Jingcheng Jiang 

Abstract: Can anti-corruption enforcement improve the allocative efficiency of industrial policy? This paper examines how politicians' hometown ties distort subsidy allocation and whether institutional enforcement can correct such distortions. Exploiting China's 2013 anti-corruption inspections, I find that enforcement reduced subsidies for firms connected to locally-born leaders, with effects concentrated among opaquely described allocations—consistent with politicians curtailing corrupt rather than legitimate transfers when monitoring intensifies. Reductions operate through behavioral change among continuing officials, and hometown subsidies shifted from predicting career advancement to becoming career liabilities, revealing disrupted clientelistic equilibria. Despite reduced transfers, productivity increased in affected regions, with gains concentrated among smaller firms previously disadvantaged by political connections. These findings demonstrate that politician-firm collusion generates substantial resource misallocation, while credible enforcement restores competitive dynamics and improves aggregate efficiency.

Abstract: What explains the recent surge of automation in China? We argue that the fragility of the migrant labor supply is a primary driver. Exploiting the COVID-19 pandemic as an exogenous shock to internal mobility, we examine whether binding labor scarcity induces directed technical change. Combining household survey, robot installations, and automation patent applications in a difference-in-differences framework, we find that the sudden unavailability of migrant workers triggered a sharp acceleration in capital deepening. Regions with higher pre-pandemic dependence on non-agricultural labor experienced significant growth in robotics and manipulator patents, while total patenting remained unchanged—indicating targeted labor-saving innovation rather than broader R&D expansion. These effects are concentrated in tight labor markets with high migration dependence, a pattern inconsistent with demand shocks, health concerns, or secular trends. Our findings demonstrate that temporary mobility restrictions can generate persistent industrial upgrading by redirecting technological change when labor constraints bind.

Abstract:  This paper documents heterogeneous effects of agricultural price shocks on child labor and human capital in rural China, driven by crop skill intensity. Using a shift-share design interacting global price fluctuations with baseline local cropping patterns, we classify crops as labor- or skill-intensive via farmer education data. Price increases for labor-intensive crops significantly reduce middle school enrollment and increase child labor, while skill-intensive crop price increases promote higher education. Farm- and individual-level data corroborate these mechanisms via income, land use, and educational spending responses. Our findings show that these price dynamics yield lasting gender disparities in human capital, with crop-specific shocks imposing differential costs on girls' education and benefits for boys. This study illustrates a crucial mechanism through which trade shocks can perpetuate inequality and influence development trajectories.

Abstract: I examine how the tenure of local political leaders affects land markets, fiscal capacity, and economic geography in China. Using a panel dataset linking city politicians to land transactions, fiscal accounts, and trade flows, I document three stylized facts: industrial land is initially priced substantially below residential land by local politicians, but this gap narrows as politicians' tenure lengthens; longer tenure correlates with systematic reallocation of land from industrial to residential use, reducing support for tradable goods production; and central government fiscal transfers decline with political tenure, increasing local governments' dependence on residential land sales revenue. To interpret these findings, I develop a multi-region spatial general equilibrium model with trade and costly migration in which local governments facing tenure-dependent fiscal transfers choose optimal land allocation between industrial and residential uses. Industrial land enhances tradable goods productivity and reduces migration costs, while residential land generates fiscal rents but only supports nontradable production. When calibrated to match city-level data on land prices, land-use shares, and tenure-trade elasticities, the model attributes approximately 30% of observed intercity trade decline and 25% of export contraction to tenure-driven land price convergence and reallocation effects. Counterfactual simulations show that policies stabilizing fiscal transfers or fixing industrial land prices would substantially mitigate these negative effects, increasing aggregate welfare by roughly 0.8%, with gains concentrated in more industrialized cities.