Multi-state choices with aggregate feedback on unfamiliar alternatives- with Philippe Jehiel [ Latest draft ] (Games and Economic Behavior 2021)
This paper studies a multi-state binary choice experiment in which in each state, one alternative has well understood consequences whereas the other alternative has unknown consequences. Subjects repeatedly receive feedback from past choices about the consequences of unfamiliar alternatives but this feedback is aggregated over states. Varying the payoffs attached to the various alternatives in various states allows us to test whether unfamiliar alternatives are discounted and whether subjects’ use of feedback is better explained by similarity-based reinforcement learning models (in the spirit of the valuation equilibrium, Jehiel and Samet 2007) or by some variant of Bayesian learning model. Our experimental data suggest that there is no discount attached to the unfamiliar alternatives and that similarity-based reinforcement learning models have a better explanatory power than their Bayesian counterparts.
Peer effects in Social Networks: Evidence from an Entrepreneurship Experiment -with Vatsal Khandelwal [Latest draft] submitted
We implement a randomized entrepreneurship program that induces peer interactions to study the mechanisms underlying peer effects -- how they vary with network position, evolve over time, and can be engineered. We find that socially close and more connected peers generate short-term gains, while socially close but less connected peers generate long-term gains. This is driven by motivation from well-connected peers in the short term and ease of collaboration with less-connected peers in the longer term. We estimate peer effects and find that a 1σ increase in peers’ entrepreneurial outcome increases an individual’s future outcome by 0.4σ, but the effect declines by 0.06–0.08σ for each additional connection of the peer. Simulations show that pairing based on network position can be feasibly leveraged to increase treatment effects. Finally, we randomize a “connections” treatment in which peers share their network contacts. Despite network sparsity, sharing contacts does not generate additional gains and is concentrated within existing social groups, showing that peer effects are difficult to engineer in settings with high homophily.
Endogenous Institutions: a network experiment in Nepal - with Giulio Iacobelli [ Latest draft ] R&R Journal of Development Economics
In developing countries where formal institutions are often weak or non-existent, the enforcement of local agreements is based on the community. Peer monitoring represents a natural mechanism for the enforcement of social norms and local agreements in such a setting. In this paper we study the demand for such monitoring and its effectiveness across different group compositions. We collect original network data in 19 villages in rural Nepal and conduct an experiment to study who is elected as a monitor in a public good game. Individuals play in groups of three, both with their close friends and with people far away in the social network and are given the opportunity to anonymously choose their preferred "institution". We combine theoretical approach and a unique lab in the field evidence to show that closely knit groups are significantly more likely to not choose a monitor, while sparse groups tend to prefer a high central one. Low central monitors are seldom chosen. Endogenous election of the high central monitor ensures higher cooperation compared to an exogenous assignment, but only in sparse groups.
Migration and networks: Evidence from Senegal - with Bernd Beber, Cara Ebert and Zara Riaz
Urban migration is a primary strategy to respond to seasonal hunger, and income shocks during the agricultural lean season. Migration frictions prevent migrants from making efficient migration decisions. We collect network data in 146 villages in Senegal and conduct an information RCT regarding migration. In treatment villages, we have mentors that conduct one-one information session and hand flyers to the participants giving them information about income and accommodation in urban migration destinations. In another treatment we complement this with a local mentor living within the village. We study how community level networks affect migration rates and how the information affects rate of migration.
From Muscle Drain to Brain Gain: the Long-Term Effects of Gurkha Recruitment in Nepal- with François Libois, Ritu Muralidharan and Oliver Vanden Eynde [ Preliminary Draft ]
Gurkha soldiers in Nepal have been recruited by the Indian and later the British armies for over 200 years. The transformational role that these soldiers played in the development of their home communities is often described informally, but is challenging to quantify. Using the plausibly exogenous locations of British recruitment depots in the 19th century, we use a continuous difference-in-difference design to show that exposure to historical Gurkha recruitment is associated with improved outcomes for education and indicators of female empowerment today that are specific to the “recruitable” Gurkha castes. Historical Gurkha recruitment is associated with higher literacy, a greater probability of attending school, higher educational levels, marrying later, increased women-run nonfarm businesses, and a greater share of women currently using contraceptives. There is a differential in these positive effects between the “recruitable” Gurkha castes and other castes. While Gurkha castes tend to hold more assets in historical recruitment grounds, the positive impacts on education remain when we explicitly account for wealth differences. This finding is consistent with the idea that military recruitment changed the culture and preferences of recruited communities, as historians have long argued.
Perceptions of local politicians towards climate change: Evidence from Nepal- with Rohini Pande, Michael Callen, Stefano Fiorin and Soledad Artiz Prillaman
Adoption of environment friendly technology using social pressure
Formation of Social networks - with Stephen Nei