Abstract Family formation is associated with sharp declines in men’s criminal activity, but the underlying mechanisms remain underexplored. This paper proposes and tests an intrahousehold bargaining mechanism. Entering a union, whether through cohabitation or marriage, brings otherwise unconstrained risky behaviors under joint decision-making. Partner disapproval creates demand for change, while bargaining power provides leverage to enforce it. Using individual-level panel data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 (NLSY97) linked to gender-specific local labor demand shocks, I show that improvements in women’s relative labor market opportunities, used as a proxy for bargaining power, reduce their male partners’ likelihood of arrest. The largest declines occur among high-risk men paired with high-leverage female partners. The effects are at least as strong for cohabitation as for marriage, consistent with a bargaining-based mechanism of desistance rather than explanations based solely on selection into unions or identity change.
Abstract Female empowerment is intended to improve women’s welfare, yet empirical evidence often reveals a non-monotonic relationship between women’s outside options and household conflict. I develop a household bargaining model, building on Hirschman’s exit-voice framework, that explains this pattern. By modeling bargaining access as contested rather than automatic, I formalize a strategic gap between activated voice and credible exit. Early gains activate voice without fully deterring resistance, raising conflict; further gains make exit credible and reduce resistance, producing an inverse-U pattern. The framework reframes conflict as an equilibrium outcome of contested bargaining access rather than as backlash against norm violation, suggesting that rising conflict can signal newly activated agency. The model further implies that standard survey measures of agency may conflate silent tolerance, expressive voice, and credible influence.