Buyer-Initiated Auctions: Nominations in Oil & Gas | [pdf], [IIOC 2026 Slides]
Auctions receiving zero bids are not uncommon when sellers face uncertain demand over large inventory. While standard mechanisms like reserve prices or entry fees help extract revenue from interested bidders, they fail to solve the extensive margin problem of which items to offer, leading to costly failed auctions. Pre-auction nomination, where potential buyers pay a small fee to propose what should be auctioned, is a popular solution in the mineral rights market, but is not well studied. This paper shows that nomination serves dual purposes: demand screening for sellers and quality screening for buyers, while creating incentives for bidders to free-ride on tracts others have identified as valuable instead of exploring and nominating themselves. Using a two-stage game with Poisson arrivals, I characterize equilibrium exploration and nomination decisions and structurally estimate exploration costs using data from North Dakota oil and gas auctions (2017--2018). Counterfactual analysis reveals that raising the nomination threshold beyond the current single-nomination level produces a coordination failure: no firms nominate and no auctions are triggered. Varying the nomination fee reveals higher fees increase conditional bid quality through a selection effect while leaving auction trigger rates nearly unchanged. Comparing a nomination fee with a reserve price, both screen bidder quality but at different stages but with different outcomes: reserve price generates higher auction trigger rate but lower expected profit per triggered auction.