1.  Short-term unemployment fluctuations and voter turnout (2022)

(with Jaromír Kovářík and Luis Miller)

Although the link between unemployment and voter participation has extensively been studied, the underlying mechanisms are poorly understood. We theorize that the aggregate impact of unemployment depends on an interaction between contextual variables and two classic economic voting motivations, pocketbook and sociotropic. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the 2015 and 2016 general elections in Spain held six months apart, enabling to assess the clean impact of short-term economic shocks without confounding their impact with more deeply-rooted structural changes in the economy, society, and political attitudes. At the macro-level, unemployment mobilizes voters in high-unemployment regions but discourages them under low unemployment. However, individual (un)employment shocks–but not macroeconomic conditions–predict the change in participation in the labor force, suggesting pocketbook voting motives. In contrast, participation of pensioners, unexposed to individual labor shocks and with little stakes in labor markets, reacts to area-level unemployment fluctuations. Hence, the aggregate link between unemployment and turnout results from an interaction among diverse social processes.

2. Cognitive Styles and Cooperation: Intuition vs Impulsivity (2022)

The relationship between intuition and cooperation has been widely studied with mixed results. We argue that these may be due to two particular issues. First, the fact that some manipulations considered to promote intuition, consisting in self-control depletion, could lead to an impulsive, rather than intuitive, cognitive style. Second,  a mediation of gender in the effect of intuition. We hypothesize that impulsivity might decrease cooperation, whereas intuition might increase cooperation in females and decrease it in males. To test these hypotheses, we conduct a Public Good Game experiment under three conditions: Cognitive Load (CL) that should induce intuitive decisions, Ego Depletion (ED) that should induce impulsive decisions and a control treatment. We find that ED unambiguously increases free riding, confirming that impulsivity increases selfishness. The effect of CL is mediated by gender; CL increases free riding in males, whereas it makes females more cooperative.

1. Risk Comunication strategies for pest control decisions

(with Douadia Bougherara and Sophie Thoyer)

One of the most recent innovations in the field of agriculture is the development of Decision Support Tools (DSTs): a set of software applications designed to provide information to assist farmers and advisors in their decision-making processes. Among the functionalities introduced by these software tools is the provision of information on the risk of pests, which allows for improvements in pest control decisions. However, this information may be complex and difficult to interpret for end-users, especially those with low numeracy. In this project, we aim to address this issue by applying experimental methods to identify optimal risk communication strategies. By bridging the gap between complex data and user comprehension, our research seeks to enhance the effectiveness of DSTs in supporting decision-making within the agricultural sector. 

2.  Moral regulation in sequential decisions

(with Umberto Galmarini and Astrid Gamba)

We study whether individuals balance moral rights and wrongs across sequential decisions. To this end, we conduct a Dictator Game in which the receiver’s payoff is determined either by the dictator’s choice between a fair and a greedy allocation or by a random computer decision. After the game, dictators are informed of the receiver’s final outcome and whether this was a product of their own choice or the computer’s. We hypothesize that feeling responsible for a favorable or unfavorable outcome will alter dictators’ perceived moral state, leading to compensatory behavior in a subsequent stage where they can donate to a charity. Being responsible for the receiver’s outcome is expected to increase (decrease) the likelihood of donation among those who previously chose the greedy (fair) option, in line with Moral Cleansing (Moral Licensing).

3.  Belief-based upstream reciprocity

(with Umberto Galmarini and Astrid Gamba)

We study the behavior of receivers in a Dictator Game where they obtain either a high or a low payoff determined by the dictator’s choice or by a random computer draw. After receiving their payoff, receivers report their beliefs about whether the outcome was determined by a human or the computer, and then enter a second stage in which they can donate to charity. Drawing on the framework of upstream reciprocity, we predict that receivers who believe they obtained a high (low) payoff from a human will experience gratitude (resentment), which they will “pay forward” by making a higher (lower) donation.