Articles in refereed journals and volumes
“Directional Equilibria” (2018) with Hun Chung. We propose a new solution concept (directional equilibrium) for the multidimensional spatial model. We establish connections the core, Pareto optimality, existence, and generic local uniqueness and stability, and we provide non-cooperative foundations. The main update is a generalization of Theorem 1, which shows that if an alternative belongs to the majority core, then it is a directional equilibrium; the proof uses the gradient restriction provided in "Necessary Gradient Restrictions at the Core of a Voting Rule." Here is a working paper with results on generic properties, here are some slides from a longer talk, and here are slides from a shorter talk. Journal of Theoretical Politics, forthcoming.
"Weak Rationalizability and Arrovian Impossibility Results for Responsive Social Choice" (2018) I give representation theorems for choice functions satisfying weak rationality conditions, and I use these to deduce impossibility theorems for preference aggregation satisfying responsiveness conditions along with weak (or no!) rationality conditions. Public Choice, forthcoming.
"Existence and Indeterminacy of Markovian Equilibria in Dynamic Bargaining Games" (2017) with Vincent Anesi. We show that if certain gradient restrictions hold at an alternative, then when players are sufficiently patient, there is a continuum of equilibria with absorbing sets arbitrarily close to that alternative. Here is a longer working paper with a result that delivers a continuum of Pareto efficient equilibria. Here are some slides from a talk. Theoretical Economics, forthcoming.
“The Political Economy of Dynamic Elections: Accountability, Commitment, and Responsiveness” (2017) with Cesar Martinelli. This paper contains a survey and synthesis of the literature on electoral accountability, i.e., repeated elections in which politicians cannot commit their policy choices. We establish sets of conditions under which policy choices nevertheless reflect the preferences of the median voter. Here is the latest version before publication. Here is a working paper that contains proofs omitted from the shorter paper. Journal of Economic Literature, 55: 916--984.
“Term Limits and Bounds on Policy Responsiveness in Dynamic Elections” (2017) I examine the possibility of policy responsiveness in an infinite-horizon model of elections with a two-period term limit, under the assumption of adverse selection and moral hazard. I characterize equilibria and prove existence of equilibrium, pointing out and correcting an error in the proof of Banks and Sundaram (1998). The current version contains corrections of many errors in the previous version. Here are some slides from a talk. Journal of Economic Theory, 170: 426--463.
“Dynamic Bargaining and Stability with Veto Players” (2017) with Vincent Anesi. We establish ergodic properties of equilibria in the finite environment of Anesi (2012), and we show that when players are patient and the voting rule is oligarchical, a set is a von Neumann-Morgenstern solution if and only if it consists of the absorbing points of an equilibrium. We also establish this result in the model with general voting rule and a persistent agenda setter. Games and Economic Behavior, 103: 30--40.
“Existence of Stationary Bargaining Equilibria” (2017) An existence theorem for stationary equilibria in a general class of bargaining models assuming only continuity and compactness conditions -- no convexity or comprehensiveness assumptions are used. This is a revision of the paper formerly known as “Coalitional Bargaining Equilibria”. Here are some slides from a shorter talk that was pretty good. Here are some slides from a longer talk that was probably less clear. Games and Economic Behavior, 102: 111--126.
“May’s Theorem in One Dimension” (2017) I provide characterizations of majority rule using the axioms of Kenneth May, but assuming single-peaked preferences and substituting transitivity properties for the more controversial positive responsiveness axiom. Journal of Theoretical Politics,29: 3--21.
"Limits of Acyclic Voting" (2016) An Arrovian result for acyclic social choice under the independence of irrelevant alternatives. This is an abbreviated version of “Limits of Acyclic Voting and Nash Implementation,” less the implementation result, plus results for saturated domains, large numbers of alternatives, and a version of acyclicity that precludes cycles of an arbitrary, fixed length. Here is a version of “Limits of Acyclic Voting and Nash Implementation" with cool, throwback type setting. Journal of Economic Theory, 163: 658--683.
“Preference Exclusions for Social Rationality” (2015) I provide conditions for transitive and acyclic voting under general preference restrictions, and I extend known results for value restriction, single peakedness, weak single peakedness, and order restriction. For median voter theorems and representative voter theorems, see my unpublished paper, “Value Restriction, Median Voters, and the Core.” Social Choice and Welfare, 46: 93--118.
"Dynamic Legislative Policy Making" (2012) with Tasos Kalandrakis, Journal of Economic Theory, 147: 1653--1688. Here is the last version prior to publication. Here are slides from a talk that mainly focusses on existence and properties of equilibrium, and here are some slides from a talk specifically on our core convergence result.
"Bargaining Foundations of the Median Voter Theorem" (2009) with Seok-ju Cho, Journal of Economic Theory, 144: 851--868. Here is the final version prior to publication. Here is a working paper that allows for an even number of voters and heterogeneous discount factors. Here are some slides from a short seminar, here are some slides from a longer presentation at the Wallis conference, and here are some detailed slides.
"Dynamics of the Presidential Veto: A Computational Analysis" (2008) with Tasos Kalandrakis and Vikram Manjunath, Mathematical and Computer Modelling, 48: 1570--1589. Here is the final version of the paper prior to publication.
"Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates" (2007) with Dan Bernhardt and Francesco Squintani, Games and Economic Behavior, 58: 1--29. Here is the last version prior to publication. For a more general, somewhat less readable version of the paper, click here. Here are some slides from a talk.
"Social Choice and Electoral Competition in the General Spatial Model" (2006) with Jeff Banks and Michel Le Breton, Journal of Economic Theory, 126: 194--234. Here is the last version prior to publication.
"Candidate Objectives and Electoral Equilibrium" (2006) in The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy, Barry Weingast and Donald Wittman, eds., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
“Probabilistic Voting in the Spatial Model of Elections: The Theory of Office-Motivated Candidates” (2005) in Social Choice and Strategic Decisions: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey S. Banks,David Austen-Smith and John Duggan, eds., New York: Springer. Here is the last version prior to publication.
"Electoral Competition with Policy-Motivated Candidates" (2005) with Mark Fey, Games and Economic Behavior, 51: 490--522. Here is the last version prior to publication. Here are some slides from a talk.
"Implementing the Efficient Allocation of Pollution" (2002) with Joanne Roberts, American Economic Review, 92: 1070--1078. Here is the last version prior to publication, and here is a version that includes an analysis of the model with incomplete information.
"Bounds for Mixed Strategy Equilibria and the Spatial Model of Elections" (2002) with Jeff Banks and Michel Le Breton, Journal of Economic Theory, 103: 88--105. Here is the last version prior to publication.
"Mixed Refinements of Shapley's Saddles and Weak Tournaments" (2001) with Michel Le Breton, Social Choice and Welfare, 8: 65--78. Here is CORE Discussion Paper no. 9921, which contains more material on weak tournaments and rationalizable sets.
"Strategic Manipulability without Resoluteness or Shared Beliefs: Gibbard-Satterthwaite Generalized" (2000) with Tom Schwartz, Social Choice and Welfare, 17: 85--93. Here is the last version prior to publication, and here is Caltech Social Science Working Paper no. 817, which contains a version of our result with a stronger range condition and weaker non-dictatorship condition.