Working papers

How Match Information Shapes Price Competition (Job Market Paper, 2025)

Abstract: I model salary competition between two employers for a candidate who privately learns about her relative match quality. Learning improves match quality but reduces competition, so the net effect on surplus depends on the ratio of productivity to match value. The main result is that not learning maximizes expected surplus when productivity is relatively high. Extensions to auction and labor markets with match-specific productivity show that committing to ignore match quality can be optimal for the party with the opportunity to learn. When such commitment is impossible, openly sharing match preferences increases the surplus of the information-advantaged side. These results suggest that mechanisms such as price-only procurement rules or mandatory disclosure of match quality can enhance the surplus of the party being competed for.

Protected but Punished? Wage Effects of Whistleblower Protection (CEPR Discussion Paper, 2025) 

with Jae Cho and Tobias Kretschmer

Abstract: We examine the impact of whistleblowing protection laws on  wages, integrating both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We find that strengthened legal protection leads to significant shifts in wage levels, highlighting an unexpected consequence of these legal changes. Specifically, companies with a history of misconduct may lower wages for their employees in response to enhanced whistleblower protection. Our analysis indicates that this wage decline is largely driven by the use of secrecy terms, such as non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).

Work in progress

The Walk-Away Effect on Monopoly Pricing

This paper examines monopolistic pricing when the buyer is uninformed about her own valuation, while the monopolist holds full information. It analyzes the welfare consequences of the interaction between the monopolist and the buyer. The monopolist's surplus is maximized with uniform pricing set at the buyer's prior expected valuation. In contrast, the buyer's surplus is maximized through uniform pricing at the lowest valuation, combined with a strategic purchasing approach, namely walk-away strategy. The findings suggest that educating buyers on strategies like the walk-away approach can enhance their surplus and help balance power in monopolistic markets.

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