Research
Publications and Accepted Articles
Games and Economic Behavior, 2022
Abstract
Psychological motivation is generally private information which generates fundamental uncertainty about others' psychological sensitivity. We incorporate uncertainty about others' reciprocal motivation into existing models of reciprocity (Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993) and propose an equilibrium concept, called Bayesian reciprocity equilibrium. We prove that an equilibrium exists. Then, we apply the theory to solve the prisoners' dilemma. In this example, we show that a small amount of uncertainty in reciprocal motivation can eliminate cooperation via iterated elimination of dominated strategies, unlike the complete information case in which cooperation is supported as an equilibrium outcome.
Unraveling Into War: Trust and Social Preferences in Hobbes's State of Nature ( with Alex Schaefer) [PDF] Economics and Philosophy, 2022
Abstract
This paper models Hobbes’s state of nature as an interaction between rational agents with social preferences. According to Hobbes, agents care about their relative standing and this influences their behavior. In a strategic context, therefore, agents also care about the social preferences of others, since such preferences will partially determine others’ choice of strategy. Introducing uncertainty regarding the social preferences of others unleashes a process of trust-unraveling, ultimately leading to Hobbes’s “state of war.” This new model improves upon what we call first wave models by incorporating uncertainty as a crucial element in explaining the emergence of war. It also improves upon newer, second wave models by allowing a wide range of types and by deducing the state of war in a purely a priori manner rather than seeking recourse to computer simulations. This a priori approach better captures Hobbes’s argument by conforming to his avowed geometric method.
Work In Progress
On the Effectiveness of Leading by Example in Public Goods Games (with Dooseok Jang)
A Model of Reactions to Streaks: Bayesian Inference by Believers in Serial Dependence
Keep Your Money: Experimental Study on Psychological Punishment (with Senran Lin)
Level-k and Psychological Play (with Martin Dufwenberg)
Abilene Paradox (with Rachel Mannahan and Lia Quadros)
Ratianalizing Buffet Pricing (with JunYi Peng Zhou)