Abstract: We use administrative records from Austria, Belgium, Estonia and Spain to study income dynamics of working-age individuals over five years. Aggregate mobility indices often mask substantial variation in short-term income trajectories for individuals at different points of the distribution. By combining relative and absolute mobility metrics that can be aggregated at the percentile level, we provide granular comparative evidence of intragenerational mobility both across countries and across socio-demographic groups. Our results show that cross-country differences in mobility patterns are particularly pronounced at the bottom and top of the distribution, while outcomes in the middle are more alike. Large cross-country differences in relative income growth or rank advancement at the bottom often translate into only modest differences in absolute living standards, underscoring the importance of considering different mobility metrics when comparing mobility across countries. Overall, Estonia exhibits greater relative and absolute intragenerational mobility than the other three countries. Across demographic groups, individuals with lower educational attainment and immigrants experience weaker mobility outcomes across the entire distribution in all countries. Women experience worse mobility outcomes at the bottom of the distribution, although the gap narrows in the upper half in Belgium, Estonia and Spain. Age and rural–urban differences vary by initial income position and are not consistent across countries.

Abstract: Economic change over the past 20 years has rendered many individuals and territories vulnerable, leading to greater interpersonal and interterritorial inequality. This rising inequality is seen as a root cause of populism. Yet, there is no comparative evidence as to whether this discontent is the consequence of localized interpersonal inequality or stagnant growth in ‘left-behind’ places. This article assesses the association between levels and changes in local GDP per capita and interpersonal inequality, and the rise of far-right populism in Europe and in the USA. The analysis—conducted at small region level for Europe and county level for the USA—shows that there are both similarities and differences in the factors connected to populist voting on both sides of the Atlantic. In the USA, neither interpersonal inequality nor economic decline can explain populist support on their own. However, these factors gain significance when considered together with the racial composition of the area. Counties with a large share of white population where economic growth has been stagnant and where inequalities have increased supported Donald Trump. Meanwhile, counties with a similar economic trajectory but with a higher share of minorities shunned populism. In Europe, the most significant factor behind the rise of far-right populism is economic decline. This effect is particularly large in areas with a high share of immigration.

Abstract: In contrast to the conservative values of rural populations, cities are often seen as bulwarks of more tolerant, liberal and progressive values. This urban–rural divide in values has become one of the major fault lines in Western democracies, underpinning major political events of the last decade, not least the election of Donald Trump. Yet, beyond a small number of countries, there is little evidence that cities really are more liberal than rural areas. Evolutionary modernisation theory suggests that socio-economic development may lead to the spread of progressive, self-expression values but provides little guidance on the role of cities in this process. Has an urban–rural split in values developed across the world? And does this gap depend on the economic development of a country? We answer these questions using a large cross-sectional dataset covering 66 countries. Despite the inherent challenges in identifying and operationalising a globally-consistent definition of what is ‘urban’, we show that there are marked and significant urban–rural differences in progressive values, defined as tolerant attitudes to immigration, gender rights and family life. These differences exist even when controlling for observable compositional effects, suggesting that cities do play a role in the spread of progressive values. Yet, these results only apply at higher levels of economic development suggesting that, for cities to leave behind rural areas in terms of liberal values, the satisfying of certain material needs is a prerequisite.