2023. "Oiling the War Machine? The Fuel Dilemma and Warfighting Capability" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 67(4). https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqad096
Oil is a double-edged sword in modern warfare for its usage enables greater firepower and mobility in combats while imposing tremendous operational and strategic burden to run and defend Wartime Fuel Network. The tension between the two generates a fuel dilemma, a consequential trade-off between fuel-powered capability and fuel sustainability. States facing the dilemma address it with three fuel management practices: minimalism, control, and gamble. I describe promises and pitfalls of each measure with three illustrative case studies—the Japanese “gamble” during WWII, Chinese “control” in the Korean War, and Vietnamese “minimalism” during the Vietnam War. The theory and evidence have important implications for future research on military logistics, warfighting capability, and the study of conventional warfare.
2022. "Shale Oil and the Future of Geopolitics" in Handbook on Oil and International Relations, ed. Roland Dannreuther and Wojciech Ostrowski. (Edward Elgar), 407-424. Link.
US shale oil has set new market realities since the mid-2010s. Its location meant a dilution of supply concentration away from the Persian Gulf, its added supply to the market a price fall, and its greater responsiveness to price changes a creation of medium-term price ceiling. This chapter explores how the new market realities may affect the direction and intensity of oil’s geopolitical consequences. To do so, I first organize a variety of issue areas subject to the shale boom according to two dimensions—state’s oil trade status (net importer vs net exporter) and the nature of their geopolitical behavior (competitive or cooperative). While shale oil is generally likely to loosen a long-held sense of anxiety of oil security, their impact on oil-importing states’ pursuit of energy security and oil exporters’ ability to exercise financial and political leverage are neither linear nor straightforward. Instead, one must take into other relevant contexts as well as interactive nature of geopolitics in accounting for how exactly states may choose to adapt to the new market and geopolitical settings.
2020. "Swinging Shale: Shale Oil, Global Oil Market, and the Geopolitics of oil" International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 64(3): 544-557. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa042
Is shale oil “revolutionizing” the global oil market and the geopolitics of oil? If so, how? While two aspects of the shale boom—a new source of supply and a cause for the price collapse in 2014–2015—dominate the conventional wisdom, I argue that the most revolutionary change is the least understood aspect of shale oil—shale oil producers’ rise as new swing suppliers due to its unique extraction technique and cost structure. Shale oil producers also differ from traditional swing producers in motives, contexts, and an amount of accessible excess capacity such that while shale oil lowers the medium-term price ceiling, it does not eliminate short-term price volatility. By examining the geopolitics of oil since the advent of shale oil, I analyze how such new market realities have or have not altered the US foreign policy on issues involving possible oil supply disruptions, Saudi Arabia's long-held special status in US grand strategy, rationale for US withdrawal from the Persian Gulf, and the foreign policy of China, the largest oil importer today, and Russia, a major petrostate.
Featured in The Monkey Cage (April 12, 2022), "What rising oil prices tell us about the oil market’s geopolitics" Link is here
2019. “A Crude Bargain: Great Powers, Oil States, and Petro-Alignment” Security Studies, Vol. 28(5): 833-869. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2019.1662478
Petro-alignment, a quid pro quo arrangement whereby great powers offer security in exchange for oil states’ friendly oil policies, is a widely used and yet undertheorized energy security strategy. One consequential aspect of this exchange is that great powers choose different levels of security commitment to keep oil producers friendly. With what criteria do great powers rank oil states? How do we conceptualize different types of petro-alignments? What exactly do great powers and oil producers exchange under each petro-alignment type? I posit that a mix of market power and geostrategic location determines the strategic value and vulnerability of individual client oil states, which then generates four corresponding types of petro-alignment—security guarantee, strategic alignment, strategic favor, and neglect. Two carefully selected case comparisons—Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1970–91, and Azerbaijan and Ecuador in 1990–2013—show how great powers created, utilized, and maintained petro-alignments under the unique logic of oil markets and across varying geopolitical settings. The findings have important implications on great powers’ grand strategies, strategic behaviors of oil states, and the role of oil in international security.
