I work on topics in political economy and applied microeconomics. I obtained my PhD in Economics from the University of Turin in May 2026.
I am a Visiting Assistant Professor at Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.
You can find my cv here.
Femicides, Media Coverage, and Community Responses to Violence Against Women
(joint work with Margot Belguise (Warwick))
Prevention of Violence Against Women (VAW) is often hindered by gender norms and underreporting. Because communities can either mobilize against VAW or reinforce prevailing norms, understanding how they respond when violence becomes publicly visible is crucial for strengthening anti-VAW policies. Exploiting the quasi-random timing of femicides across French cities, we investigate two key aspects of local response: (i) changes in local newspaper coverage of VAW and (ii) shifts in community mobilization and help-seeking behavior. We document that local newspapers expand their reporting of opinion pieces following a femicide, raising awareness about gender-based violence more broadly. VAW articles become more factual and policy-oriented, while more often include information on the alleged motives of perpetrators. Turning to the community reactions, we find that femicides boost local anti-VAW protests and increase reporting of rape and sexual harassment. These effects are similar across the political spectrum, and we find no evidence of backlash or polarization in the media or community response. These results are consistent with a salience effect and suggest the need to raise awareness to build broader support for policies aimed at tackling VAW.
Unpacking the Incumbency Effect: Electoral Advantage and Coalition Building in Government Formation (joint work with Manuel Bagues (Warwick) and Margot Belguise (Warwick))
In parliamentary democracies, electoral success alone does not determine government formation, parties must also succeed in post-election bargaining processes. Using data from European national elections (1945-2024) and Spanish municipal elections (1999-2023), we examine how incumbency affects both electoral performance and post-election bargaining. We find that incumbent parties enjoy an electoral advantage but face a disadvantage in government formation, being less likely to form governments than non-incumbents with similar vote shares. This bargaining penalty is particularly pronounced for long-term incumbents and parties lacking recent coalition experience. These findings suggest that proportional representation systems enable opposition parties to serve as an effective counterweight to incumbent power, creating de facto checks and balances against political entrenchment.
Think Globally, Act Locally: Environmental Degradation and Climate Activism
Social and political activism can influence government environmental policy adoption but it is not clear how communities react to local environmental threats. Increases in local environmental risk could push people to internalize the costs of environmental degradation and make them more willing to act on climate. Using granular data on open-air fires of industrial waste in Italy, I first document that, although fires do not increase short-term mortality, they are associated with greater self-reported concerns for the environment. However, at the local level, such concern does not translate into an increase in environmental protests. Instead, environmental degradation is associated with political consequences: local green parties are more likely to run for office in areas with more waste fires. Overall, this suggests that local environmental risk does not work as a signal to overcome the collective action problem associated with protest mobilization. It may be effective, instead, to spur political activism fueled by green parties.
Don't blame me! Politicians' accountability and electoral response when powers are shared, Economics & Politics. 2024 Nov;36(3):1180-222.
This paper examines if politicians react to events they cannot control to avoid political blame and if voters hold politicians accountable for functions beyond their office. I focus on the response of mayors and voters to a farmland tax implemented by the Italian central government. I investigate how the municipalities affected by the new policy adjust to it and study if the election odds of the incumbent mayor's party in towns subject to the tax are affected. Mayors increase spending in municipalities where the tax is implemented. Average spending grows by 1.38 euro (about a 1% increase) and it is financed by increased borrowing which expands by 0.64 euro per capita, on average. Voters do not seem to punish the local incumbent for a policy decided by the national government. Two factors may have contributed to offsetting the electoral impact. The first is greater spending in those municipalities where the incumbent is on the ballot. The second is a media account of the policy which was factual and not biased against the local incumbent. Overall, these findings suggest politicians react to policies that are fully out of their hands, potentially to avoid electoral punishment.