Abstract Family formation is associated with sharp declines in men’s criminal activity, but the underlying mechanisms remain underexplored. This paper proposes and tests an intrahousehold bargaining mechanism. Entering a union, whether through cohabitation or marriage, brings previously unconstrained risky behavior into household negotiation. Partner disapproval creates demand for change, while bargaining power determines how strongly that demand translates into behavioral change. Using individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) linked to gender-specific local labor demand shocks, I show that men’s likelihood of arrest falls as their female partners’ relative labor market opportunities improve, a proxy for bargaining power. Arrest declines are also larger among men with higher baseline risk, consistent with more previously unconstrained behavior becoming subject to household negotiation. The bargaining-power association is at least as strong in cohabitation as in marriage, inconsistent with explanations based solely on legal marriage or marital identity.
Abstract Female empowerment is intended to improve women’s welfare, yet empirical evidence often reveals a non-monotonic relationship between women’s outside options and household conflict. I develop a household bargaining model, building on Hirschman’s exit-voice framework, that explains this pattern. By modeling bargaining access as contested rather than automatic, I formalize a strategic gap between activated voice and credible exit. Early gains activate voice without fully deterring resistance, raising conflict; further gains make exit credible and reduce resistance, producing an inverse-U pattern. The framework reframes conflict as an equilibrium outcome of contested bargaining access rather than as backlash against norm violation, suggesting that rising conflict can signal newly activated agency. The model further implies that standard survey measures of agency may conflate silent tolerance, expressive voice, and credible influence.
A supply of household flexibility can create its own demand: when families can absorb the demands of work, firms have greater incentive to design jobs that require continuous worker availability.
How belief-based incentives are designed and maintained to keep people believing and trying for longer.