2016. “Gas on the Fire: Great Power Alliances and Petrostate Aggression” (with Jackson Woods), International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 17(3): 231-249. https://doi.org/10.1093/isp/ekv004
What causes petro-aggression? Conventional wisdom maintains that the regime type of petrostates has significant effects on the likelihood that petrostates will launch revisionist militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). While domestic politics is an important factor that might explain the motivation and behavioral patterns of a petrostate, it says little about the international environment in which a petrostate decides to initiate conflicts. One significant factor that presents opportunities and constraints for petro-aggression is a great power alliance. In essence, the great power has strong incentives not to upset the relationship with its client petrostate ally for both strategic and economic reasons and, hence, tends not to oppose military adventurism by its ally. Consequently, the petrostate’s anticipation of great power inaction or even protection for its revisionist policy creates a moral hazard problem. Overall, by offering favorable circumstances, a great power alliance has a positive effect on petro-aggression. Although not without caveats, our large-n model and case study bear out this conclusion.
2016. “Refining the Prize: Chinese Oil Refineries and its Energy Security” The Pacific Review, Vol. 29 (3): 361-386. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1022584
Since China became a net oil importer in 1993, oil refineries have played integral roles in China's quest for oil security. And yet, the capacity, security, and configurations of refineries were rarely featured in the discussions about China's oil policy. To fill this gap, this paper explains the basics of refinery economics and technology, and details the development in China's refining industry since the early 1990s. By taking refineries into consideration, it then revisits and reassesses the existing literature regarding the motives and drivers behind China's foreign oil policy, its effectiveness, and the political interactions between China and crude oil producers.
2025. "Arms Control under Nuclear Asymmetry." Survival, Vol. 67(3): 49-62. https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2025.2508081
Arms-control initiatives have historically been framed by the symmetry of the Cold War era, yet contemporary nuclear rivalries increasingly reflect nuclear asymmetry. Such asymmetry undermines structural arms control by imposing prohibitive costs and incentivising political resistance, while simultaneously heightening the necessity for behavioural measures to address elevated risks of escalation. A case study of Cold War naval arms control demonstrates this dynamic: while structural measures were infeasible, behavioural initiatives such as the Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972 proved effective under conditions of pronounced naval asymmetry. Insights from that experience provide crucial guidance for navigating the challenges of asymmetric nuclear rivalries today.
2023. "공포의 균형에서 신중함의 균형으로: 북미 간 핵 군비통제의 이론적 고찰." 「한국정치학회보」 57(2): 33-58. DOI : 10.18854/kpsr.2023.57.2.002
본 논문은 국제정치학 핵군비통제 이론과 북미관계의 특수성을 고려하여 최근 정책적 관심이 모아지고 있는 북미핵군비통제의 실효성과 실현 가능성을 분석한다. 이를 위해 우선 핵군비통제의 이론적 근거를 제시하고, 핵보유국 간 상호억지를 안정화시키기 위한 구조적 군비통제와 위기안정성을 제고하기 위한 운용적 군비통제로 구분하여 그 작동원리와 기대효과를 설명한다. 다음으로 이와 같은 두 가지 형태의 핵군비통제가 북미관계에 적용가능한지 분석한다. 먼저 구조적 군비통제의 경우, 북미 간 현저한 핵전력의 불균형 때문에 실효성 있는 설계가 어려울 것으로 보이며, 실현 가능성 또한 낮을 것으로 판단된다. 반면 운용적 군비통제는 북한과 미국 사이 정보의 불확실성을 줄이고 위기 발생 시 외교적 해결을 가능케 함으로써 핵전력의 불균형으로 발생하는 북미 간 위기 불안정성을 완화하는 데 실효성을 발휘할 것으로 보이며, 구조적 군비통제보다 실현 비용 또한 상대적으로 적을 것으로 판단된다. 본 연구는 이와 같은 분석을 통해 미국의 학자들과 정책결정자들을 중심으로 이루어지고 있는 핵군비통제 논의를 국내로 확장하고자 한다.
English Title: "From Balance of Terror to Balance of Prudence: A Theoretical Analysis for Nuclear Arms Control Between the U.S. and North Korea"
Abstract: The possibility of nuclear arms control with North Korea, which was previously deemed implausible and unacceptable, is gaining traction among analysts and policymakers. What is missing, however, is proper engagement with theories of nuclear arms control and studies about its relevance to asymmetric nuclear relationships. This paper seeks to fill this gap by first distinguishing between structural and operational arms control, elucidating their rationale, organizing principles, and expected outcomes. Second, because nuclear asymmetry defines and dominates the US-North Korea nuclear tension, structural nuclear arms control is practically impossible to design and politically too costly. On the other hand, nuclear asymmetry exacerbates crisis stability problem, and operational nuclear arms control can provide meaningful crisis management mechanisms with relatively acceptable cost.
