On the Neuropanopticon, the Self-as-Platform, and Existential Obsolescence

My research investigates how neurotechnologies reshape power, autonomy, agency, and what it means to be human. Over the past few years this work has taken shape around three linked concepts: the neuropanopticon, the self-as-platform, and existential obsolescence. Each one marks a stage in the same process, tracing how surveillance over the body deepens into governance of the mind, and how that governance can end in the quiet removal of human agency.

The Neuropanopticon

This concept extends Foucault's account of disciplinary power into the age of neurotechnology. More than simply observing behaviour, wearable devices, biometric sensors, and workplace monitoring tools track attention, anxiety, stress, happiness, and cognitive load, turning the body into a continuous source of data. The neuropanopticon names this new regime of visibility, in which surveillance moves inside the organism itself.

The Self-as-Platform

If the neuropanopticon is about being watched, the self-as-platform is about being conducted, reorganised, and reconstructed. Here the person is no longer just observed. She is treated as an interface, a system to be monitored, optimised, updated, and managed like a piece of infrastructure. The environment that used to surround the individual, the world she had to adapt to, relocates into her own body and mind. She acts as her own entrepreneur and becomes the site that needs to be governed.

Existential Obsolescence

This is the concept I have worked on longest, and the one I see as the endpoint of the other two. Predictive closed-loop Brain-Machine Interfaces do more than monitor or reorganise the self. They act before the person decides, replacing volition with algorithmic anticipation. Existential obsolescence names this condition: the human subject remains present but becomes functionally irrelevant to her own actions. Agency does not disappear through exclusion or incapacity, but dissolves quietly, absorbed into a system that decides on her behalf.

Unlike assistive technologies, predictive closed-loop BMIs intervene without dialogue, replacing decision-making with algorithmic optimisation. This marks a shift from an earlier concern with superfluity, where individuals were excluded from systems of value, towards a deeper absorption into systems that render human agency redundant from within.

Why this matters?

These three concepts trace one arc. Surveillance over the body and mind leads to reorganisation of the self, and reorganisation leads to the erosion of agency. My work asks what legitimacy such systems can claim, and what governance would need to look like to protect autonomy at each stage of this process.

🌱 This is a work in progress. I'm glad to receive feedback, discuss ideas, or present it upon request.

This project builds on my earlier work on the ethical and political dimensions of Brain-Machine Interfaces, where I argued for stronger informed consent and examined how BMIs can threaten personal autonomy and self-ownership through surveillance and emotional control. You can read more about these foundational explorations below.

On the Ethics of Human Enhancement

In my doctoral research, I explored the ethical foundations of human enhancement technologies through a new philosophical framework called Human Nature Developmentalism. I argued that to assess the morality of altering human biology—especially through genetic interventions—we must first understand what it means to be human and what a good life is. I proposed that human beings are fundamentally purposive and creative agents who flourish through the exercise, development, and enjoyment of their capacities. From this starting point, I build a theory of well-being and a model of ethical counselling that helps guide decision-making around enhancement. My work offers a fresh perspective on human nature, flourishing, and the future of biomedical technologies. This ethical framework can be expanded to other areas outside the realm of medical ethics, such as education, technology policy, and social justice, wherever questions about human development, flourishing, and agency are at stake.

On Libertarianism

I conducted a critical and comparative study of two major libertarian theories — those of Robert Nozick and Hillel Steiner. This work sought to analyse the foundational principles of each thinker, with particular attention to their conceptions of self-ownership, the moral basis of property rights, and the historical theories of justice they propose. While both authors ground their political philosophies in the framework of natural rights and a negative conception of liberty, they diverge significantly in how they interpret and formulate principles of just acquisition, especially regarding the Lockean proviso. A central thread throughout the research was the examination of the structural tension between the principles of property and liberty — and how the prioritisation of property may affect the coherence and normative ambitions of libertarianism as a political philosophy. This enquiry led me to a broader reflection on whether liberty, as conceived in these frameworks, retains substantive value or is reduced to a merely formal status within a system governed by procedural rights with property as its structuring principle.