Presentations: 2026 Global Entrepreneurship and Innovation Research Conference (GEIRC - Cambridge), 2026 ENTFIN - 10th Anniversary Conference, GLOBAFA Madrid, IFC/WBG DEC-PM Brownbag Seminar, Columbia Business School, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, private sector presentations
Venture capital investing has three key features which impact its risk characteristics: cyclicality, intangibility, and a narrow industry focus. I propose two new venture-capital specific risk factors: intangible investment intensity and technology-sector specialization. I motivate these factors in a model of venture capital general partners facing both investment and fundraising risk. By making more intangible or sector-focused investments, general partners risk not being able to raise new funds from their investors (limited partners) during downturns. This exposure demands risk compensation for general partners beyond common public market benchmarks. The model generates this compensation by allowing them to benefit more strongly from technology shocks when making more intangible or sector-focused investments, at least on average. Consistent with the model, I find startup investments associated with higher levels of intangibility (sector focus) to generate higher round-to-exit returns and to be more likely to be acquired or file for an initial public offering.
Factor Model Selection Using the ICAPM, joint with Paul Glasserman and Harry Mamaysky
Presentations: Econometric Society North America Meeting (AMES) 2026, FMA Applied Research Conference 2026, FMA European Conference 2026, 2026 RCEA Rimini Center Conference, 42nd International Conference of the Association Française de Finance (AFFI), IFC/WBG DEC-PM Brownbag Seminar, Academy of Finance
Scheduled: 2026 European Meeting of the Econometric Society (ESEM), 2026 Asia Meeting of the Econometric Society (AMES), Vieco 2026- Vienna-Copenhagen Conference on Financial Econometrics, 2026 FMA Annual Meeting, 2026 Southern Finance Association
Using market data together with household-level consumption data, we extend the factor model ICAPM consistency test of Maio and Santa-Clara (2012). We find that more consistent factor models have less persistent alphas, and more stable betas and out-of-sample mean squared errors. We propose a novel statistical test for the sign of the consistency-stability relationship across many factor models and over time. Our methodology allows for the identification of the historically most ICAPM-consistent factor models and factors. Our results suggest that historically consistent models are likely to be stable in the future.
What Does Venture Capital Actually Finance? Scale and Structure around the World, joint with Santiago Reyes, Paolo Mauro, Kianna Freeman, Marcio Cruz, Pablo Kaminsky, Cesaire Meh
Presentations: 8th EBRD and CEPR Research Symposium on The Frontiers of Finance in Emerging Markets (co-author).
This paper studies venture capital activity around the world with a particular focus on emerging markets
IFC/WBG Report on Lowering the Cost of Equity for Businesses in Low- and Middle-Income Countries, led by Paolo Mauro and Cesaire Meh
Corporate Taxation, Leverage and Macroeconomic Stability, joint with Franziska Bremus
DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus 93, 2016 - DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research
Macro-Managed Factor Portfolios
In this paper, I construct portfolios hedging factor performance across different macroeconomic environments. Using a big data approach, I am able to improve traditional factor performance by 1.09-3.4% p.a. on a risk-adjusted basis with monthly rebalancing. A long-short portfolio of volatility-hedged portfolios of Muir and Moreira (2016) traded on the same signals delivers risk-adjusted outperformance of 3.24% per year over the original strategies.
Financing Innovation under Financial Feedback Effects
This paper proposes a novel closed-form model of innovative firms seeking to attract R&D financing in the presence of financial feedback effects and asymmetric information. The model features investment complementarities and multiple equilibria, an inefficient low investment equilibrium and an efficient high investment equilibrium. I then derive conditions under which firms engage in risky showcasing to achieve the high investment equilibrium.