Working papers

How Match Information Shapes Price Competition (Job Market Paper, 2025)

Abstract: I model salary competition between two employers for a job candidate who privately learns about her relative match quality. The candidate’s learning improves match quality and reduces competition, with the dominant effect depending on the ratio of her productivity to the value placed on match quality. When productivity is relatively low, employers offer a minimal wage without competition, making learning beneficial. When productivity is high, however, employers compete—but less so as learning becomes more precise—making it preferable for the candidate not to learn. These results extend to other competitive settings and suggest that commitment to ignoring match quality—like price-only rules in public procurement—can boost competition. In private markets, where such commitment is difficult, openly sharing preferences can increase surplus.

Protected but Punished? Wage Effects of Whistleblower Protection (CEPR Discussion Paper, 2025) 

with Jae Cho and Tobias Kretschmer

Abstract: We examine the impact of whistleblowing protection laws on  wages, integrating both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We find that strengthened legal protection leads to significant shifts in wage levels, highlighting an unexpected consequence of these legal changes. Specifically, companies with a history of misconduct may lower wages for their employees in response to enhanced whistleblower protection. Our analysis indicates that this wage decline is largely driven by the use of secrecy terms, such as non-disclosure agreements (NDAs).

Work in progress

The Walk-Away Effect on Monopoly Pricing

This paper examines monopolistic pricing when the buyer is uninformed about her own valuation, while the monopolist holds full information. It analyzes the welfare consequences of the interaction between the monopolist and the buyer. The monopolist's surplus is maximized with uniform pricing set at the buyer's prior expected valuation. In contrast, the buyer's surplus is maximized through uniform pricing at the lowest valuation, combined with a strategic purchasing approach, namely walk-away strategy. The findings suggest that educating buyers on strategies like the walk-away approach can enhance their surplus and help balance power in monopolistic markets.

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