I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at the University of Virginia. My research interests are industrial organization, antitrust, spatial economics, and real estate.
Email: bxm2vk@virginia.edu
CV: PDF
I am a Ph.D. Candidate in Economics at the University of Virginia. My research interests are industrial organization, antitrust, spatial economics, and real estate.
Email: bxm2vk@virginia.edu
CV: PDF
Working Papers
Penetrating Regionally Fragmented Markets with Serial Acquisitions and Superior Management
Serial acquisitions can transform fragmented industries without a single large merger, making their cumulative effects central to competition policy. I study how operating efficiencies and local market power jointly shape consolidation through private equity rollups. Using Texas retail gasoline data on ownership, acquisitions, prices, and consumer travel patterns, I develop a dynamic spatial model of acquisition, entry, exit, and pricing. The model links management efficiencies across an acquirer’s portfolio to its expansion decisions and independent owners’ incentives to sell. The framework is designed to distinguish efficiency gains from market power created by consolidated ownership and to assess how oversight of acquisition sequences affects prices, consumer welfare, and the evolution of local competition.
Snavely Distinguished Dissertation Proposal Award, UVA (2026); Snavely Prize for Best Second Year Paper, UVA (2025)
Growth Without Productivity: Market Concentration in U.S. Residential Construction
The expansion of large U.S. homebuilders alongside stagnant construction productivity challenges the view that concentration reflects the growth of more efficient firms. Using nationwide deed records covering nearly 10 million new-home sales, I document rising concentration in national and local markets and develop a dynamic model of competition between national and local builders. In the model, complex land-use regulation raises the cost of entering new markets, favoring acquisitions that provide local regulatory knowledge and land pipelines. Greater market share can lower construction and financing costs through bargaining power with subcontractors, suppliers, and lenders, without necessarily improving production technology. These predictable gains may favor acquisition-led growth over risky productivity investment. The framework is designed to evaluate how regulatory reform, acquisition policies, and investment incentives could affect concentration, productivity, housing supply, and affordability.
Pre-Doctoral Work
Asymmetric Mortgage Channel of Monetary Policy: Refinancing as a Call Option
with Sangyup Choi and Jiseob Kim
Revise and Resubmit, International Economic Review
One Size Does Not Fit All: Unveiling Asymmetric Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area
with Sangyup Choi and Jiseob Kim
Revise and Resubmit, Journal of Banking and Finance
Upcoming Presentation
Asia-Pacific Industrial Organization Conference (APIOC), Xiamen University, December 2026