Working papers
Belief Granularity, Market Liquidity and Price Efficiency, with David Storey
(Draft available upon request)
Presentations: Market Microstructure Summer School 2025, FMA Asia 2025, Warwick Business School
Abstract
We model investors’ decisions to use coarse thinking to process information and the effects of this on asset markets. Agents with weak priors may choose to pool together their signals across assets to mitigate the problem of overfitting. This model of coarse information processing helps explain features of return comovement in markets that are hard to explain with existing models based on rational expectations or limited attention. Theoretically and empirically, we demonstrate a link between return comovement and return predictability.
(Draft available upon request)
Presentations: Market Microstructure Summer School 2024, Warwick Business School
Abstract
This paper develops a game-theoretic model of endogenous liquidity fragmentation in decentralized exchanges with automated market makers. Liquidity providers strategically create competing pools, while traders optimally split orders across pools by balancing price impact and gas fees. When gas fees are sufficiently small, no pure-strategy equilibrium exists because entry by additional pools is always profitable. For intermediate gas fees, multiple fragmented equilibria may coexist. For sufficiently large gas fees, fragmentation collapses and the market converges to a unique one-pool equilibrium. We then show that front-running creates an additional motive for fragmentation: by splitting orders across pools, traders reduce rents extractable through sandwich attacks. Thus fragmentation can arise as a defensive response to predatory transaction ordering. The equilibrium degree of fragmentation is endogenously determined by the interaction of gas fees, entry incentives, and front-running risk.