I. Introduction
Hylton, Chapter One
A. Economics of Antitrust: Hylton, Ch.1, Economics; The Role of Competition, 4-31
B. Purposes of Antitrust Statutes:
Hylton, Chapter Two
Sherman Act 885-886; Clayton Act (skim), 887-906; FTC Act (skim), 906-920; Enacting the Antitrust Laws, 31-43
*Optional background materials:
(1) Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 Antitrust Law Journal (2007) (empirical analysis of antitrust laws).
(2) Keith N. Hylton, Panel I: Professor Brodley’s General Contributions to Antitrust Scholarship: Introduction, 90 Boston University Law Review 1367 (2010) (history of antitrust scholarship).
(3) Keith N. Hylton, A Comment on Markovits’s Welfare Economics and Antitrust, 68 Antitrust Bulletin 603 (2023) (modern controversies in antitrust).
(4) David S. Evans and Keith N. Hylton, The Lawful Acquisition and Exercise of Monopoly Power and its Implications for the Objectives of Antitrust, 4 Competition Policy International (2008) (goals of antitrust law.)
C. Enforcement:
Hylton, Chapter Three
*Procedures for Enforcing the Antitrust Laws, 43-52 (skim, optional); Private Actions, 53-60 (skim, optional)
*Apple v. Pepper (optional, google); American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant (optional, google)
II. Cartels and Section 1
Hylton, Chapter Four
Brief lecture on cartel theory
A. Development of the Rule of Reason and the Per Se Illegality of Price-Fixing:
Hylton, Chapter 5
Trans-Missouri
Addyston Pipe & Steel
Joint Traffic
Standard Oil
Chicago Board of Trade
Trenton Potteries
Appalachian Coals
Socony-Vacuum Oil
B. Modern Applications:
Hylton, Chapter Six
Topco Associates, 117
Broadcast Music, 121
Maricopa County Medical Society, 132
National Society of Professional Engineers, 138
NCAA, 145
California Dental, 154
C. When Does an Agreement Exist?
Hylton, Chapter Seven
Eastern States, 181
Interstate Circuit, 181;
American Tobacco, 187;
Theater Enterprises, 185
Notes, 190-198; Matsushita, Hylton, 142-143;
In re Text Messaging (7th Cir. 2010), 198; same case, 782 F.3d 867 (7th Cir. 2015).
Copperweld, 202
Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 217
American Needle v. NFL, 211
*Optional reading:
Hylton, Oligopoly Pricing and Richard Posner, 18 Antitrust Source (2018)
D. Facilitating Practices:
Hylton, Chapter Eight
American Column & Lumber, 221;
Maple Flooring, 225
Container Corp., 229
Basing Point Pricing Economics (Hylton, 159-165)
Cement Institute, 240
du Pont (Ethyl), 245
E. Concerted Refusals to Deal:
Hylton, Chapter Nine
Eastern States, 251;
Cement Manufacturers, 251;
McCann, 252;
FOGA, 253;
Klor’s, 258;
American Medical, 259; Molinas, 260;
Associated Press, 261;
Northwest Wholesale Stationers, 266;
Indiana Federation of Dentists, 272;
Nynex, 277
III. Monopoly and Section 2
A. Monopolization:
Hylton, Chapter Ten
Standard Oil, 355;
American Tobacco, 356;
American Can, 357;
United States Steel, 357;
Alcoa, 358;
American Tobacco, 365;
Griffith, 373;
United Shoe Machinery, 375;
Grinnell, 382;
Microsoft, 388;
Remedies, 366-367, 406-407, 422-423 (Overview: Hylton, Ch. 10)
Keith N. Hylton, Remedies, Antitrust Law, and Microsoft: Comment on Shapiro, 75 Antitrust Law Journal (2009)
*Optional reading:
Hylton, “Book Review: Microsoft’s Antitrust Travails,”
Hylton, “Microsoft After Fifteen Years,” Competition Policy International, vol. 11(No.1), Spring/Autumn 2016.
Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Preserving Competition: Economic Analysis, Legal Standards and Microsoft, 8 George Mason Law Review 1 (1999)
Ronald A. Cass & Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 Southern California Law Review (2001).
Keith N. Hylton, The Law and Economics of Monopolization Standards, in Antitrust Law and Economics (2010).
The antitrust source: https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust-magazine-online/apr17_full_source.pdf
Vertical Integration: Otter Tail Power, 411; Berkey Photo 412; Aspen Skiing, 412; Trinko, 423; Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., 468; Hylton, Ch. 10, 202-206.
*Other optional reading:
Keith N. Hylton, Scalia and Antitrust, 30 Antitrust 60 (2016)
Keith N. Hylton, Gorsuch versus Scalia: How Will Antitrust Change? 16 Antitrust Source Issue 5 (April 2017)
Leveraging a Patent: General Electric, 317; FTC v. Actavis, 342
The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Leverage Debate: Hylton, Ch. 10, 206-212
*Optional reading: Keith N. Hylton, Unilateral Refusals to Deal and the Antitrust Modernization Commission Report, 53 Antitrust Bulletin 623 (2008).
