I worked on a few projects as a master's student, mostly in the microeconomic theory of matching. These projects are now inactive.
Master's Projects
A Generalization of the TTC and Stability Comparisons in Priority-Based Matching
This paper studies the school choice problem with generalized capacities. It is known that no mechanism is strategy-proof and both efficient and stable. We consider the problem of maximizing stability within the class of efficient mechanisms and make critical progress. First, we generalize the canonical top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism to a setting where schools may have multiple slots and get a class called standard pointing procedures that are strategy-proof, efficient and nonbossy. Then we show that the TTC is not the most stable within this class and construct a `most stable' mechanism within this class, the upper-envelope standard pointing procedure. Finally, a characterization and some stability properties of the equitable top trading cycles mechanism are shown.
We study the house allocation problem with fractional endowments introduced in Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011), and we design an algorithm, the probabilistic serial top trading cycles (PSTTC) algorithm, which finds a fractional allocation that satisfies ordinal efficiency, ordinal individual rationality and weak equal endowment no envy. Our algorithm is tight, in the sense that introducing strategic concerns or no justified envy is incompatible with the existing properties. We also introduce the notion of an ordinal weak core and show that our mechanism always selects a matching that is in the ordinal weak core.
Inequality, Market Power and Pareto-Improving Transfers
We examine the potential for support of redistributive policies in the presence of market power and inequality. A profit-maximizing monopolist chooses quality and price to serve the rich and, possibly, the poor. The degree of inequality affects equilibrium quality, pricing, and access. Under conditions of moderate inequality, there exist Pareto-improving transfers that increase access, though they may reduce quality. An access-improving transfer from the rich to the poor creates a surplus for the rich and boosts monopoly profits. When the proportion of the poor is not too high, an access-improving transfer from the monopolist to the poor can also enhance both monopoly profits and the utility of the rich. However, such Pareto-improving transfers become infeasible—either the rich or the monopolist is disadvantaged by redistribution—when inequality is either too high or too low. By connecting strands of literature on inequality, industrial organization, and the transfer paradox, we contribute to a deeper understanding of effective and politically feasible redistribution.