Research

Publications

The effects of the Affordable Care Act on Seasonal Agricultural Workers, (with Jeffrey Perloff)  Journal of The Agricultural and Applied Economic Association (2022) [Paper] 

Abstract: This study investigates the effects of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) policies (Medicaid expansion, health insurance premium subsidy, and tax penalty) on farmworkers' health insurance coverage and healthcare utilization. Using the National Agricultural Worker Survey, we find that the ACA policies substantially raised the share of seasonal farmworkers with medical insurance. It significantly increased workers' use of preventive medical services and decreased the use of hospitals, including emergency rooms, which was a goal of the law's proponents. These effects did not significantly differ between workers with and without a pre-existing medical condition.

Working Papers

• Defaults and Decisions: Choice Architecture and Consumer Opt-Out [Paper]

Abstract: This paper studies how defaults (preset options) shape consumer choice and firm outcomes. I use transaction data from over 15 million New York City Yellow taxi rides to estimate a structural model of tipping behavior. The model disentangles two mechanisms driving default tip adherence: norm-based deviation costs and cognitive (or effort-related) default opt-out costs. I find that defaults strongly anchor behavior: more than six in ten passengers select a default tip, and opt-out costs, estimated at $0.63, or 5% of the average fare, deter default opt-out. Counterfactual simulations highlight a design tradeoff: revenue-maximizing defaults increase tip revenue by 14% but raise opt-out costs, while consumer welfare-maximizing defaults reduce opt-out frictions at the expense of revenue. Targeted defaults that account for observable consumer heterogeneity provide measurable improvements in both consumer utility and tip income, boosting tip revenue by 7% and consumer welfare by 23% relative to uniformly assigned defaults.

Media Coverage: Forbes, WSJ, WSJ, Stanford Insights, Marginal Revolution

Presented at: Psychology and Economics Lunch Series (UCB), IO Seminar Series (UCB), Science & Philanthropy Initiative Conference, Haas School of Business Marketing Seminar Series, Stanford GSB Marketing Seminar, Stanford GSB Rising Scholars Conference, Chicago Booth Marketing Seminar, Stanford Institute of Theoretical Economics, Marketing Science Conference, Public and Labor Economics Workshop (Texas A&M), Simon Business School Marketing Seminar (University of Rochester), IAREP-SABE 2021 Virtual Conference, Virtual Quantitative Marketing Seminar, BASS FORMS Conference (UT Dallas), 2022 World Economic Science Association Conference (MIT), Stanford Behavioral and Experimental Economics Seminar.

• The Price of Identity: Overoptimism and Congruence Concerns (with Eugen Dimant, Lorenz Götte, Michael Kurschilgen, & Maximilian Muller) [Paper]

Abstract: We examine how identity influences economic decision-making, using field experiments on sports betting to measure belief distortions and identity-driven preferences. We find that people overestimate the likelihood of identity-aligned outcomes by 10–18%, and allocate 20% more of their betting budget to teams for which they have an affinity than to neutral teams. Using a structural model of portfolio allocation, we show that overoptimism accounts for 30%–44% of this investment gap, while the remaining 56%–70% stems from an aversion to betting against one’s favored team, even when such bets offer higher expected returns. Our estimates suggest that this aversion is equivalent to discounting gains from identity-incongruent outcomes by 17%–27%. We also provide evidence for the "identity-threat response" theory: when individuals perceive their identity as under threat–such as after their team’s poor performance–they strengthen their commitment, reinforcing identity-driven betting. Our findings raise policy concerns, as identity-driven biases may exacerbate financial harm not only in the rapidly expanding sports betting market but also in broader consumer and financial decision-making contexts where identity affects choices.

Presented at: Stanford Institute of Theoretical Economics, Stanford GSB Marketing Seminar, Kellogg School of Management, Ross School of Business (University of Michigan), Virtual Experimental Economics Seminar Series (Middlebury), Imperial College London, MIT Sloan, Cornell, UChicago.

• Competition and Discrimination: When Markets Discipline Sorting but Amplify Quality Gaps [Draft Coming Soon]

Abstract: Does competition reduce discrimination? Becker's theory predicts that competitive pressure makes discrimination costly forcing discriminators to "pay for their tastes" through lower profits but whether this reduces discriminatory behavior depends on how discrimination manifests. I study this by examining NYC Yellow Taxi driver behavior across two margins: where they work (spatial sorting) and service quality (route efficiency). Leveraging quasi-random passenger assignment at New York City airports and the entry of Green cabs as an exogenous competition shock, I construct measures of racial similarity between drivers and neighborhoods. I find sharply contrasting effects. Drivers initially sort into demographically similar neighborhoods, moving from zero to perfect racial alignment raises the probability of staying by 1.9 percentage points (4.2% increase). Green cab entry reduced this sorting by 35 percent, consistent with competition making spatial discrimination more costly. However, competition had the opposite effect on service quality: route padding increased for all passengers but rose disproportionately for those from dissimilar neighborhoods, widening the discrimination gap. I show theoretically that discrimination acts like a shadow tax whose effective rate depends on competitive intensity and the margin of discrimination. When discrimination involves forgoing profit (spatial sorting), competition reduces its intensity; when it involves extracting revenue (route padding), competition may amplify it as providers seek to recoup losses selectively. These findings reveal that market forces alone may be insufficient to eliminate discrimination and can even intensify it when discrimination operates through quality degradation.

Work In progress

• Who You Learn With Matters: Composition Externalities in Markets with Endogenous Signals, (with George Gui)