research
research
Job Market Paper
Excessive Content Moderation
R&R at the RAND Journal of Economics
NET Institute Working Paper
Unregulated online platforms often host extreme and socially undesirable content. As mainstream platforms tighten moderation, some users shift to unmoderated alternatives, leading to a leakage of extreme content. I develop a duopoly model in which an ad-funded mainstream platform competes with an unmoderated fringe. Heterogeneous users choose platforms and produce content reflecting their views. The mainstream platform trades off attracting fringe users with hosting safer content more valued by advertisers. With strong network effects, the unsafe-content-minimizing moderation is more lenient than the profit-maximizing one. Therefore, regulation mandating stricter moderation may backfire by increasing the overall level of unsafe content.
Presented at 2026 Simposio de la AEE*, 2026 Centre for Competition Policy Annual Conference, 2026 Network of Industrial Economists Symposium, 2025 TILEC - Economic Governance of Social Media, 2025 EARIE, U. Autónoma de Barcelona Microlab Workshop, 2025 Economics of Digitization Workshop, U. Pablo de Olavide seminar, EU Commision's JRC Workshop, 2024 Jornadas de Economía Industrial, 2024 Spanish Association of Law and Economics Meeting, 2024 ENTER (Brussels)
Working papers
Centrality as a Merger Defense
This paper studies horizontal mergers in a production network. I show that greater downstream centrality -- the extent to which other sectors rely, directly or indirectly, on a sector's output -- reduces the cost synergy required for a merger to be pro-competitive when final-demand elasticity exceeds the elasticity of substitution in production.
Presented at 2026 EARIE, 2026 Barcelona School of Economics Jamboree, 2025 Spanish Association of Law and Economics Meeting, 2025 Jornadas de Economía Industrial
NET Institute Working Paper (soon)
Piracy is central to digital markets, where identical content can be accessed legally or through unauthorized channels. While easier piracy seems likely to intensify competition and lower prices, it also reduces profitability and discourages entry. We develop a circular-city model with free entry in which consumers jointly choose content and access mode. Stronger enforcement raises prices for a fixed number of firms but also attracts competitors. Prices rise with enforcement in less competitive markets but can follow an inverted U in more competitive markets, where entry eventually pushes prices down. Extensions show that piracy can also weaken competition and raise prices by attracting consumers most willing to switch between legal providers.
Presented at 2026 Jornadas de Economía Industrial
Work in progress
Network Connection and Disconnection (with Sean Ennis)
Generative AI, Toxicity and Champions League (with Annalí Casanueva and Marina Rizzi)