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Research Motivation driven by First Principle:
#9 Bio-inspired Cyber-immunity: Does innate cyber-immunity exist? How to optimally establish acquired cyber-immunity? How do cyber-immunity propagate across power networks? [PDF][IEEE]
#8 Infinitesimal-attack-high-impact Phenomena: Can an infinitesimal cyber-attack trigger 10^2 MW power reversals within 10 seconds from 10^3 km away? [PDF][IEEE][Open-source HVDC Cybersecurity Testbed]
#7 Attack-induced Butterfly Effect: How many catastrophic chain reactions can a tiny cyber-attack unleash? How bad can it get? [PDF][IEEE]
#6 Physical Security Region: How to guarantee the existence of security regions? How to enlarge this security bubble? How to achieve inverter-security-constrained optimal-power-flow? [PDF] [Elsevier]
#5 Cybersecurity Paradigm Shift: What happened during the cybersecurity paradigm shift from power systems to power electronics? Cybersecurity before/during/after cyber events? [PDF] [Elsevier]
#4 Cybersecurity Cost-benefit Trade-off: What are cyber-defense benefits? At what cost? [PDF][IEEE]
#3 Insecurity Region & Cybersecurity Margin: What if inadequate cyber-defense resources/budgets? How to minimize attack-induced insecurity region? How to maximize cybersecurity margin? [arXiv] [IEEE]
#2 Multi-objective Attacker: What if multiple cyber-attack targets/outcomes? [PDF][IEEE]
#1 Heterogeneous Defendee: What if diverse cyber stakeholders with conflicting costs/benefits? [PDF][IEEE]
Research #9 Bio-inspired Cyber-immunity
Innate Cyber-Immunity within Each Subnetwork: Without extrinsic protection, how to characterize the innate cyber-immunity for a selected power subnetwork?
Acquired Cyber-Immunity within Each Subnetwork: What is the minimum cost to establish the acquired cyber-immunity for a selected power subnetwork? How to achieve the minimum cost?
Cyber-Immunity Propagation across Adjacent Subnetworks: Spatially, what is the minimum cyber-defense participation required from other subnetworks to establish cyber-immunity for the selected subnetwork? Temporally, how does the sequence of their participation impact cyber-immunity?
Research #8 Infinitesimal-attack-high-impact Phenomena of Power Delivery Systems
[Open-source HVDC Cybersecurity Testbed]
Cyber-attack Bifurcation: What are the bifurcation points that lead to small-attack-high-impact or infinitesimal-attack-high-impact situations?
Cyber-attack Duality: What are the similarities and differences of attack-induced behaviors between the VSC HVDC system and the CSC HVDC system?
Jiazuo Hou, Hanchen Deng, Xuan Gong, and Jimmy Chih-Hsien Peng, “Infinitesimal-attack-high-impact phenomena: Cyber-attack bifurcation in two-terminal HVDC power delivery systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 1775-1789, 2025. [PDF][IEEE]
Research #7 Butterfly Effect of Cyberattack
Attack-induced Equilibrium Points: What would be the HVDC equilibrium points, i.e., steady-state operation points, under different cyber-attacks?
Worst Attack-induced Consequences: What and when are the most damaging consequences regarding attack-induced power mismatch, over-current, and over-voltage?
Attack-induced Butterfly Effects: Would an infinitesimal perturbation of cyber-attack ripple out and eventually cause large differences in attack-induced outcomes?
Jiazuo Hou, Hanchen Deng, and Jimmy Chih-Hsien Peng, “A butterfly effect: Attack-induced heterogeneous equilibrium points of high-Voltage DC systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 15, no. 6, pp. 5992-6004, Jun. 2024. [PDF][IEEE]
Cyber-attack butterfly effect in the established HVDC cybersecurity testbed (.gif loading after 30 seconds):
Research #6 Security Region of Inverter-interfaced Power Systems
Existence of Security Region: Considering the unique physical limits of inverters, what is the criterion for tuning the inverter limits and system parameters to ensure the security region existence?
Expansion of Security Region: Considering the volatile operating points, how to quantify and enlarge the security region size by tuning inverter and system parameters of inverter-interfaced power systems?
Application of Security Region: How to apply the inverter security constraints into the optimal power flow (OPF) of inverter-interfaced power systems in a computationally tractable manner?
Research #5 Cybersecurity paradigm shift from power systems to power electronics
General cybersecurity paradigm of power electronics closed-loop controllers?
Cybersecurity of power electronics devices before/during/after cyber events?
Cyber events/threats/regulations of power electronics and power systems?
Jiazuo Hou, Chenxi Hu, Shunbo Lei, and Yunhe Hou, “Cyber resilience of power electronics-enabled power systems: a review,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, vol. 189, pp. 114036, 2024. [PDF] [Elsevier]
Research #4 Cost-benefit Trade-off of Cybersecurity
What are the benefits of cyber-defense? At what cost?
Trade-off between cybersecurity benefits and costs?
Jiazuo Hou, Shunbo Lei, Yue Song, Lipeng Zhu, Wei Sun, and Yunhe Hou, “The cost and benefit of enhancing cybersecurity for hybrid AC/DC grids,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 14, no. 6, pp. 4758-4771, Nov. 2023. [PDF][IEEE]
Research #3 #2 #1 Cyber Attacker-defender-defendee Framework
Research #3 #2 #1 Cyber Attacker-defender-defendee Framework
The demand for carbon neutrality is prompting a shift from conventional synchronous generator-based power systems to renewable-intensive power systems. The improved controllability and observability are underpinned by metering and communication infrastructures that are vulnerable to cyber-attacks, leading to unaffordable economic and societal impacts.
To this end, the proposed cyber attacker-defender-defendee framework focuses on evaluating and enhancing cyber resilience of renewable-enabled power systems and power electronics equipment, in which the perspectives of cyber attackers, defenders, and defendees, are explored, respectively.
Research #3 Cost-effective Cyber Defender: What if inadequate cyber-defense resources/budgets? Techno-economic analysis?
Before information warfare: With inadequate cyber-defense resources, how to quantify and minimize the attack-induced insecurity region?
During information warfare: With limited cyber-defense budgets, how to quantify and maximize the cybersecurity margin?
Jiazuo Hou, Fei Teng, Wenqian Yin, Yue Song, and Yunhe Hou, “Preventive-corrective cyber-defense: attack-induced region minimization and cybersecurity margin maximization,” IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, 2024. (Early Access) [arXiv] [IEEE]
Research #2 Multi-objective Cyber Attacker (to provide insights for defenders): What if multiple cyber-attack targets/results?
How to achieve multiple attacking purposes with different priorities?
How do multiple attacking purposes conflict with each other?
What is the most damaging impact (i.e., the damaging boundary) for each attacking purpose (e.g., the efficiency, security, and stability) on a power system?
Jiazuo Hou, Jun Wang, Wei Sun, Yue Song, and Yunhe Hou, “Small-signal angle stability-oriented false data injection cyber-attacks on power systems,” IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 635-648, Jan. 2023. [PDF][IEEE]
Research #1 Heterogeneous Cyber Defendee: What if heterogeneous cyber defendees?
Cyberattack evaluation: How to evaluate cyber-attack-induced consequences of heterogeneous agents?
Cybersecurity enhancement: How to timely counteract unfolding cyber-attacks?
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