The role of bidding agreements in the US radio frequency auctions (JOB MARKET PAPER)
In the US spectrum auctions which allocate radio frequency rights to the private sector, firms are allowed to form multilateral bidding agreements. These agreements explicitly allow bidders to discuss their strategies and bids. Using public auction- and firm-level data from the Federal Communications Commission, I empirically investigate whether the bidding agreement rule leads to differential auction outcomes for firms that are members of such agreements, versus other firms. I find that firms which are member of a bidding agreement, bid more aggressively and pay up to 43 % higher prices than firms who have no such agreements. Moreover, results of further empirical tests do not support the hypothesis that bidding agreements result in anti-competitive behavior. In contrast, I find suggestive evidence in favor of a resource pooling argument. Consequently, the regulator's rule of permitting bidding agreements appears to be justified on economic grounds, and should be reinstated in future frequency auctions. My result corroborates findings of earlier empirical studies on joint bidding, conducted in other types of auctions.
Tournament incentives and peer effects in marathons
Using a comprehensive dataset of marathon races, I study the role of monetary and non-monetary determinants of runners' race choice and their performance in a race. While the research question has been examined before, I add to the existing literature in two important ways: First, I control for possible selection bias arising from the fact that the pool of participants in a race is not a random sample from the population. This has not been previously done due to lack of proper data. Second, I admit the possibility that runners' outcomes are affected by peer effects, which I define here as the presence of competitors with similar ability. Peer effects are found to have a positive effect on both participation and performance, suggesting that runners favor competitions with more peers of similar ability, because it allows them to perform better in absolute terms.
The Road Not Taken: Contest Selection and the Effect of Expected Competition
The main focus of research on contests has been on within-contest mechanisms, under the assumption that the pool of participants is exogenously fixed. In this study, I empirically assess the determinants of contest selection when the pool of contestants is endogenous. Employing a rich panel of foot-racing data, I study how runners respond to incentives when choosing races. I pay particular attention to the role of expected competition in the contest. The results show convincing evidence on the deterrence effect of expected competition. This effect appears to be especially strong in races with lower prize money concentration. The established results that prize money has a positive effect, while prize concentration has a negative effect on contest choice, are confirmed. Additionally, higher-ability runners pay more attention to total prize money, while lower-ability runners respond stronger to prize concentration. The tradeoff between prize money and additional competition is estimated to be between $ 9516 and $ 9591 for each additional opponent that a runner has to face.
Drip pricing and sellers' strategies: Evidence from Airbnb
[details coming soon]