This Registered Report examines urban-rural tensions in Sweden – a historically egalitarian, multi-party welfare state with strong geographical equalization schemes, making it a least-likely case for place-based resentment theories. Using an online survey experiment (n = 2,051), we measured resentment through perceptions of in-group and out-group, and by experimentally varying whether political statements came from rural or urban politicians. Rural respondents showed stronger in-group identification, greater place-based resentment, and more negative stereotypes of their out-group than urban respondents. However, we find no evidence of place-based bias – that is, that rural respondents are less receptive to urban politicians’ statements, or vice versa. These findings reveal clear urban-rural tensions in a context often considered unlikely for such divides, underscoring the role of regional identities in political discourse and policy in multi-party welfare states beyond Anglo-Saxon settings, while indicating that these tensions do not translate into systematic bias in evaluating political statements.

This study explores the bi-directional relationship between attractiveness and prosocial behavior. While it is known that we often expect attractive people to act more prosocial, this research also examines how someone's actions can affect how attractive we perceive them to be. In a pre-registered incentivized behavioral experiment (n = 250), using avatar pictures representative of previous players in a dictator game, we asked participants (i) about their belief how prosocial the previous players behaved based solely on their avatars, which were either attractive or not, and (ii) to judge the avatars' attractiveness after learning whether their actions were prosocial or selfish. As anticipated, participants expected attractive avatars to behave more prosocially. More importantly, our study identified a robust causal effect of prosocial behavior on perceived attractiveness. Furthermore, those who already believed attractive people are more likely to be prosocial also judged the prosocial avatars as more attractive than those who were selfish. Our study highlights a dynamic, bi-directional relationship between attractiveness and behavior, offering a novel perspective on the intricate interplay of attractiveness, perception, and behavior in social contexts.

Due to diffusion of responsibility, majority voting may induce immoral and selfish behavior because voters are rarely solely responsible for the outcome. Across three behavioral experiments (two preregistered; n = 1983), we test this hypothesis in situations where there is a conflict between morality and material self-interest. Participants were randomly assigned to make decisions about extracting money from a charity either in an experimental referendum or individually. We find no evidence that voting induces immoral behavior. Neither do we find that people self-servingly distort their beliefs about their responsibility for the outcome when they vote. If anything, the results suggest that voting makes people less immoral.

Inaccurate beliefs about procedural fairness often motivate people to act in self-serving and selfish manners. We investigate whether information about a level playing field might mitigate such behaviors. In a pre-registered behavioral experiment (n = 444), using a competitive and real-effort task, we manipulate whether participants are informed about the fairness of a competition or not. Following the competition, participants (who either won or lost the competition) decided how to distribute earnings between themselves and their opponent. We show that informing participants about the fairness of the competition reduces selfish behavior among losers, while behavior among winners remains unaffected. Moreover, we show that losers who were not informed about the fairness of the competition incorrectly viewed it as having been unfairly stacked against them (i.e., believing that they encountered significantly more difficult tasks than their opponents). Our findings suggest that information about a level playing field reduces selfish behavior and is important for understanding when and why motivated reasoning about procedural fairness helps people uphold a positive self-image.

Voting is a cornerstone of democratic decision-making, but it may also diffuse individual responsibility, potentially encouraging people to support actions they would avoid when deciding alone. Such diffusion of responsibility could lead voters to prioritize relative standing over collective welfare, for example by endorsing policies that reduce others’ advantages even at a cost to overall efficiency. Across two behavioral experiments (total N = 1,750), including a preregistered replication, we examined whether voting contributes to envy-driven behavior in distributive decisions. Participants made choices in redistribution games under three decision-making rules: individually, through majority voting, or, in Study 2, via a Random Dictator mechanism that involved group decision-making without majority rule. In both studies, voting contributed to a higher rate of envy-driven choices, in which participants sacrificed efficiency to reduce disadvantageous inequality. This effect replicated with nearly identical magnitude in the preregistered study and was strongest when the personal cost of acting enviously was low. Results from the Random Dictator condition indicated that group decision-making alone increased envy-driven behavior, consistent with diffusion of responsibility, while majority rule amplified this effect further. These findings suggest that collective decision-making can shift social preferences by diffusing personal responsibility, thereby fostering competitive motives rather than cooperative ones. This psychological mechanism helps explain why democratic decisions about redistribution may sometimes reflect relative concerns rather than collective welfare.

Manuscript available upon request

Manuscript available upon request