Working papers
Keyu Wu
Distinguished CESifo Affiliate Award
Most decisions are made based on perceived information about available options, yet the same information is often perceived or evaluated differently depending on the prevailing context. Moreover, seemingly identical contextual information, such as previously seen products or job applicants, can exert opposing influences on people’s perceptions and evaluations of the same “target” product or job applicant. Inspired by insights from neuroscience and psychophysics, I propose that these opposing influences may arise because contextual information can play multiple roles in perception formation, with the dominant role depending on perceived distinguishability between the contextual information and the target. The framework yields a novel set of comparative-static predictions for how contextual influences can be changed by manipulating various properties of the contextual information and the target, such as the perceived uncertainty in their values and the perceived value discrepancy between them. In an experiment involving risky investment decisions, I show that investments in the same risky project respond to contextual information in ways consistent with the framework’s three comparative-static predictions. The framework offers a potentially parsimonious account of many seemingly contradictory contextual influences and generates testable implications for a wide range of decision domains, including product perceptions, job applicant evaluations, wage satisfaction, and social judgments.
Ernst Fehr and Keyu Wu
Revise & Resubmit (second round), American Economic Review
In many markets, firms increase product complexity through add-on features, which can make the evaluation and comparison of products difficult and thus increase buyers’ search cost. Does this product obfuscation limit buyers’ search behavior and induce them to buy overpriced products? And if so, why does competition not eliminate obfuscated products? We show – based on competitive experimental markets – that if add-ons merely complicate the products without generating additional surplus, obfuscation via product complexity indeed becomes fragile because buyers display an aversion against complex products. However, in the presence of surplus-enhancing add-ons, obfuscation via product complexity becomes a stable market feature that severely constrains the depth and breadth of buyers’ search. Sellers anticipate and take advantage of this by making unfavorable product features less visible and selling add-ons persistently above marginal cost. Even the most favorably priced product in the market is offered above marginal cost, and buyers persistently fail to find the best product such that inferior products have a good chance of being bought, leading to enduring price dispersion. Surplus-enhancing obfuscation opportunities are the causal driver of persistent profits and price dispersion because if we remove these opportunities, overall prices quickly converge to marginal cost.
Keyu Wu, Ernst Fehr, Sean Hofland and Martin Schonger
Ambiguous prospects are ubiquitous in social and economic life, but the psychological foundations of behavior under ambiguity are still not well understood. One of the most robust empirical regularities is the strong correlation between attitudes towards ambiguity and compound risk which suggests that compound risk aversion may provide a psychological foundation for ambiguity aversion. However, compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion may also be independent psychological phenomena, but what would then explain the strong correlation between attitudes towards compound risk and ambiguity? We tackle these questions by training a treatment group’s ability to reduce compound to simple risks, and analyzing how this affects their compound risk and ambiguity attitudes in comparison to a control group who is taught something unrelated to reducing compound risk. We find that aversion to compound risk disappears almost entirely in the treatment group, while the aversion towards both artificial and natural sources of ambiguity remains high and is basically unaffected by the teaching of how to reduce compound lotteries. Moreover, similar to previous studies, we observe a strong correlation between compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion, but this correlation only exists in the control group while in the treatment group it is rather low and no longer significant. These findings suggest that compound risk aversion and ambiguity aversion do not share the same psychological foundations: while compound risk aversion is primarily generated by a form of bounded rationality – the inability to reduce compound lotteries – ambiguity aversion is unrelated to this inability, suggesting that ambiguity aversion may be a genuine preference in its own right.
Publications
Ernst Fehr and Keyu Wu. Nature Human Behavior (2026)
Fairness concerns shape how people judge wages, institutions, taxes, transfers and social conflict. Decades of research show that people care not only about their own outcomes but also about how outcomes are distributed across others. The key question is now how these concerns operate outside simple laboratory settings, in real social and institutional environments. We argue that fairness concerns are shaped by comparison groups, beliefs about what outcomes are deserved, social norms, early-life experience and the institutions that make some comparisons more visible than others. This means that policies and organizations do not merely respond to fairness preferences; they can also activate, redirect and reshape them. Progress requires methods that connect experiments with field data, institutional variation and richer measures of how people evaluate whole income distributions. Such work can improve the design of workplaces, welfare policies and public institutions that are both effective and seen as legitimate.
