John Preston

email j.m.preston [at] reading.ac.uk

Professional Activities

Professional Qualifications

Books

Professional Activities

I'm currently a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at the University of Reading, in the UK.

I'm qualified in artificial intelligence, as well as philosophy, and my main research interests are in the history of philosophy (especially figures such as Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ernst Mach, the Vienna Circle, plus associated late nineteenth and early-to-mid-twentieth-century philosophers and philosopher-scientists such as Ludwig Boltzmann and Heinrich Hertz), Michael Polanyi, Karl Popper, Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, and Alan R. White.

Areas of philosophy in which I've a special interest include philosophy of science, epistemology, philosophy of mind, of AI and of cognitive science, and classical Chinese philosophy.

Professional Qualifications

BA in Philosophy, The Polytechnic of North London, 1982.

B.Phil in Philosophy, Oriel College, University of Oxford, 1984.

D.Phil in Philosophy, Oriel College, University of Oxford, 1988.

M.Sc. in Computer Studies (Artificial Intelligence), University of Essex, 1990.

Books

(ed.), Interpreting Mach: Critical Essays, (Cambridge University Press, 2021).

Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions: A Reader’s Guide, (London: Continuum, 2008).

(ed.), Wittgenstein and Reason, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2008).

(with Mark Bishop) (eds.), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, (Oxford University Press, 2002).

(with Gonzalo Munévar and David Lamb) (eds.), The Worst Enemy of Science?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).

(ed.), Paul K. Feyerabend, Knowledge, Science and Relativism: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, (Cambridge University Press, 1999).

(ed.), Thought and Language, (Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Feyerabend: Philosophy, Science and Society, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997).

Articles

‘Feyerabend, Experts, and Dilettantes’, Philosophical Inquiries, 12, 2024, 89-106.

‘Feyerabend and Mach’, in S.Gattei & R.Corvi (eds.), Feyerabend in Dialogue: Critical Essays (Springer, 2024), 59-91.

‘Kuhn’s Paradigms and their Early Critics’, in Journal of Physics: Conference Series: HAPP Centre: 10th Anniversary Commemorative Volume, (Bristol: IOP Publishing, 2024). https://doi.org/10.1088/1742-6596/2877/1/012072

'"Interpretations of Nature” in Polanyi’s Science, Faith and Society’, for Science, Faith, Society: New Essays on the Philosophy of Michael Polanyi, edited by Péter Hartl (Springer, 2024), 101-114.

‘The Idea of a Pseudo-problem in Mach, Hertz, and Boltzmann’, Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 54, 2023, 55-77.

‘Gestalt Epistemology: From Gestalt Psychology to Phenomenology in the Work of Michael Polanyi’, Philosophia Scientiae, 26, 2022, 233-254

‘Introduction: A New Mach for a New Millennium’, in John Preston (ed.), Interpreting Mach: Critical Essays, (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 1-9.

‘Phenomenalism, or Neutral Monism, in Mach’s Analysis of Sensations?’, in John Preston (ed.), Interpreting Mach: Critical Essays, (Cambridge University Press, 2021), 235-257.

‘Why Thomas Kuhn was No Revolutionary’, IAI news, 22nd July 2020: https://iai.tv/articles/why-thomas-kuhn-was-no-revolutionary-auid-1597?_auid=2020

(With Sarah Craddock) ‘Roles and Representations of Women in Early Chinese Philosophy: A Survey’, Frontiers of Philosophy in China, 15, 2020, 198-222.

(With Severin Schroeder) ‘Explication, Description and Enlightenment’, Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, 22, 2020, 106-120.

‘Mach, Wittgenstein, Science and Logic’, in F.Stadler (ed.), Ernst Mach – Life, Work, Influence (Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook), (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2019), 63-90.

'Wittgenstein, Hertz and Boltzmann’, in H-J.Glock & J.Hyman (eds.), A Companion to Wittgenstein, (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 2017), 110-123.

'Art-Rap, German Idealism and Therapy: John Preston interviews milo’, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 74, 3rd Quarter 2016, 66-69.

‘The Rise of Western Rationalism: Paul Feyerabend’s Story’, in I.J.Kidd & M.Brown (eds.), Reappraising Feyerabend, special issue of Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 57, 2016, 79-86.

‘Logical Space and Phase-Space’, in D.Moyal-Sharrock, V.Munz & A.Coliva (eds.), Mind, Language and Action: Proceedings of the 36th International Wittgenstein Symposium, (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2015), 35-44.

'The Neuroscientific Case for a Representative Theory of Perception’, (written with my colleague Severin Schroeder), in Timothy P. Racine & Kathleen L. Slaney (eds.), A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 253-273.

‘What are Computers (If They’re Not Thinking Things)?’, in S. Barry Cooper, A. Dawar & B. Löwe (eds.), How the World Computes: Turing Centenary Conference and 8th Conference on Computability in Europe, CIE 2012, Cambridge, UK, June 2012, Proceedings (Berlin & Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2012), 609-615.

‘Unthinking Things’, The Philosophers’ Magazine, 57, 2nd Quarter 2012, 79-83.

