On Existential Obsolescence

This is cutting-edge research at the frontier of ethics, technology, and human agency. But what exactly am I doing?
My research investigates the ethical and ontological stakes of predictive closed-loop Brain-Machine Interfaces (BMIs). While these technologies promise to optimise cognitive and emotional performance by directly intervening in the brain, they also risk bypassing the very core of human autonomy and agency. I propose and explore the concept of Existential Obsolescence—a condition in which the human subject becomes functionally irrelevant to his own actions, not through exclusion or incapacity, but through the automation and preemption of volition, judgment, and ethical authorship. Unlike assistive technologies, predictive closed-loop BMIs intervene without dialogue, silently replacing decision-making with algorithmic optimisation. This marks a profound shift: from a concern with superfluity—where individuals are excluded from systems of value—to a deeper absorption into systems that render human agency redundant from within. My work critically engages with this transition, revealing how technologies designed to enhance can, paradoxically, erode our capacity for self-determination and turn the human being into a passive substrate for performance, efficiency, and data extraction. In this sense, BMIs emerge not simply as tools for improvement, but as "total devices" that reconfigure what it means to be human in a post-autonomous, posthuman age.

🌱 This is a work in progress. I'm glad to receive feedback, discuss ideas, or present it upon request.

This project builds on my earlier work exploring the ethical and political dimensions of Brain-Machine Interfaces. In previous articles, I have argued for the need for enhanced informed consent and critically examined how BMIs threaten personal autonomy, dignity, and self-ownership through potential mechanisms of surveillance and emotional control. You can read more about these foundational explorations below.

On the Ethics of Human Enhancement

In my doctoral research, I explored the ethical foundations of human enhancement technologies through a new philosophical framework called Human Nature Developmentalism. I argued that to assess the morality of altering human biology—especially through genetic interventions—we must first understand what it means to be human and what a good life is. I proposed that human beings are fundamentally purposive and creative agents who flourish through the exercise, development, and enjoyment of their capacities. From this starting point, I build a theory of well-being and a model of ethical counselling that helps guide decision-making around enhancement. My work offers a fresh perspective on human nature, flourishing, and the future of biomedical technologies. This ethical framework can be expanded to other areas outside the realm of medical ethics, such as education, technology policy, and social justice, wherever questions about human development, flourishing, and agency are at stake.

On Libertarianism

I conducted a critical and comparative study of two major libertarian theories — those of Robert Nozick and Hillel Steiner. This work sought to analyse the foundational principles of each thinker, with particular attention to their conceptions of self-ownership, the moral basis of property rights, and the historical theories of justice they propose. While both authors ground their political philosophies in the framework of natural rights and a negative conception of liberty, they diverge significantly in how they interpret and formulate principles of just acquisition, especially regarding the Lockean proviso. A central thread throughout the research was the examination of the structural tension between the principles of property and liberty — and how the prioritisation of property may affect the coherence and normative ambitions of libertarianism as a political philosophy. This enquiry led me to a broader reflection on whether liberty, as conceived in these frameworks, retains substantive value or is reduced to a merely formal status within a system governed by procedural rights with property as its structuring principle.