"Strategic Innovation, Spillovers, and Growth" - Job Market Paper [Link to Paper]
This paper develops a general equilibrium model of endogenous growth in which firms’ distance from the technological frontier shapes innovation incentives and market structure. I extend the step-by-step quality-ladder with CES demand by including fixed operating costs. These costs endogenously determine the technology gap at which a laggard stops producing. The inactive firm retains its technology, may continue to innovate, and can reenter. This duopoly boundary changes R&D incentives on both sides of the market: leaders innovate toward monopoly, while laggards invest to remain active competitors.
Motivated by U.S. evidence of persistent distance from the frontier, continued R&D by distant laggards, and variation in knowledge diffusion across technology gaps, the baseline model allows spillovers to increase with technological backwardness. I jointly estimate the innovation step size, R&D cost scale, fixed labor requirement, and spillover intensity using simulated method of moments. The five targets are utilization-adjusted TFP growth, business R&D relative to GDP, SG&A relative to sales as a proxy for operating costs, and the mean and standard deviation of laggard distance from the industry-year frontier, measured using intangible intensity. The calibrated economy sustains persistent technology gaps alongside active laggard innovation. Counterfactuals show that spillovers reaching distant laggards and outside firms preserve reentry pressure and support growth. Spillovers concentrated near the frontier instead bring firms closer to neck-and-neck competition but crowd out private R&D and lower long-run growth. The growth effect of knowledge diffusion therefore depends on where it reaches firms in the distribution of technology gaps.
"Trade Frictions, Firm Survival, and Technological Catch-Up"
This paper studies when trade protection promotes technological catch-up and when it instead sustains inefficient domestic laggards. The model features domestic firms competing with higher-quality imported intermediates, with trade frictions and fixed operating costs determining whether lagging firms remain active or exit the market. Protection can preserve domestic production and give lagging firms additional time and market share to invest in innovation, but it can also weaken competitive incentives and allow technologically obsolete firms to survive without catching up. The framework is used to characterize how policies such as tariffs, trade costs, and innovation subsidies affect domestic survival, innovation, and the evolution of technology gaps, and to identify the conditions under which protection encourages catch-up rather than persistent inefficiency.
"Operating-Cost Asymmetry, Innovation, and Labor Allocation"