Research

I articulate a novel theory of the location of immanent universals, according to which universals have a unique exact location yet bear an intimate locational relationship to the objects which instantiate them.

I formalize Descartes' theories of surfaces into a rigorous mereotopology, and defend its philosophical plausibility and coherence. I also compare the resultant logic to popular extant mereotopologies, based on Bolzano and Brentano's philosophies.

I demonstrate that work on mereotopology often holds three axioms/definitions/assumptions which are jointly inconsistent, and sketch some possible responses to this problem.

I argue that extant typings of pluralities in our plural logics fail for various reasons, and regiment plural logic in a subtyping logic to overcome these issues.

I argue that supersubstantivalists ought to define material mereological relations in terms of locational ones. Surprisingly, I show that this move does not entail mereological harmony.

I offer a theory of Composition as Identity which captures the alleged ontological innocence of mereology. The view abides by Leibniz' Law, avoids collapsing the distinction between plurals and mereology, and does not violate Cantor's Theorem.

I show that extant formulations of the 'Parts Ground Wholes' thesis stand in tension with various models of (classical) mereology and principles in the logic of ground. I offer my own formulation of the principle in light of these issues.