Research Projects
Research Projects
When people are given a chance to avoid learning how their decisions harm others, many prefer to remain ignorant and act more selfishly. As many such decisions are made collectively, I study whether this avoidance persists in groups and how responsibility for search and information sharing affect it. In an experiment, participants choose among options that benefit themselves but impose a negative externality on a third party, first in an individual setting and then in a group setting. Information about the externality can be acquired at no cost. In groups, I vary whether one assigned group member or all group members are responsible for acquiring information and whether acquired information is shared. Information avoidance persists in groups. The assigned member neither acquires significantly less information nor votes more selfishly than in the individual setting, but remains ignorant more often than group members who share the search responsibility. As a result, groups relying on one group member are more often uninformed and implement more selfish options. When acquired information is shared, it also reaches group members who acquire little or no information themselves. They then vote less selfishly, and their groups implement less harmful options. How groups organize information acquisition can therefore limit the consequences of information avoidance.
joint with Henrik Orzen, Max Riegel, Wladislaw Mill
joint with Jindi Dai
joint with Jian Qu