Research
Research
We explore the interplay between two key drivers of individual green consumption: environmental preferences and social image concerns, when both conspicuous goods and green goods contribute to social image. We consider four lifestyles crossing two characteristics (Green/Brown) x (Conspicuous/Ordinary), all differing in environmental impacts and status benefits. Our working hypothesis is that the more one cares about the environment, the more one weighs green consumption relative to conspicuous consumption in social image benefits, allowing environmentally sensitive agents to achieve moral consistency. Our model generates two general insights under such type of preferences. First, under moral consistency in image benefits, the environmental impact of consumption does not necessarily decrease monotonically when environmental preferences increase. This impact depends on relative impact-intensities, i.e., on pollution per dollar rather than per unit of goods, giving rise to possible volume effects and behavioral rebound. When Green Conspicuous goods have relatively low impact intensity, increasing environmental concern above some threshold may paradoxically raise pollution when image is morally consistent. Second, Green Conspicuous goods smooth the behavioral change from Brown Conspicuous to Green Ordinary lifestyles when environmental preferences change, offering individuals with intermediate environmental concern and strong image motives greener options while maintaining social image from conspicuous consumption. These results show that image-driven green consumption does not automatically reduce environmental damage, and highlight both the potential and the limits of conspicuous green goods in reconciling Eco and Ego in consumer behavior.
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Presentations of this work: FAERE Doctoral Workshop (March 2024), Internal PhD Seminar (June 2024), FAERE Annual Conference (September 2024), 30th EAERE Conference in Bergen (June 2025), 24th Journées LAGV in Marseille (July 2025), 14th Mannheim Conference on Energy and the Environment (May 2026)
Upcoming presentations: World Congress of Environmental and Resource Economists (WCERE) in Lisbon (July 2026)
We investigate how social image concerns and pro-environmental motivation shape vegetarian (and organic) food choices among university students using a lab-in-the-field experiment in a student canteen (N = 238), where participants chose between vegetarian and meat-based dishes. In treated groups, an organic vegetarian option was made publicly salient through a distinctive green tray, increasing its social visibility. We find a significant interaction between the treatment and image-oriented behavioral tendencies, suggesting the nudge operates selectively among individuals with stronger baseline reputational concerns, a pattern consistent with a social shaming mechanism whereby the green tray raises the reputational cost of the meat choice rather than the reputational benefit of the organic one. Indeed, our main pre-registered hypothesis that greater visibility should increase the share of vegetarian choices and raise demand for the more expensive organic option is not confirmed by our data: we find no significant average treatment effect on either the pooled vegetarian vs. meat margin or the organic vegetarian margin specifically. This interpretation is reinforced by the contrast between the two margins: while the treatment heterogeneity result survives on the vegetarian margin, it vanishes on the organic margin, where choices are instead driven by domain-specific willingness-to-pay and price sensitivity. We also document a counterintuitive positive effect of perceived peer meat consumption on vegetarian choice, which we explore using post-experimental survey data: the effect is concentrated among image-motivated individuals, pointing toward distinction-seeking rather than conformity as the operative norm mechanism. Taken together, these findings suggest that social visibility nudges do operate through reputational channels, with effectiveness conditioned on pre-existing behavioral dispositions, and they carry practical implications for the design of interventions targeting young adults' food demand.
Presentations of this work: Paris Junior Experimentalists Meetings (November 2024), Environmental Economics Seminar, University of Gothenburg (May 2025), CREST-PSAE Workshop (April 2026), PSAE Internal Seminar, Journées LAGV in Aix-en-Provence (June 2026), 16th Annual Conference of the French Association of Experimental Economics (ASFEE) in Lille (June 2026)
Upcoming presentations: 13th Annual Conference of the French Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (September 2026)
This paper develops a dynamic self-signaling model of sequential pro-environmental behavior with motivated belief updating. Individuals differ in intrinsic prosocial motivation and choose sequentially between two pro-environmental actions. In addition to discounted material payoffs from contributing to a public good, agents derive self-image utility from seeing themselves as morally motivated. Because individuals forget their type after the first period, they must infer it from their initial behavior when making subsequent decisions. The first action thus serves as a signal to the future self, creating an intrapersonal signaling problem in which initial behavior affects both self-image and future choices. We extend the self-signaling framework of Benabou and Tirole (2011) by explicitly focusing on subsequent behavior rather than identity formation in the first action. The model generates endogenous behavioral spillovers: the initial action affects second-period behavior through updated self-beliefs, and this can either reinforce or crowd out further pro-environmental effort. We characterize Perfect Bayesian Equilibria and map equilibrium configurations in the cost–self-image space. The equilibrium set typically features transitions from full inaction, to separating equilibria in which only high-motivation types undertake initial and/or sustained action, and finally to pooling equilibria with full contribution. As a result, the same primitives can generate positive or negative policy spillovers in terms of probability to take a second pro-environmental action when a policy plays on the incentives to take the first one. Overall, the model provides a unified intrapersonal signaling foundation for heterogeneous behavioral responses to environmental incentives and policies, speaking to the complex intertemporal effects of demand-based green policies.
Recently presented at the PSAE PhD Seminar and at the Parisian PhD Seminar in Environmental Economics.
Next presentation: Workshop on Cognitive Economics in Herrsching am Ammersee (August 24-25)