Research

Publications/Accepted Papers

“Self-Enforcing Contracts with Persistence” with Martin Dumav and William Fuchs

(Journal of Monetary Economics, 2022)

Working Papers

“Confidentiality and Competition in Concurrent Bargaining”

(R&R at the Review of Financial Studies)

(Previously titled "Price Experimentation in Confidential Negotiations")

I analyze a dynamic model of concurrent bargaining in which multiple prospective buyers compete to trade with an informed seller. When the seller maintains confidentiality over buyers' past offers, buyers may engage in competitive ``price experimentation'': buyers risk early losses to subsequently acquire informational advantages over competitors and expect to earn future information rents. Due to price experimentation, the seller may benefit from maintaining confidentiality over past offers and restricting buyer entry. The model has implications for the strategic choice between auctions and negotiations, and for the common use of ``pre-qualification'' in asset sales.

WFA, Annual Conference of the EALE, Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, AEFIN Finance Forum, Barcelona GSE Workshop, CICF, Durham Economic Theory Conference, Econometric Society Meetings, FTG Summer School, Hong Kong Joint Finance Workshop, Stanford SITE - Dynamic Games, Contracts and Markets, World Congress of the Game Theory Society, McCombs School of Business, CUHK, and Korea University

“Exploitation Payoffs and Incentives for Exploration” with William Fuchs

We study optimal contracting for innovation projects involving initial exploration followed by exploitation upon success, integrating the experimentation literature with dynamic corporate finance. The shape of the exploitation payoff frontier — not just its level — determines the optimal contract for experimentation and its duration. When the exploitation stage involves moral hazard and limited liability, the principal's continuation profit is inverted U-shaped in the agent's continuation utility. This weakens the principal’s rent-extraction motive and may induce more efficient experimentation, even when the exploitation payoff frontier is always lower. Applications to corporate governance and innovation subsidy design yield sharp policy prescriptions.

Arizona State University, Chung-Ang University, CUHK, Oxford University*, UT Austin, APAD (scheduled), CAFM, FMA, Econometric Society Australian Meeting, Organizational Economics Asian Conference, Financial Intermediation Research Society, Finance Theory Workshop in Hong Kong, FTG Meetings, SITE - Dynamic Games, Contracts and Market, Relational Contracting Workshop*, World Congress of Econometric Society

Works in Progress

Dynamic Security Design without Commitment (with Vladimir Asriyan, William Fuchs, and Victoria Vanasco)
Dynamic Crisis Management (with Bomi Ahn and Keeyoung Rhee)
Structural Estimation of Exponential Bandit Models (with Yuan Meng and Joonkyo Hong)

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