Eva Ranehill, Roberto Weber and Keyu Wu. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 226 (2024): 106694.
Previous literature notes that more equal societies seem to be associated with higher social capital that potentially contributes to better economic outcomes such as reduced transaction costs and increased efficiency in economic exchange. However, previous evidence on the relationship between inequality and social capital is correlational. In this study, we implement an experiment in which groups are exogenously exposed to redistribution policies that generate variation in group equality, allowing us to, within the setting of the laboratory, causally explore the impact of group inequality on group social capital. Each group’s social capital is mainly measured by cooperativeness, trust, and trustworthiness within the groups, and we also complement our analyses by eliciting group members’ own beliefs, distributional preferences, and attitudes towards other members. We find that groups with progressive redistribution policies feel significantly more cohesive with other members, but groups with regressive redistribution policies care significantly less about other members’ payoffs. However, social capital measured by group members’ trust, trustworthiness, and cooperation are not significantly affected by redistributive policies.
Haoran He and Keyu Wu. Journal of Economic Psychology 54 (2016): 177-193.
A rapidly growing literature has been attempting to measure the strength of inequity aversion preferences as accurately as possible. We vary two factors that might affect the accuracy of the measurement of inequity aversion preference, i.e., choice sets with different underlying inequity aversion strength ranges and with different relative income inequities while absolute income inequities remain fixed. We find that unidirectional changes in the choice sets for disadvantageous and advantageous inequity aversion preferences significantly bias the measured strength of both preferences in the same directions of the changes and that the variance in inequity aversion increases with the range of choice sets. Moreover, a decrease in relative income inequity raises the measured strength of advantageous inequity aversion but does not affect disadvantageous inequity aversion preference.
Work in Progress
Recovering Economic Preferences under Behavioral Attenuation Bias
Economic preferences lie at the heart of economic analysis, yet they are typically inferred from observed behavior that is often systematically distorted by cognitive biases and bounded rationality. One prevalent distortion is the attenuated responsiveness of behavior to economic fundamentals arising from the inherent cognitive difficulty of decision-making. How can we distinguish genuine preferences from such cognitive attenuation bias and recover knowledge about underlying preferences from potentially attenuated behavior? This paper proposes a simple method that, under mild assumptions, yields behavior-based bounds on attenuation bias and underlying preferences and, under stronger assumptions, yields a unique inference for each. Three experiments demonstrate the method's validity and applicability. First, in an induced-value product demand experiment, observable demand curves exhibit substantial attenuation bias relative to the value-maximizing demand curve, while the demand curve recovered by the method approximates it much more closely. Second, in an experiment eliciting valuations of policy programs targeting various socioeconomic outcomes, observed valuations exhibit substantial insensitivity to program scope (“scope neglect”). The recovered elasticities largely eliminate this insensitivity, suggesting that underlying preferences are much more sensitive to program scope than typically observed valuations imply. Third, in a portfolio allocation experiment involving risky and riskless assets, observed allocations exhibit much weaker responsiveness to return-risk fundamentals than predicted by benchmark finance models, consistent with previous findings. The method decomposes this discrepancy into cognitive attenuation and other frictions arising from objective constraints and belief formation, showing that the recovered underlying responsiveness aligns much more closely with benchmark model predictions than typically observed behavior does.
Identifying Fairness Ideals as Reference Points (with Adrian Bruhin and Ernst Fehr)
Internal Belief Constructs and Motivated Information Acquisition (with Gergely Hajdu, Kathleen Ngangoue and Yan Xu)
Explaining the Rigidity of Stereotypes (with Xuechunzi Bai)