Abstract: Income mobility is often invoked as a counterweight to slow income growth and rising inequality, yet conclusions on who benefits from mobility depend on the part of the income distribution examined and metric used. Drawing on harmonised administrative records from Austria, Belgium, Estonia and Spain, we combine relative and absolute mobility metrics to document disposable income dynamics for working-age individuals along the distribution. Bottom-income earners experience markedly different income growth across countries, while those at the top experience homogeneous declines. Similarly, rank persistence varies substantially across countries, from 0.64 in Estonia to 0.79 in Spain, but top incomes are highly persistent everywhere, largely insulated from country-specific mobility dynamics. Mobility gaps by age, gender, education and place of residence also change in sign and magnitude depending on people’s starting point. We further show that different metrics can give conflicting assessments of where mobility is more favourable for those at the bottom, and that countries' inequality and aggregate income growth help explain why. Higher inequality strengthens rank persistence, because where income gaps between ranks are wider, even large differences in income growth along the distribution produce limited movement in ranks. Higher aggregate income growth weakens the narrowing of absolute income gaps, particularly where inequality is high, because even with strongly progressive income growth, those with higher incomes still make large absolute gains. Hence, more unequal or higher-growth countries need more progressive income growth to deliver comparable positional mobility and narrowing of absolute income gaps.

Abstract: Economic change over the past 20 years has rendered many individuals and territories vulnerable, leading to greater interpersonal and interterritorial inequality. This rising inequality is seen as a root cause of populism. Yet, there is no comparative evidence as to whether this discontent is the consequence of localized interpersonal inequality or stagnant growth in ‘left-behind’ places. This article assesses the association between levels and changes in local GDP per capita and interpersonal inequality, and the rise of far-right populism in Europe and in the USA. The analysis—conducted at small region level for Europe and county level for the USA—shows that there are both similarities and differences in the factors connected to populist voting on both sides of the Atlantic. In the USA, neither interpersonal inequality nor economic decline can explain populist support on their own. However, these factors gain significance when considered together with the racial composition of the area. Counties with a large share of white population where economic growth has been stagnant and where inequalities have increased supported Donald Trump. Meanwhile, counties with a similar economic trajectory but with a higher share of minorities shunned populism. In Europe, the most significant factor behind the rise of far-right populism is economic decline. This effect is particularly large in areas with a high share of immigration.

Abstract: In contrast to the conservative values of rural populations, cities are often seen as bulwarks of more tolerant, liberal and progressive values. This urban–rural divide in values has become one of the major fault lines in Western democracies, underpinning major political events of the last decade, not least the election of Donald Trump. Yet, beyond a small number of countries, there is little evidence that cities really are more liberal than rural areas. Evolutionary modernisation theory suggests that socio-economic development may lead to the spread of progressive, self-expression values but provides little guidance on the role of cities in this process. Has an urban–rural split in values developed across the world? And does this gap depend on the economic development of a country? We answer these questions using a large cross-sectional dataset covering 66 countries. Despite the inherent challenges in identifying and operationalising a globally-consistent definition of what is ‘urban’, we show that there are marked and significant urban–rural differences in progressive values, defined as tolerant attitudes to immigration, gender rights and family life. These differences exist even when controlling for observable compositional effects, suggesting that cities do play a role in the spread of progressive values. Yet, these results only apply at higher levels of economic development suggesting that, for cities to leave behind rural areas in terms of liberal values, the satisfying of certain material needs is a prerequisite. 

Abstract: People’s ability to access essential services is key to their labour market and social inclusion. An important dimension of accessibility is physical accessibility, but little cross-country evidence exists on how close people live to the services facilities they need. This paper helps to address this gap, focusing on three types of essential services: Public Employment Services, primary schools and Early Childhood Education and Care. It collects and maps data on the location of these services for a selection of OECD countries and links them with data on population and transport infrastructure. This allows to compute travel times to the nearest service facility and to quantify disparities in accessibility at the regional level. The results highlight substantial inequalities in accessibility of essential services across and within countries. Although large parts of the population can easily reach these services in most countries, some people are relatively underserved. This is particularly the case in non-metropolitan and low-income regions. At the same time, accessibility seems to be associated with the potential demand for these services once accounting for other regional economic and demographic characteristics.