 

[1] "Institutional Investors' Heterogeneity and Layoff Decisions" with Hanqing (Chevy) Fang, Pyung Kyung Kang, Zhenyu Wu, and Gady Jacoby   

Abstract: This paper examines whether institutional investors heterogeneity affect corporate employee layoff decisions. More specifically, we find empirical evidence that employee layoffs will be less likely for firms with more long-term institutional investors as opposed to firms with more short- term institutional investors. The ownership by local institutional investors is more negatively related to the likelihood of employee layoffs than ownership by distant institutional investors. We show that firms with high long-term institutional investors and local institutional investors enhance financial performance after layoffs.

[2] "The Influence of Ownership Structure on REITs’ Financing Decisions" with Yiqin Chen , and Li Ma

Abstract: This paper examines how ownership structure shapes Real Estate Investment Trusts’ (REITs) financing and investment decisions following natural disasters. We provide evidence supporting the monitoring role of institutional investors by showing that REITs with higher institutional ownership are more likely to reduce leverage after disaster events. To explore investor heterogeneity, we distinguish between long-term and short-term institutional ownership. Our findings indicate that REITs with greater long-term institutional ownership significantly decrease leverage in the post-disaster period, whereas no comparable effect is observed for short-term institutional ownership. These results are consistent with the view that long-term institutional investors exert stronger monitoring over managerial decisions. We further document that REITs with higher long-term institutional ownership are particularly likely to reduce long-term debt, suggesting an active adjustment of capital structure in response to exogenous shocks. Beyond financing decisions, these REITs also adopt more proactive asset management strategies: they are more likely to acquire properties in disaster-affected areas and less likely to divest existing assets. In contrast, REITs with higher insider ownership tend to retain existing properties rather than pursue acquisitions or asset sales. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of ownership structure in shaping REITs’ financial and operational responses to natural disasters.