A Theory of the Rights of Nature

Since Ecuador recognized the rights of nature in its 2008 constitution, governments and courts around the world have extended legal rights to rivers, forests, and other ecosystems. My dissertation investigates the practice of attributing rights to natural entities and develops a justification for the rights of nature. I pinpoint their distinctive political value, identify the interests they protect, and outline the institutions required to enforce them effectively. 

Taking the contemporary rights of nature movement as my starting point, I outline a theory of the rights of nature that carves out a middle ground between two dominant scholarly approaches. The first rejects the rights of nature as theoretically implausible; the second embraces them by appealing to accounts of nature’s intrinsic value. I argue instead that the strongest case for these rights lies in their capacity to help communities resist environmental domination. Robust rights of nature thus protect fundamental human interests.                                   

"The Lorax Problem: Guardianship of Nature" (forthcoming in American Journal of Political Science)

Abstract: The global rights of nature movement has generated a burgeoning body of scholarship. A central puzzle in this literature concerns the guardianship of nature. Given that nature cannot communicate in human language, who should guard the rights of nature, and how do we know when they have been violated? I call this puzzle the Lorax Problem. This article outlines an answer by arguing that guardianship claims for nature are legitimate when they satisfy two conditions: (i) an affected interests condition and (ii) an expertise condition. On my account, vulnerable agents satisfy these conditions and therefore qualify as legitimate guardians of nature. Addressing the Lorax Problem clarifies what it means to speak for nature, who the relevant actors should be, and why they matter.