Working Papers
Gas Games with Electricity
If large natural gas firms also generate electricity, is this detrimental for competition and trade? I consider eastern Australia, where both electricity and gas markets are operated as uniform-price auctions, and large firms participate across both. I estimate a supply function equilibrium model for the gas market, allowing for firms' asymmetric information about electricity. Two potential issues arise. First, when gas firms generate electricity from non-gas fuels, such as coal and renewables, they may have incentive to raise the gas costs for rival gas-fired generators, because this is passed through to higher electricity prices. I estimate that this has raised the price of gas on average, but by a modest 0.8 percent. Second, the realized gas price reveals rivals' signals about gas-fired electricity generation levels, so at higher gas prices firms shade their gas supply more. This leads to steeper gas-market supply schedules, exacerbating market power. I estimate that this adverse selection has reduced gains from trade in the gas market by 10 percent on average. Increasing the frequency with which the gas market is cleared could improve market outcomes.
Inferring the Value of Stored Water in Hydroelectric Schemes
with Daniel Arzhintar, Gordon Leslie and Paul Wyrwoll, submitted
We study how a major hydroelectric scheme operator values its stored water. Using wholesale electricity market bidding data, we estimate a descriptive function of the opportunity cost of generation, which follows from the operator's implicit water valuation. The function exhibits near-complete passthrough of an exchange-traded electricity futures price, and decreases with greater reservoir volumes and snow depth. It remained stable even when the value of releases to an alternate, dependent river was high, as it ceased-to-flow. These results may motivate development of futures-linked administered water prices for hydropower schemes to provide water services for non-energy uses.