Research

Working Papers

This paper analyzes a model of multiple overconfident traders submitting market orders where traders' private information is subject to correlated errors, as well as its extension to endogenous information. We consider two standard types of overconfidence: overconfidence in own signals and underconfidence in others' signals. The analyses on the effects of overconfidence on traders' behavior and the equilibrium price suggest that these effects are richer than our typical understanding of overconfidence focusing on its positive effect on trading volume as follows: First, trading volume may increase or decrease with overconfidence depending on its type. Second, these different types of overconfidence may differ radically on the patterns of trading volume and price informativeness with respect to the number of traders. Third, overconfidence can cause equilibrium multiplicity in information acquisition.



This paper studies the interdependence of myopic corporate behavior and the so-called feedback effect, where financial prices contain useful information for corporate decision making. We model the feedback effect in a mostly standard trading environment, except that the existence of equilibrium and its tractable analysis are ensured by Pareto distribution of productivity. The analysis shows that the feedback effect causes a price inflation and the resulting long-term inefficiency, which can be understood in the context of innovation strategies. This illustrates a challenge in extending the argument on the informational role of financial markets to the long-term productive efficiency.



Publications

Theory papers:

Empirical papers: