(20) “The Philosophy of Epistemic Autonomy: Introduction to Special Issue.” Social Epistemology. (2024).
(19) “Disagreement, Skepticism, and Begging the Question.” International Journal for the Study of Skepticism. (2024). https://doi.org/10.1163/22105700-bja10077
(18) “Epistemic Autonomy and Intellectual Humility,” Social Epistemology. (2023). https://doi.org/10.1080/02691728.2023.2258093
(17) “Measuring Virtuous Responses to Peer Disagreement: The Intellectual Humility and Actively Open-Minded Thinking of Conciliationists,” (with James Beebe) Journal of the American Philosophical Association. (2022).
(16) “Why Think for Yourself?” Episteme: A Journal of Individual and Social Epistemology (2022).
(15) “Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement,” Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (2021).
(14) “What’s Wrong with Moral Deference?” Florida Philosophical Review 18(1): 1-6. (2019).
(13) “The Impossibility of Mere Animal Knowledge for Reflective Subjects,” (with Sanford Goldberg) Erkenntnis (2018). DOI 10.1007/s10670-018-0052-2
(12) “Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution,” TOPOI (special issue: Disagreement: Perspectives from Argumentation Theory and Epistemology). (2018) DOI 10.1007/s11245-018-9576-y
(11) “Religious Disagreement and Divine Hiddenness,” Philosophia Christi (2018) 20(1): 215-225 (special issue: Religious Disagreement).
(10) "Gritty Faith," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly. (2018) DOI: 10.5840/acpq201858152
(9) “Moral Caution and the Epistemology of Disagreement,” Journal of Social Philosophy (2016) 47(2): 120-141.
(8) “Disagreement and Epistemic Peers,” Oxford Handbooks Online in Philosophy. (2015). DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199935314.013.13
(7) “Are Conciliatory Views of Disagreement Self-Defeating?” Social Epistemology (2015) 29(2): 145-159.
(6) “Is there a Well-Founded Solution to the Generality Problem?” Philosophical Studies (2015) 172(2): 459-468.
(5) “A Puzzle about Disagreement and Rationality,” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2014) 3(4): 1-3.
(4) “The Case for Rational Uniqueness,” Logos & Episteme: An International Journal of Epistemology (2011) 2(3): 359-73.
(3) “Epistemological Considerations Concerning Skeptical Theism: A Response to Dougherty,” Faith and Philosophy (2011) 28(3): 323-331.
(2) “Bergmann’s Dilemma: Exit Strategies for Internalists,” (co-authored with Jason Rogers, equal work). Philosophical Studies (2011) 152(1): 55-80.
(1) “Conciliatory Views of Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Philosophy (2009) 6(3): 269-279.
(19) “Humble Inquiry.” In Humility and Rationality. Brill. (forthcoming)
(18) “Navigating Inquiry.” (with Josh DiPaolo) In Inquiry: Philosophical Perspctives. Eds. Aaron Creller and Jonathan Matheson. Routledge. (forthcoming)
(17) “Against Doing Your Own Research.” In Too Weird to Believe, Too Plausible to Deny. Ed. Clifford Sosis. Routledge. (forthcoming)
(16) “Evidentialism & Normative Expectations.” In Evidentialism at 40: New Argument, New Angles. Eds. K. McCain, S. Stapleford, M. Steup. Routledge. (forthcoming)
(15) “Evidentialism & Social Epistemology.” In Oxford Handbook of Social Epistemology. Eds. Jennifer Lackey and Aidan McGlynn. (forthcoming)
(14) “Disagreement and Higher-Order Evidence.” In Routledge Companion to Evidence. Eds. M. Lasonen-Aarnio and C. Littlejohn. Routledge. (2024) 256-272.
(13) “The Virtue of Epistemic Autonomy.” In Epistemic Autonomy. Eds. Kirk Lougheed and Jonathan Matheson. (2021) 173-194.
(12) “Introduction: Puzzles Concerning Epistemic Autonomy.’ (with Kirk Lougheed). In Epistemic Autonomy. Eds. Kirk Lougheed and Jonathan Matheson. (2021) 1-18.
(11) "The Argument from Common Consent." In Contemporary Arguments in Natural Theology. Ed. Colin Ruloff. Bloomsbury Pres (2021) 293-310.
(10) "Robust Justification." In Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Eds. Kevin McCain and Scott Stapleford. Routledge. (2020) 146-60.
