Abstract: Can the provision of minority rights effectively resolve conflicts? I investigate the consequences of collective rights granted to minority groups with a specific focus on the inter- and intra-ethnic reactions. I argue that privileges bestowed upon minorities without sufficient self- or state-enforcement mechanisms can trigger aggression from local majority elites who have economic interests in the ethnic territory. This, in turn, can lead to the militarization of both majority elites and minority communities striving to protect their tribal lands. The argument is tested on the conflict between indigenous Filipinos and mining interests in a mixed method approach. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I provide quantitative evidence that the introduction of indigenous autonomy intensified violent conflict in indigenous areas, particularly those with mining applications. Qualitative case studies in Mindanao further provide that the conflict escalation is exacerbated by the social schism in the indigenous groups caused by autonomy.

Abstract: We provide the first systematic analysis of electoral competitiveness in American ranked-choice voting (RCV) elections. First, we develop a novel dataset of the margin of victory in American RCV contests from 2004 to 2024 by integrating a state-of the- art optimization algorithm with over 38.9 million candidate rankings submitted by actual voters. Second, we propose a theoretical explanation for how the presence of an incumbent may shape electoral competitiveness under RCV. We show that incumbent held seats are, on average, less competitive and have fewer candidates than open races. Using regression discontinuity with non-ignorable sample selection, we also illustrate how incumbency may allow candidates to cultivate favorable rankings under RCV. Finally, we also show that incumbent-held seats are, on average, less likely to have second and higher rounds than open races, making voters’ lower preferences count less. These findings have broad implications for election reforms, the incumbency advantage, and electoral competition.

Abstract: We link opposition to globalization in advanced democracies to changes in the global institutional environment. For much of the 20th century, countries such as the U.S. provided a superior institutional environment, fostering economic exchange among firms enmeshed in domestic production networks. This institutional comparative advantage eroded with the global strengthening of property rights, creating a distinct source of discontent with globalization -- rooted in global institutional change and concentrated in institution-dependent production. We develop novel measures of the institution-dependence of production across industries and local economies within the U.S., and show that trade competition is more pronounced, 2016 vote shares for Donald J. Trump are higher, and attitudes toward trade are more negative in areas reliant on the production of these goods. By highlighting the role of domestic production networks, we suggest a link from global institutional dynamics to domestic politics and offer a novel explanation of globalization backlash.

Abstract: We link opposition to globalization in advanced democracies to changes in the global institutional environment. For much of the 20th century, countries such as the U.S. provided a superior institutional environment, fostering economic exchange among firms enmeshed in domestic production networks. This institutional comparative advantage eroded with the global strengthening of property rights, creating a distinct source of discontent with globalization -- rooted in global institutional change and concentrated in institution-dependent production. We develop novel measures of the institution-dependence of production across industries and local economies within the U.S., and show that trade competition is more pronounced, 2016 vote shares for Donald J. Trump are higher, and attitudes toward trade are more negative in areas reliant on the production of these goods. By highlighting the role of domestic production networks, we suggest a link from global institutional dynamics to domestic politics and offer a novel explanation of globalization backlash.

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Abstract: This paper analyzes a model in which an outcome equals a frontier function of inputs minus a nonnegative unobserved deviation. The inputs may be endogenous (statistically dependent on the deviation). If zero lies in the support of the deviation given the inputs—an assumption we term assignment at the frontier—then the frontier is identified by the supremum of the outcome given those inputs, obviating the need for instruments. We then consider estimation with random error that is mean-independent of the inputs. Motivated by the assignment at the frontier assumption, we regularize estimation by requiring the fitted distribution of the deviation to maintain a minimum probability mass in a neighborhood of zero. Finally, we derive a lower bound on mean deviation, using only variance and skewness, that is robust to scarcity of data near the frontier. We apply our methods to estimate a frontier production function and mean inefficiency.

Abstract: TBD