Program

Session 1A: Mechanism Design
(chair: Jan Werner)

Marcin Pęski (U of Toronto), Informed principal and mechanism design with default continuation game

Steven Kivinen (U of Graz), The Fragility of Cooperation (with G. Ziegler)

Jan Werner (U of Minnesota), Mechanism Design for Environmental Protection: The Legacy of Leo Hurwicz

Session 1B: Market Selection, Prediction and Manipulation
(chair: Pablo Beker)

Han Ozsoylev (Ozyegin U), Hype-and-Dump Manipulation (with N. Eren)

Pietro Dindo (Ca' Foscari U of Venice), On the Long-Run Accuracy of Prediction Markets (with P. Beker)

Pablo Beker (U of Warwick), If You’re NOT So Smart, Why Are You Rich? (with J. Y. Chen)

Session 2A: AI and Information Design
(chair: Piotr Dworczak)

Artem Tsikiridis (U of Warsaw), To Trust or Not to Trust: Assignment Mechanisms with Predictions in the Private Graph Model (with R. Colini-Baldeschi, S. Klumper, G. Schäfer)

Michał Tulwin (EUI), Delegating to a Biased AI Agent

Piotr Dworczak (U of Cologne, Northwestern U, and GRAPE), Robust Trust

Session 2B: Equilibria In Games
(chair: Łukasz Balbus)

Sayantan Ghosal (U of Glasgow), The (In)Stability of Expectations Coordination (with G. Desgranges)

Michael Greinecker (ENS Paris-Saclay), Correlated Equilibria in Very Large Anonymous Games (with R. Nastorg)

Łukasz Balbus (U Zielonogórski), (Large) Recursive Global Games (with M. Greinecker, K. Reffett, L. Wozny)

Session 3A: Decision Theory
(chair: Xiangyu Qu)

Agustin Troccoli Moretti (U Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona School of Economics), Anxiety, Worry, and Dynamic Choice under Uncertain Threat (with F. Payro Chew)

Fernando Payro Chew (Autonomous U of Barcelona and Barcelona School of Economics), Modeling the Modeler (with E. Piermont)

Jean-Pierre Drugeon (CNRS- Paris School of Economics), Towards an Axiomatic Foundation for Recursive Utility under Taste Ambiguity

Xiangyu Qu (Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, CNRS), A Model of Mean Asymmetric Dispersion (with B. Dong-Xuan)

Session 3B: Macroeconomics
(chair: Anna Rubinchik)

Guilherme Carmona (U of Surrey), Knowledge Economies (with K. Laohakunakorn)

Kevin Reffett (Arizona State U), Macroprudential Policies with Multiple Equilibria in Open Economies with Collateral Constraints (with D. Pierri)

Rodrigo Raad (Federal University of Minas Gerais), An Explicit Lipschitz Recursive Equilibrium for a Multi-Sector Economy with Economy-Wide (with K. Reffett, Ł. Woźny)

Anna Rubinchik (U of Porto), Workers’ Productivity Enhancement in an Overlapping-Generations Model: Evaluating a Fully Anticipated General Equilibrium Response Using Portuguese Data (with T. Silva,  A. Gorokhovsky, A. Carneiro)

Session 4A: Incentives and Auctions
(chair: Frank Riedel)

Roberto Serrano (Brown University), Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Correspondences (with T. Kunimoto, R. Saran)

Wojciech Olszewski (Northwestern U), On evaluating contracts by their performance in the worst cases

Frank Riedel (Bielefeld U), First-price Sealed-bid Auctions with Smoothly Ambiguity-Averse Bidders (with T. Ma)

Session 4B: Applied Theory
(chair: Fryderyk Falniowski)

Gregory Dannay (EUI), Optimal Price Discrimination in a Competitive Markets

Danisz Okulicz (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Incentivizing Public Lawyers and Enhancing Fairness via Sorting in Adversarial Systems (with K. K. Aköz, E. Doğan, B. K.Shahdadi)

Fryderyk Falniowski (Krakow U of Economics), Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration (with C. Carissimo, S. Rahimi, H. H. Nax)

Session 5A: Comparative Statics and Single Crossing
(chair: Christopher Teh)

Tom Potoms (University of Antwerp), A Non-parametric Test of Single-Crossing Indifference Curve (with T. Demuynck, M. Rigaux) 

Christopher Teh (Toulouse School of Economics), Supermodular value function (with P. Dziewulski, J. Quah)

Session 5B: Coalition Games and Voting
(chair: Piotr Kępczyński)

Clemens Puppe (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology), Tukey Medians as Condorcet Winners, Ex-Ante: An Imprecise Bayesian Foundation (with K. Nehring)

Piotr Kępczyński (U of Warsaw), Sequential Elimination and Union Shapley Value for Group Assessment in Coalitional Games (with O. Skibski)

Session 6A: Preferences
(chair: Ali Khan)

Pawel Dziewulski, Endogenous preference formation in social interaction (with Ł. Woźny)

Michał Lewandowski (SGH Warsaw School of Economics), Dutch Books Without Additivity: A New Foundation for Coherence under Uncertainty (with Ł. Woźny)

Ali Khan  (Johns Hopkins U), On Continuity of Separately Convex Preferences and Correspondences

Session 6B: Allocation and Division
(chair: Mich Tvede)

Karol Flores-Szwagrzak (Copenhagen Business School), Technological Progress and Fair Compensation (with J. D. Moreno-Ternero, L. P. Østerdal)

Agustin Bonifacio (GATE Lyon–Saint-Etienne), Non-obvious manipulability in division problems with general preferences (with R.P. Arribillaga)

Mich Tvede (U of Sheffield), Envy-free pseudo-markets for indivisible goods (with A. Citanna)

Session 7A: Knowledge and Information
(chair: Mikós Pintér)

Karl Schlag (U of Vienna), A Non-Guessing Theory for How to Process Information

Sudipta Sarangi (Virginia Tech), Free Disposal with Costly Access (with H. Tzavellas, J. Park)

Miklós Pintér (Corvinus U of Budapest), Agreeing to Agree Without Common Priors and Common Knowledge (with Ziv Hellman)

Session 7B: Dynamic Optimization and Invariant Measures
(chair: Paweł Pasteczka

Anna Jaśkiewicz (Wroclaw U of Science and Technology), On the Bellman equation in recursive stochastic dynamic programming with the CES aggregator (with A. S. Nowak)

Jakub Bielawski (Krakow U of Economics), Natural Invariant Measures for Chaotic Game Dynamics: Finding Order in Chaos (with T. Chotibut, F. Falniowski, M. Misiurewicz, G. Piliouras)

Paweł Pasteczka (University of Rzeszow), On future allocations of scarce resources with concave utility functions (with J. Chudziak, M. Żołdak)

Session 8A: Networks
(chair: Arnold Polanski)

Hector Tzavellas (Virginia Tech), Network Beliefs and Behavior with Peer Effects (with P. K. Chaudhuri, M. O. Jackson, S. Sarangi)

Tomasz Wąs (U of Oxford), Proportional Selection in Networks (with G. Papasotiropoulos, O. Skibski, P. Skowron)

Arnold Polanski (U of East Anglia), Strategic Security in Networks of Alliances and Rivalries

Session 8B: Dynamic Equilibrium
(chair: Martin Jensen)

Xinyang Wang (ITAM), Equilibrium Stability and Uniqueness with a Large Number of Commodities and Patient Consumers

Michael Zierhut (Nagoya University), How Paradoxical is the Transfer Paradox in the Long Run

Martin Jensen (U of Nottingham), Strategic Avoidance and Dynamic Inconsistency