2022. "Evolution of the U.S.-ROK Alliance, 1953-1978: A Historical Institutionalist Perspective," The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 34 (3): 339-361.
https://doi.org/10.22883/kjda.2022.34.3.001
What accounts for the pace, timing, and scope of the U.S.？ROK alliance’s evolution? Through the prism of historical institutionalism, I construct a novel explanation for how the alliance, in particular its rule on operational control, has been subject to the confluence of internally generated dynamics, exogenous junctures, and historical processes. First, I illustrate how three crises―a coup in 1961, ROK forces deployment to Vietnam in 1965, and North Korea’s provocations in 1968―were instrumental in exposing flaws and gaps, unanticipated in the original alliance design. Second, episodic analysis shows how each juncture temporarily loosened the structural constraints and allowed ROK to push for incremental revisions on U.S. vertical and unilateral exercise of operational control over ROK forces. Third, they collectively generated negative feedback, contributing to the establishment of more horizontal and institutionalized Combined Forces Command in 1978. The study highlights a client ally’s agency and historical institutionalism’s promise in understanding international security institutions.
2022. "Survival Politics: Regime Security and Alliance Design on the Korean Peninsula" (with Jackson Woods), Journal of Global Security Studies, Vol. 7 (2), https://doi.org/10.1093/jogss/ogac001
What determines states’ willingness to institutionalize alliances? Contrary to conventional emphasis on system-level conditions, we argue that states pay close attention to the domestic political consequences of institutionalizing alliances. This is particularly true for unequal allies. Client regimes are disproportionately sensitive to alliance design, as it affects patron allies’ ability to influence their military, distribute finance and arms, and legitimate preferred political groups. Two factors—power consolidation and political compatibility—determine whether the client views alliance institutionalization as complementary or conflictual with regime survival. The divergent alliance designs North and South Korea chose after the Korean War support our argument. An unresolved power consolidation process forced Kim Il-Sung to refuse formalizing the wartime alliance with the PRC, and Kim concluded a minimal treaty in 1961 after consolidating his power. In contrast, rapid consolidation left Rhee Syngman little to fear from continuing the highly institutionalized wartime alliance arrangement with the United States, which accepted his authority in the south. Our findings have important implications for alliance design, intra-alliance politics, and civil–military relations.
2019. “Sanctions for Nuclear Inhibition: Comparing Sanction Conditions between Iran and North Korea” (with Jung-Chul Lee). Asian Perspective, Vol. 43 (1): 95-122. https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0003
When do sanctions succeed in nuclear inhibition? Is there a generalizable framework to estimate sanction effectiveness against nuclear aspirants? Instead of relying on partial equilibrium analysis, we conceptualize sanctions as three sequential phases—imposition of economic pain, conversion to political pressure, and creation (or failure thereof) of zone of possible agreement (ZOPA). The effectiveness of each phase is subject to phase-specific contextual variables, an aggregation of which helps measure individual sanction's effectiveness, conduct cross-case comparison, and estimate one's replicability in other cases. To illustrate its analytical utility, we analyze the divergent sanction outcomes between Iran in 2012–2015 and North Korea in 2013–2017. Iran was economically more vulnerable and politically less resilient, and its bargaining position was closer to a ZOPA than North Korea was. Our analysis questions the utility of economic sanctions against North Korea and helps expand the discussion away from the policy obsession with the role of China. Theoretically, it rectifies an imbalance against qualitative and holistic approach in the sanction literature and contributes to discussions about nuclear inhibition strategies.
2019. “Deterrence under Nuclear Asymmetry: THAAD and the prospects for missile defense on the Korean Peninsula” (with Soul Park). Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 40 (2): 165-192. https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2018.1558750
The 2016 decision to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) to South Korea has generated multitude of intensely politicized issues and has proved highly controversial. This has made it challenging to alleviate, let alone clarify, points of analytical and policy tensions. We instead disaggregate and revisit two fundamental questions. One is whether THAAD could really defend South Korea from North Korean missiles. We challenge the conventional “qualified optimism” by giving analytical primacy to three countermeasures available to defeat THAAD–use of decoys, tumbling and spiral motion, and outnumbering. These countermeasures are relatively inexpensive to create but exceedingly difficult to offset. Second, we assess the optimal way to ensure South Korean national security against North Korean missiles. By examining the balance of capability and issues of credibility/commitment, we show that the U.S. extended deterrence by punishment remains plentiful and sufficiently credible even without enhancing the current defense capability.
2015. “Making Sense of North Korea: How to Response to Pyongyang’s Charm Offensive” (with Jung-Chul Lee), Foreign Affairs, January 21, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/142798/jung-chul-lee-and-inwook-kim/making-sense-of-north-korea