Predatory Pricing: Barry Wright, 435; Matsushita (see Hylton, Ch. 10); Brooke Group, 443; AMR, 456; Weyerhaeuser, 462; Hylton, Ch. 10, 212-229
*Optional reading: Keith N. Hylton, Weyerhaeuser, Predatory Bidding, and Error Costs, 53 Antitrust Bulletin 51 (2008).
Bundled Discounts: LePage’s, 660; Cascade Health, 663
B. Monopoly Power:
Hylton, Chapter Eleven
Merger Guidelines, 492;
Alcoa, 502;
du Pont (Cellophane), 507;
Microsoft, 515
*Optional reading: Keith N. Hylton, Brown Shoe Versus the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 39 Review of Industrial Organization 95 (2011).
C. Attempt to Monopolize:
Hylton, Chapter Twelve
Swift, (Hylton, Ch. 12);
Lorain Journal, 527 (also, see discussion in Hylton);
Union Leader, Lessig (see Hylton);
Spectrum Sports, 530 (Overview: Hylton, Ch. 12)
IV. Vertical Restraints
A. Restricted Distribution:
Hylton, Chapter Thirteen
Resale Price Maintenance:
Dr. Miles, 538;
Albrecht, 542;
Khan (briefly), 554
Sole Outlets; Territorial and Customer Limitations
Hylton, Chapter Thirteen
Hylton, Sole Outlet (Exclusivity Agreement), 262-264; Schwinn, 542; Sylvania, 547 (lecture over)
Agency and Similar Relationships, 571-572; Hylton, 266-270
Refusal to Deal and Vertical Agreements
Hylton, Ch. 13 (discussing the following cases: Colgate, 573 of Areeda casebook;
Parke Davis, 575;
Monsanto, 576;
Business Electronics, 275-278 of Hylton text.
Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 560
Anti-steering
Ohio v. American Express, 667
B. Tying Arrangements:
Hylton, Chapter Fourteen
Early Cases, Hylton, 284-286; IBM, 599;
International Salt, 589;
Northern Pacific Railway, 591;
Loew’s, 660 (see Hylton, 292);
Jerrold Electronics, 600;
Fortner Enterprises, 607 (see Hylton, at 295);
Jefferson Parish, 610;
Eastman Kodak, 622;
Microsoft, 636;
Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 642 (Overview: Hylton, Ch. 14)
*Optional reading:
Keith N. Hylton & Michael Salinger, Tying Law and Policy: A Decision Theoretic Approach, 69 Antitrust Law Journal 469 (2001)
C. Exclusive Dealing:
Standard Oil (Standard Stations), 646;
Motion Picture Advertising Service, 652;
Tampa Electric, 653;
Barry Wright, 655; Hylton, Ch. 14, 303-307.
V. Mergers
Hylton, Chapter Fifteen
A. Introduction to Merger Law: Hylton, Ch. 15: Areeda text, 694-706
B. Horizontal Mergers:
Brown Shoe, 707;
Philadelphia National Bank, 712;
Continental Can, 720;
Von’s, 721;
General Dynamics, 722;
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 729;
FTC v. Staples, 743;
Butterworth, 758
Vertical Mergers:
Hylton, Chapter Sixteen
Early Development, 801; duPont (General Motors), 803; Brown Shoe, 804; Merger Guidelines, 811
C. Conglomerate Mergers
Procter & Gamble (Clorox), 824;
Subsequent decisions, see Hylton chapter
VI. Antitrust and the State
A. Noerr-Pennington Doctrine:
Hylton, Chapter Seventeen
Noerr Motor Freight, 280;
California Motor Transport, 285;
N.O.W., 305;
Indian Head, 299;
Trial Lawyers, 306;
City of Columbia, 292;
Columbia Pictures, 288
B. The State Action Doctrine and Related Concepts
Hylton, 371-377; Areeda text, 70-72;
Ticor (Hylton, Ch. 17)
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health System
North Dental Examiners v. FTC
Credit Suisse Securities v. Billing
VII. Comparative Antitrust Law
Keith N. Hylton, Antitrust Enforcement Regimes: Fundamental Differences, in 1 The Oxford Handbook of International Antitrust Economics (Roger D. Blair and D. Daniel Sokol, 2015)
Keith N. Hylton & Fei Deng, Antitrust Around the World: An Empirical Analysis of the Scope of Competition Laws and Their Effects, 74 Antitrust Law Journal (2007) (comparative antitrust analysis and empirical examination of antitrust laws).
Hylton, Antitrust World Reports (summarizing antitrust laws around the world)