I have worked on three main projects as a master's student, spanning microeconomic theory (in particular matching theory) and applied microeconomic theory (in particular at the intersection of development economics and industrial organization).
Matching Theory
A Generalization of the TTC and Stability Comparisons in Priority-Based Matching
This paper studies the school choice problem with generalized capacities. It is known that no mechanism is strategy-proof and both efficient and stable. We consider the problem of maximizing stability within the class of efficient mechanisms and make critical progress. First, we generalize the canonical top trading cycles (TTC) mechanism to a setting where schools may have multiple slots and get a class called standard pointing procedures that are strategy-proof, efficient and nonbossy. Then we show that the TTC is not the most stable within this class and construct a `most stable' mechanism within this class, the upper-envelope standard pointing procedure. Finally, a characterization and some stability properties of the equitable top trading cycles mechanism are shown.
We study the house allocation problem with fractional endowments introduced in Athanassoglou and Sethuraman (2011), and we design an algorithm, the probabilistic serial top trading cycles (PSTTC) algorithm, which finds a fractional allocation that satisfies ordinal efficiency, ordinal individual rationality and weak equal endowment no envy. Our algorithm is tight, in the sense that introducing strategic concerns or no justified envy is incompatible with the existing properties. We also introduce the notion of an ordinal weak core and show that our mechanism always selects a matching that is in the ordinal weak core.
Applied Microeconomic Theory
Inequality, Market Power and Pareto-Improving Transfers
We examine the potential for support of redistributive policies in the presence of market power and inequality. A profit-maximizing monopolist chooses quality and price to serve the rich and, possibly, the poor. The degree of inequality affects equilibrium quality, pricing, and access. Under conditions of moderate inequality, there exist Pareto-improving transfers that increase access, though they may reduce quality. An access-improving transfer from the rich to the poor creates a surplus for the rich and boosts monopoly profits. When the proportion of the poor is not too high, an access-improving transfer from the monopolist to the poor can also enhance both monopoly profits and the utility of the rich. However, such Pareto-improving transfers become infeasible—either the rich or the monopolist is disadvantaged by redistribution—when inequality is either too high or too low. By connecting strands of literature on inequality, industrial organization, and the transfer paradox, we contribute to a deeper understanding of effective and politically feasible redistribution.
Other Minor Work
Winner’s Curse: Do Bigger Victories for MLAs Worsen or Improve Development? (Empirical)
This paper studies the impact of the MLA’s (local state representative) margin of victory on the development of the constituency. There could be two different effects: one, lower margin of victory induces more development work since the MLA feels unsafe in her seat; on the other hand, a bigger margin of victory means a stable polity with an influential MLA which could lead to more development. The TCPD Data on Indian elections is combined with SHRUG DMSP nightlights data to analyze over 3000 elections in India from 1994 up to 2008 and its consequences on development. We find no significant effect in either direction, but with heavy temporal and regional heterogeneities.
Interoperable Goods with a Common Platform (Industrial Organization)
This paper studies the choice of firms between a common platform provided publicly at low cost (such as UPI, a public payment platform in India) and a costly proprietary platform. The key difference is that there is full network compatibility in the former but not in the latter, but customers can switch from the former to the latter due to increased customer satisfaction. I model this in a standard two-stage setup with a network game embedded, analyze the equilibria generated, do comparative static exercises and welfare-comparisons.