Research

At present, my research focuses on deep disagreements (how they should be defined and studied, what contributions they may offer to scientific/moral progress and how they relate to epistemic/linguistic injustice), hinge epistemology (meta-philosophical issues, its application to mathematics and ethics, and its connection to social epistemology), meta-ethics (the meta-ethical implications of moral expressivism) and hate speech (how it emerges in online spaces, and what measures can be implemented to counter it).

For a full list of my publications, please go here. In this page you will find my past and present funded research projects, together with associated publications. 

Deep disagreements are generally understood as systematic and persistent disagreements rooted in contrary worldviews where there is no mutually recognized method of resolution because disputants reason and analyze evidence using different frameworks and/or principles. Despite their centrality to our life, it remains unclear how we ought to understand deep disagreements and their implications for moral progress. My research aims to fill this lacuna by rethinking the study of deep disagreements with Wittgenstein. First, drawing on Wittgenstein’s views and philosophical method, I develop a novel account of deep disagreements. Against existing theories of deep disagreements, I defend that it is a mistake to assume that the characteristics of deep disagreements display a theoretical unity that can only be adequately explained by one true global theory. Instead, deep disagreements are complex phenomena that are to be clarified by a variety of complementary local explanations. Second, I use this account of deep disagreements to assess whether they can contribute to moral progress. Specifically, I study the challenges of, and the unique opportunities offered by, deep disagreements to determine if there are any strategies for constructive dialogue that contribute to moral progress.

Project Nº1293324N funded by the FWO (Fonds Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek). Parts of this project have also received funding during 2022-2023 from DAAD (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst) and KU Leuven. 

This project examines Ludwig Wittgenstein's moral philosophy, both early and late, to shed light on his ethical and meta-ethical views. The project is divided into two parts. The first part examines Wittgenstein's early work on ethics (pre-1929), focusing especially on the Tracatus Logico-Philosophicus and the Lecture on Ethics. It spells out Wittgenstein's conception of ethics as transcendental to better understand how one can achieve a good ethical life through the good ethical will and a correct attitude to the world. The second part shifts its attention to Wittgenstein's later work on moral philosophy (post-1929), with a special interest in his Lectures in Cambridge during the 1930s and his Lectures on Aesthetics. Through the analysis of Wittgenstein's grammatical investigations of moral discourse, it sets out to clarify his answers to semantic (e.g., what is the linguistic function of moral judgments?), epistemological (e.g., are there moral truths and/or one true ethics?) and metaphysical (e.g., are there any moral entities?) questions about moral thought, talk and practice. 

PhD Project Nº FPU16/05569 funded by the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte del Gobierno de España (MECD)