The Development Economics Seminar at Hiroshima University is organized by the International Economic Development Program. We meet on Tuesdays at 6pm.
Militarized Sanctuary: How Incomplete Protection of Indigenous Peoples Entangle Them into Armed Conflict
by Tatsuya Koyama (Emory University)
January 13th, 2026 at 4:30pm JST
Abstract: Can the provision of minority rights effectively resolve conflicts? I investigate the consequences of collective rights granted to minority groups with a specific focus on the inter- and intra-ethnic reactions. I argue that privileges bestowed upon minorities without sufficient self- or state-enforcement mechanisms can trigger aggression from local majority elites who have economic interests in the ethnic territory. This, in turn, can lead to the militarization of both majority elites and minority communities striving to protect their tribal lands. The argument is tested on the conflict between indigenous Filipinos and mining interests in a mixed method approach. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I provide quantitative evidence that the introduction of indigenous autonomy intensified violent conflict in indigenous areas, particularly those with mining applications. Qualitative case studies in Mindanao further provide that the conflict escalation is exacerbated by the social schism in the indigenous groups caused by autonomy.
How Incumbency Shapes Electoral Competitiveness in Ranked-Choice Voting
by Yuki Atsusaka (University of Houston)
February 20th, 2026 at 4:00pm JST
Abstract: We provide the first systematic analysis of electoral competitiveness in American ranked-choice voting (RCV) elections. First, we develop a novel dataset of the margin of victory in American RCV contests from 2004 to 2024 by integrating a state-of the- art optimization algorithm with over 38.9 million candidate rankings submitted by actual voters. Second, we propose a theoretical explanation for how the presence of an incumbent may shape electoral competitiveness under RCV. We show that incumbent held seats are, on average, less competitive and have fewer candidates than open races. Using regression discontinuity with non-ignorable sample selection, we also illustrate how incumbency may allow candidates to cultivate favorable rankings under RCV. Finally, we also show that incumbent-held seats are, on average, less likely to have second and higher rounds than open races, making voters’ lower preferences count less. These findings have broad implications for election reforms, the incumbency advantage, and electoral competition.
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