'The Extended Mind, the Concept of Belief, and Epistemic Credit’, in R.Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind, (Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books, MIT Press, 2010), pp.355-369. (ISBN 978-0-262-01403-8)

‘Hertz, Wittgenstein, and the Instrumentalist Turn in the Philosophy of Science’, in G.Wolfschmidt (ed.), Heinrich Hertz (1857-1894) and the Development of Communication: Proceedings of the Symposium for History of Science, (Hamburg: Norderstedt, 2008), pp.80-93.

'Mach and Hertz’s Mechanics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol.39, 2008, pp.91-101.

'Hertz, Wittgenstein, and Philosophical Method’, Philosophical Investigations, vol.31, no.1, 2008, pp.48-67.

'Janik on Hertz and the early Wittgenstein’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol.73, 2006, pp.83-95.

‘Harré on Hertz and the Tractatus’, Philosophy, vol.81, 2006, pp.357-64.

‘Is Your Mobile Part of Your Mind?’, in K.Nyiri (ed.), Mobile Understanding: The Epistemology of Ubiquitous Communication, (Vienna: Passagen Verlag, 2006), pp.67-77.

'Bird, Kuhn and Positivism’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, vol.35, 2004, pp.327-335.

‘Kuhn, Instrumentalism, and the Progress of Science’, Social Epistemology, vol.17, 2003, pp.259-65.

'Introduction’, in J. M. Preston & M. Bishop (eds.), Views into the Chinese Room: New Essays on Searle and Artificial Intelligence, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.1-50.

‘Prefazione all’ edizione italiana’, in my Feyerabend: Filosofia, Scienza, Societa, (Milano: Il Saggiatore, 2001), pp.13-14.

‘Feyerabend, Paul’, in W. H. Newton–Smith (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000), pp.143-8.

‘Science as Supermarket: ‘Post-Modern’ Themes in Paul Feyerabend’s Later Philosophy of Science’, in J. M. Preston, G. Munévar & D. Lamb (eds.), The Worst Enemy of Science?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.80-101.

(With David Lamb) ‘Introduction’, to J. M. Preston, G. Munévar & D. Lamb (eds.), The Worst Enemy of Science?: Essays in Memory of Paul Feyerabend, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp.xiii-xvii.

‘Author’s Response’ (to a review symposium on my Feyerabend book), Metascience, volume 8, 1999, pp.233-243.

'Feyerabend, Paul’, ‘Krautrock’, and ‘Popper, Karl’, in J. E. Sandford (ed.), Encyclopaedia of Contemporary German Culture, (London: Routledge, 1999), pp.214-5, 353-4, 491-2.

‘Introduction to volume 3’ in J. M. Preston (ed.), Paul K. Feyerabend, Knowledge, Science and Relativism: Philosophical Papers, Volume 3, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp.1-15.

‘Science as Supermarket: ‘Post-Modern’ Themes in Paul Feyerabend’s Later Philosophy of Science’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, volume 29, no.3, 1998, pp.425-447.

‘Feyerabend’s Retreat from Realism’, Philosophy of Science, volume 64, 1997, pp.S421-431.

‘Feyerabend’s Final Relativism’, The European Legacy, volume 2, no.4, 1997, pp.615-620.

‘Introduction: Thought as Language’, in J. M. Preston (ed.), Thought and Language, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp.1-14.

‘Feyerabend’s Polanyian Turns’, Appraisal, volume 1, Supplementary Issue, 1997, pp.S30-S36.

(With H–J. Glock): ‘Externalism and First–Person Authority’, The Monist, volume 78, no.4, October 1995, pp.515-533.

‘Has Poincaré’s Conventionalism been Refuted?’, Ratio (New Series), volume 8, no.2, September 1995, pp.193-200.

'Frictionless Philosophy: Paul Feyerabend and Relativism’, History of European Ideas, volume 20, nos.4–6, February 1995, pp.963–968.

‘Methodology, Epistemology and Conventions: Popper’s Bad Start’, in D. Hull, M. Forbes & R. M. Burian (eds.), PSA 1994, Proceedings of the 1994 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Volume 1: Symposia and Invited Papers, (East Lansing, MI: Philosophy of Science Association, 1994), pp.314–322.

‘On Some Objections to Relativism’, Ratio (New Series), volume 5, no.1, June 1992, pp.57–73.

'Folk Psychology as Theory or Practice?: The Case for Eliminative Materialism’, Inquiry, volume 32, no.3, September 1989, pp.277–303.

Ernst Mach

I edited a volume on the philosophical work of Ernst Mach entitled Interpreting Mach: Critical Essays, published by Cambridge University Press in 2021. It includes essays by ten prominent scholars of Mach’s work, and is dedicated to the memory our colleague, fellow Mach-scholar, Erik Banks.

Ludwig Wittgenstein

I'm also working on my next book project, a full-length treatment provisionally entitled Wittgenstein, Natural Science, and the Great Philosopher-Physicists. It will cover the background to Wittgenstein’s ideas in this field, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, the middle and later periods of his works, and the Wittgensteinian tradition in the philosophy of natural and social science.

Alan R. White

Together with Constantine Sandis, I'm editing a volume of the selected papers of the canonical mid-twentieth-century linguistic philosopher Alan R. White.

Mary B. Hesse

I have long been interested in the philosophical work of Mary Hesse (who was one of my D.Phil thesis examiners), and embarked on a study of her philosophy of science during 2023. Its first fruit, a paper on Hesse and scientific realisms, is due to be published in 2025.

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