(1) Silencing Dissent: Shrinking Space for Political Opposition and Accelerating Democratic Recession in Indonesia (subject to be submitted by the end of 2025)

In this paper, I argue that strategies and maneuvers implemented by ruling elites in Indonesia to demobilize and repress opposing voices have become increasingly pervasive and comprehensive since the beginning of Jokowi’s second presidential term. More specifically, the ongoing executive aggrandizement is distinct from its predecessor in the following three points. First, the military and uncivil organizations attached to political notables have made a comeback on the country’s political scene, and have arisen as two main proxies of ruling elites willing to enfeeble the opposing voices in civil society. Second, compared to the past, elected officials and their supporting elite groups are more blunt in expressing and practicing their antagonism toward critics and opponents. This trend becomes more salient alongside the beginning of the presidency under Prabowo Subianto in 2024, whose democratic commitment is more questionable than that of his predecessor, Jokowi. And lastly, using various options, including cooptation, legal threats to freedom of expression in both online and offline contexts, and populist rhetoric that divides “us” and “them,” the targets of executive aggrandizement are broader than previously, and include virtually all possible candidates for mobilizing dissent and opposition. In turn, while representatives of opposition forces, notably civil society and student activists, have sometimes posed few challenges to the elites’ attempts to dismantle accountability mechanisms, their space for mobilizing public dissent has been continuously shrinking.

(3) The Conditional Effect of Recipient Citizens’ Perception of ODA Donor Countries: Focusing on the Trust in Government among Indonesian Citizens (co-worked with GIL, Jung Ah) (subject to be submitted by the end of 2025)

(5) Prices of Candlelight: Varied Outcomes of the Peaceful Popular Protests in three Asian countries (co-worked with Alice Guglielmini) (subject to be submitted by early 2026)

Using the framework of the political opportunity structure theorized by students of contentious politics, this paper argues that country-specific political and institutional settings defining the room for using repressive state measures play a key role in determining the outcome of peaceful popular protests like candlelight vigils. In Korea, the “Candlelight Revolution” was able to achieve its goals and avoid violent events thanks to the country's institutional structure and authorities refraining from using force. On the contrary, candlelight protests in Hong Kong failed to reach their objectives because the political institutions did not allow them, and the authorities escalated violent events. Lastly, the half-hearted achievement of the recent Thai protests was caused by a political class unwilling or unable to listen to the people’s demands and choosing to respond with force – that is, a lack of political opportunities.