(9) “Silencing, Epistemic Injustice, and Epistemic Paternalism.” (with Valerie Joly Chock) In Epistemic Paternalism Reconsidered: Conceptions, Justifications and Implications. Eds. Guy Axtell and Amiel Bernal. Rowman & Littlefield. (2020)
(8) “Moral Experts, Deference & Disagreement.” (with Nathan Nobis and Scott McElreath) In Moral Expertise: New Essays from Theoretical and Clinical Perspectives. Eds. J. Watson and L. Guidry-Grimes. Springer, (2018) 87-105.
(7) “Disagreement Skepticism and the Rationality of Religious Belief.” In Ted Poston and Kevin McCain (Eds.) The Mystery of Skepticism. Brill. (2018) 83-104.
(6) “Disagreement and the Ethics of Belief.” In James Collier (Ed.) The Future of Social Epistemology: A Collective Vision. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, (2015) 139-148.
(5) “Introduction” (co-authored with Rico Vitz, equal work). In Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz (Eds.) The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, New York: Oxford University Press, (2014) 1-14.
(4) “Disagreement: Idealized and Everyday.” In Jonathan Matheson and Rico Vitz (Eds.) The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social, New York: Oxford University Press, (2014) 315-330.
(3) “Skeptical Theism and Phenomenal Conservatism.” In Trent Dougherty and Justin McBrayer (Eds.) Skeptical Theism: New Essays, New York: Oxford University Press, (2014) 3-20.
(2) “How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View?” (co-authored with Brandon Carey, equal work) In Diego Machuca (Ed.) Disagreement and Skepticism, New York: Routledge, (2013) 131-49.
(1) “Epistemic Relativism.” In Andrew Cullison (Ed.) Continuum Companion to Epistemology. New York: Continuum (2012) 161-79.
(13) Review of M. Benton and J. Kvanvig, Religious Disagreement and Pluralism, in the International Journal for Philosophy of Religion (2023).
(12) Review of M. Skipper and A. Steglich-Petersen, Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays, in Metascience 29 (2020): 205-208.
(11) Review of J. Pittard, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, in Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 9 no. 7 (2020): 36-44.
(10) Review of Q. Cassam, Vices of the Mind: From the Intellectual to the Political, (with Ben Beatson, Valerie Joly Chock, and Jamie Lang) in Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 8, no. 8 (2019): 48-55.
(9) Review of J. Fantl, The Limitations of the Open Mind, in Notre Dame Philosophical Review. (2018). https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/the-limitations-of-the-open-mind-2/
(8) Review of J. Brown, Fallibilism: Evidence and Knowledge, (with Valerie Joly Chock) in Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7, no. 10 (2018): 55-58.
(7) Review of L. Zagzebksi, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief, (with Jensen Alex, Valerie Joly Chock, and Kyle Mallard) in Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6, no. 9 (2017): 29-34.
(6) Review of B. Frances, Disagreement, (with Katie V. Rivers) in Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 5, no. 1 (2016): 7-9.
(5) Review of J. Gibbons, The Norm of Belief, in The Philosophical Quarterly (2015) 66(263): 420-423.
(4) Review of N. Levy, Hard Luck: How Luck Undermines Free Will and Moral Responsibility, in Metapsychology (2014) 18(30).
(3) Review of I. Evans and N. Smith, Knowledge, in Metascience (2013) 22(2): 471-474 online access [dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11016-012-9729-3].
(2) Review of D. Henderson and T. Horgan, The Epistemological Spectrum: At the Interface of Cognitive Science & Conceptual Analysis, in The Review of Metaphysics (2012) 65(4): 875-877.
(1) Review of R. Wedgewood, The Nature of Normativity, in Metapsychology (2012) 16(48).
(3) “Skeptical Theism” Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Philosophy of Religion. (2021).
(2) “Disagreement” 1000-word Philosophy. (2018)
(1) “Disagreement” (co-authored with Bryan Frances). Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/disagreement/>.
(8) “The Possibility of Epistemic Nudging: Reply to Grundmann.” (with Valerie Joly Chock) Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2021) 10(8): 36-42.
(7) “Science and Epistemic Injustice: A Reply to Medvecky” (with Valerie Joly Chock) Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2019) 8(1): 1-9.
(6) “Conscientiousness and Other Problems: A Reply to Zagzebski.” (with Jensen Alex, Valerie Joly Chock, and Kyle Mallard) Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2018) 7(1): 10-13.
(5) "Reply to Diego Machuca" Syndicate Book Symposium on The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2017).
(4) "Reply to Amber Carlson" Syndicate Book Symposium on The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2017).
(3) "Reply to Paul Bogosian" Syndicate Book Symposium on The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2017).
(2) "Reply to Nathan Ballantyne" Syndicate Book Symposium on The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement (2017).
(1) “Epistemic Norms and Self-Defeat: A Reply to Littlejohn.” Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective (2015) 4(2): 26-32.
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